Some good news for Americans traveling by air: the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced this Tuesday that the TSA no longer requires travelers to take off their shoes as part of TSA's security checkpoint process. While it is a relief there is one less protocol to follow at U.S. airports, this instance gets at the inanity of TSA's security protocols.
TSA was created in 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks. The Aviation and Transportation and Security Act was passed in November 2001 nationalizing passenger screening in the name of national security. Prior to 9/11, airline passenger screening was the responsibility of the airlines. Since private companies had years of experience whereas the U.S. government had no experience in airline passenger screening prior to 9/11, it remains unclear why the TSA thought it would have a better chance of thwarting terrorists.
Consider TSA's "shoes off" policy as Exhibit A of the TSA's dysfunction. Shortly after 9/11, Richard Reid, also known as the Shoe Bomber, traveled from Paris to Miami. He unsuccessfully tried to ignite 50 grams of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PNET) that was concealed in his shoes. Reid is serving life in prison, but his attempt inspired the TSA to take on the "shoes off" travel policy. If this policy were so vital to national security, you would think that the TSA would have implemented it right away, right? Not so much.
As late as August 2006, the TSA was still advising travelers that they did not need to remove shoes before entering a metal detector. It would not have taken five years to implement the policy if it were that urgent, much like it would not have taken two decades to have implemented the REAL ID Act if it a national ID were meant to enhance national security. Second, the TSA has never in its existence caught anyone with a hidden bomb in their shoe, thereby questioning the logic of such a policy. If that were not enough, there are very few instances in which other countries have this airport policy. By and large, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Israel, India, United Kingdom, and Mexico do not have this protocol in place.
If it were simply a matter of one stupid policy, I would be merely calling for reform on a specific TSA policy. However, "shoes off" is an example of overall TSA incompetency chasing a problem that by and large does not exist. Let us start with that second part first. Last year, the Cato Institute conducted a risk analysis of foreign-born terrorism on U.S. soil looking at terrorist attacks from 1975 to 2023, including 9/11. The probability of a person being killed in terrorist attack on U.S. soil committed by a foreign-born individual is about 1 in 4.5 million. To put that in context, a U.S. citizen is almost 4 times more likely to get struck by lightning than in a terrorist attack.
I seriously question how safe the TSA keeps passengers. In 2013, I called for the elimination of the TSA because its screening capabilities were so shoddy. In 2015, ABC News was able to conduct an investigation of how the DHS carried out undercover tests to test TSA's competence. It turns out that 95 percent of mock explosives or banned weapons smuggled by DHS during these simulations went unnoticed by the TSA.
A 2019 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) on these TSA simulations shows that the TSA has a long way to go. Repeat incidents plus a lack of reporting showing considerable improvement indicate the TSA remains inept at its screening process. Data on TSA screening failure rates has been kept classified since 2017, so we cannot get a current figure on TSA's incompetence. This should not be a surprise: the "solution" to dealing with poor screening practices is to curtail transparency and sweep the problem under the rug.
To be fair, we need to ask whether the cost is justifiable. It is a fair question given that the U.S. government spent $9.1 billion on TSA in fiscal year 2024. In 2023, I discussed the value of a statistical life, which is a common practice in cost-benefit analysis to determine the amount one is willing to pay to reduce the probability of a death. Governments have a higher VSL than actuarial practices. Even if you go with the higher amounts, it could not exceed much beyond $12 million.
The most generous independent estimate is $15 million, which is already beyond standard CBA. However, that $15 million figure assumes 100 percent effectiveness rate. Assuming that the 95 percent failure rate still holds, the estimate is closer to $667 million per life saved. Once adjusted for inflation, that estimate puts the cost at $912 million per life saved. This is public policy speak to say that the TSA is so inefficient that the exceptionally high costs do not justify any purported benefits by any reasonable CBA.
On top of that, there are other useless TSA practices. As security professional Bruce Schneier points out, liquid bans are arbitrary and unproven, full-body scanners are invasive and ineffective; and the SPOT behavioral screening program lacks evidence of effectiveness. And do not get me started on the TSA not following the science by forcing airplane passengers to wear face masks during the COVID pandemic.
The TSA is talented at feeling up and patting down airline passengers, confiscating items that do not need to be confiscated, and creating a bunch of national security theater, but is efficient at little else. It's American government at its finest because a government monopoly is incapable of properly trading off costs and benefits. The TSA has been far more invasive and costly than terrorism itself. The TSA belongs in a list of U.S. federal government agencies that should be eliminated, including the Department of Education, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). If we care about airport security, fiscal discipline, and national security, the TSA should be abolished and privatized so airplane passengers can go through metal detectors without dealing with the excessive security theater.