The political and religious musings of a Right-leaning, libertarian, formerly Orthodox Jew who emphasizes rationalism, pragmatism, common sense, and free, open-minded thought.
About a month ago on February 28, the United States and Israel launched surprise attacks on Iran that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other military bigwigs. Since then, there have been military strikes from both sides. The fallout from this war and how it will end remains to be seen. We have already seen one of the predictable outcomes come to fruition.
There is about 20 percent of the world's petroleum and liquified natural gas that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Because of the Strait being all but closed, oil barrels have already increased from $73 a barrel at the eve of the war to around $113 a barrel. What is interesting here is not merely the magnitude of the spike, but its timing. The market did not wait for a sustained disruption in supply. They moved almost immediately after the war started.
And because energy is a universal input into the economy, the price movement does not stay confined to the oil market. It feeds directly into transportation costs, manufacturing inputs, agricultural production, and electricity-intensive sectors like artificial intelligence and data infrastructure.
But this is more than the immediate shock of the military escalation. It is uncertainty about the future. A study from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas finds that even when the increase in the probability of a worst-case scenario rises, the prices start to rise and the output starts to drop. As the conflict progresses, the probability does not disappear; it intensifies.
The risk becomes more realized with higher insurance costs, higher shipping costs, and increased precautionary behavior. The risk premium driven by expectations blends into a price increase driven by reality. As this other study from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas calculates, the longer the conflict persists, the more permanent those price hikes remain and the bigger the impact on the GDP (see below).
The costs go beyond the energy market. As of March 23, there has been nearly $29 billion spent on this war. The Cato Institute points out that this undefined war has no clear exit strategy, which makes it more like the war in Afghanistan. Then there's the fact that when geopolitical risk rises, companies do not invest; they wait. Research from the Federal Reserve shows that heightened uncertainty about wars and conflicts causes business to delay capital spending and hiring, which leads to a sizable drop in investment.
Taken together, the economic consequences of war extend beyond headline figures. Higher gasoline prices are the most visible cost, but it one of many costs in a long chain of government expenditures, business decisions, and long-term economic growth. As uncertainty rises, investment falls along with economic growth.
In that sense, war operates like a hidden tax that shows up in the form of higher prices, larger deficits, and a slower-growing economy. It's amazing because it's a tax that no one in the U.S. voted for, that no one in the U.S. can escape, and will get explained away afterwards as if nothing happened.
This has been quite a busy week for me personally. I wanted to make sure that I got in two entries in this week, so I want to give a grab bag of some of the ongoings within the wonderful world of public policy. I hope to return to providing more in-depth analyses next week.
Interest on U.S. Debt. Earlier this week, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its Budget and Economic Outlook for the next ten years. This report has some eye-popping findings, such as the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to hit over 120 percent in the next decade. For context, all that wartime spending for World War II only got the debt-to-GDP ratio to 106 percent. This is not the sort of record that the U.S. should want to break. Because of that profligate spending, the U.S. is paying off more interest on debt than ever. According to this report (p. 82), the U.S. government is projected to spend a whopping $16.2 trillion (yes, that is trillion with a "t") on interest between 2027 and and 2036.
Who pays for Trump's tariffs? Trump and Vance were under the belief that other countries were going to pay for Trump's tariffs, that Trump's tariffs are without cost or consequence. It turns out that is false. When I reported on this topic about three weeks ago, I covered a report by the Kiel Institute that says that the U.S. as the importing country pays 96 percent of the costs of the tariffs. What was not clear from this Kiel Institute report is whether the businesses paid or if it was the consumers.
This is where the Budget and Economic Outlook comes into play. According to the CBO (p. 30), 95 percent of the tariffs were paid by raising consumer prices on U.S. consumers. This means that businesses have by and large passed on the costs to the everyday American. This lines up with a recent Tax Foundation estimate that Trump's tariffs are a tax of $1,000 in 2025 and $1,300 in 2026 for the average household.
National Guard. In response to the rampant crime in Washington, DC, President Trump deployed troops to reduce crime in DC. Irrespective of the debate about whether this is effective, we now know how much this cost. The CBO recently released a report on how much all Trump's deployment of the National Guard to all cities cost, which was $496 million from August to December 2025. For DC alone, that was an amount of $223 million. Regardless of what you have to say about the crime rates, there has to be a more cost-friendly route to bring crime down without having to resort to using the National Guard. Perhaps another conversation for another time.
A little over a week ago, the Trump administration sent shockwaves throughout the world with the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia. The Maduros are facing charges of narco-terrorism and drug trafficking. I could question Trump's rationale for it. After all, there are multiple countries that have had unfair elections, leaders tied to drug trafficking, and/or could be construed as a threat to U.S. national security. On the flip side, I could bring up how using military force abroad without a formal declaration of war is anything but unique to Trump and actually dates back to Thomas Jefferson. Today I do not want to get into whether this capture was legal or if Trump did it for the oil. The question I hope to answer is whether this is a rare example of limited and liberty-advancing force or if this move is something that should have us worried.
Years of Socialist Tyranny
One thing I noticed is that Venezuelans across the world were cheering the capture, including Buenos Aires, Lima, Madrid, and Miami. Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, turned one of the richest countries in Latin America into a bona fide basket case. About half of Venezuelans live in poverty due to the hyperinflation. The corruption is so bad that it is ranked by Transparency International as the 3rd most corrupt country on the planet. Let's say the vast majority of Venezuelans were not feeling the warmth of collectivism. The repression under Maduro got so dire that it created about 8 million Venezuelan refugees. Maduro was an oppressive tyrant and an hijo de puta that caused human suffering. His removal is reason for Venezuelans worldwide to celebrate.
Historical Precedent for Limited Military Intervention
While this seems like a victory for liberty, the broader implications of this capture need to be taken into account. As I brought up in the intro, this is hardly the first time this has happened where a president took a limited, targeted military or covert action without congressional approval. Truman did it with the Korean War, Kennedy with the Cuban missile crisis, Reagan with Grenada, Bush Sr. with Panama, Obama with Libya, and Trump last year with Iran.
I would also point out that, as anti-war as I am generally, not all uses of war are morally equivalent in terms of magnitude. A targeted intervention that seeks to end suffering and restore human rights could be justified, but it would have to be limited and proportional. If Trump's attack on Venezuela is a one-off and truly surgical, one could argue that this a military equivalent of limited government that could help avoid a much larger military intervention.
Potential for Mission Creep
Putting aside the grey area with congressional authority or the War Powers Resolution, I have to question what will happen next in Venezuela. The interim leader of Venezuela is Delcy Rodríguez, who was Maduro's Vice President. If the military and security infrastructures stay intact, this will be a pyrrhic victory in which the old regime under slightly different management remains, which does nothing good for Venezuela in the grand scheme of things.
Alternatively, Trump said to reporters last Wednesday that the U.S. could end up running Venezuela for years, which has the potential to be an imperial overreach that undermines democracy and international law. Mission creep in this case could result in the U.S. becoming responsible for managing Venezuela's political transition, economic recovery, or security. If that is the case, it risks the United States repeating the mistakes of Vietnam or of Afghanistan, especially if militias or pro-Maduro factions resist.
The U.S.' Track Record on Regime Change in Latin America
It is not as though the United States has the best history on regime change in Latin America. In 1954, the CIA overthrew the democratically elected Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, which ushered in a dictatorship and a civil war. The CIA toppled Salvador Allende in Chile and ended up with the dictator Augusto Pinochet. The U.S. supporting the Contra rebels in their fight against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua led to civil war. And let's not forget the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, which almost started World War III. Given the U.S.' unfortunate history with meddling in Latin America, removing Maduro could be another quagmire that makes the situation worse for years to come.
Upsetting International Order
The capture of Maduro raises profound questions about the international legal order and respect for sovereignty. Under the UN Charter, the use of force is prohibited, except in cases of self-defense. This norm exists to promote diplomatic conflict resolution, maintain peace, and preserve state sovereignty. By unilaterally removing a foreign leader, it creates a disturbing precedent in which a state could justify intervention in another country's affairs under the guise of law enforcement.
Nations like Russia or China could follow suit, turn international affairs into a free-for-all, and have military force become the go-to for settling disputes instead of diplomacy or international law. I am not here to say international law is perfect. I was questioning the efficacy of international law last week. Even in spite of imperfect international norms, breaking them without a better framework makes the world less predictable and stable. It would be a return to imperialist norms in which powerful nations felt entitled to intervene in weaker states without impunity.
Wrestling with Venezuela's Regime Change
Capturing Maduro and ousting him from his rule in Venezuela is an important milestone. Liberty may have gained a symbolic victory in Venezuela, but the next step is about who governs Venezuela, how Venezuela is governed, and whether the lives of Venezuelans are improved as a result. Without a credible, internally driven transition, Venezuela risks continued instability under different management. Whether Venezuela emerges freer, stabler, and self-deeming remains the real test and is far from finished.
About two weeks ago on June 13, Israel initiated a surprise attack on Iran known as Operation Rising Lion targeting top military officers and scientists, much like it did when Israel targeted Hezbollah operatives in September 2024. Iran fired missiles on Israel and there have been airstrikes since. These past few days have been an escalation of the animosity that has existed between Israel and Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Iran has financially backed Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis. Then there was the Iranian attacks on the Israeli embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina, the latter of which was the largest terrorist attack in Argentinean history. On top of the proxy conflicts and historical tension, Iran has called for Israel's destruction multiple times over the past few decades.
Israel attacked Iran on June 13 because Israel reportedly wanted to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon that would annihilate Israel. This would make sense because the UN nuclear watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submitted a report a day before Operation Rising Lion showing that Iran was in breach of its non-proliferation obligations. President Trump initially said that he will help Israel "if needed." And help he did.
On June 22, the United States military carried out Operation Midnight Hammer to attack three nuclear facilities: Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. The White House is claiming that Iranian nuclear capabilities have been obliterated. Although Trump announced a ceasefire the following day, it is neither clear whether there will be further attacks from Israel or Iran, nor is it clear whether Iran's nuclear capabilities are decimated. As of now, the ceasefire is holding, but it is too soon to tell. Similar to what I pondered three years ago with Ukraine, the question I ask now is whether the United States should have militarily gotten involved in Iran.
The answer depends in part on how much damage was done to Iran's nuclear facilities. Damage assessments are still preliminary. An initial assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said that it was only delayed by a few months. On the other hand, the CIA released a statement saying that it would take years for Iran to rebuild. If Iran's nuclear capabilities remain largely intact, it could risk greater regional tension and drag the United States in yet another war in the Middle East. If their capabilities truly were hindered, then this limited military intervention could have prevented World War III.
Whether the United States should have carried out Operation Midnight Hammer also depends on how the United States, Israel, and Iran will respond. If the United States gets further involved in terms of actual fighting, then it makes Trump look bad since Trump promised in his last presidential campaign that he would not start any new wars. To reiterate, Israel views Iran as an existential threat. While the IDF preliminarily finds that Iran's capabilities have been set back for years, Israel might escalate if it perceives that Iran has not been adequately incapacitated.
As for Iran, the Iranian government has already passed legislation to prohibit the IAEA from entering Iran. Iran does not have the capability to attack the United States directly. Iran tends to avoid conventional conflict and instead advances its regional operations through propaganda and proxy operations. As such, Tehran could attack the Strait of Hormuz, which could send oil prices soaring. Tehran could also attack U.S. military installations in the Middle East, much like Iran attempted on June 23 with Operation Glad Tidings of Victory when it unsuccessfully sent missiles to the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Domestically, I understand that Iran is militarily weakened and economically pummeled. At the same time, that desperation could encourage the Ayatollah to tighten the screws on its citizens.
This is a roundabout way of saying that this conflict is very much developing and much is up in the air. Even if Iran has been hobbled, Iran remains a threat. I do not want another war in the Middle East, much like most Americans. Cato Institute calculated that if the war with Iran created displacement at the same rate as Syria, that would mean 23.4 million civilians, which would increase the worldwide refugee population by 76 percent. It would be a tragedy indeed. Ultimately, I hope that further conflict and bloodshed is avoided in the Middle East. Whether that ends up being the case is something that only time will tell.
Trump has been in office for less than a month and he is already shaking things up. In the cases of immigration and international trade policy, it has not been for the better. Those topics notwithstanding, how he is approaching foreign policy is noteworthy. As the American Enterprise Institute brought up, Trump is not contending with a single school of thought when it comes to foreign policy, but five. He has floated acquiring a number of pieces of land, including purchasing Greenland.
Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu met with President Donald Trump for a press conference. You would think that Trump would want to discuss the ceasefire or U.S. policy with Iran. Instead, Trump decided to throw in a curveball: the possible U.S. annexation of Gaza. His thought is that by taking over the Gaza Strip, the U.S. can dismantle the bombs, missiles, and network of tunnels; rebuild Gaza; and create economic development that will convert Gaza into the "Riviera of the Middle East."
From someone who really likes Israel, I like the prospect of removing a legitimate threat to Israel and turning Gaza into a developed and peaceful part of the world. It has some parallels to how the United States dealt with Nazi Germany post-World War II by re-educating the citizenry while implementing the Marshall Plan. Instead of starting World War III, Germany ended up being a democratic nation-state with a growing economy. I have documented how anti-Semitism is a prominent feature of Palestinian society and not simply a bug or an abnormality (see here and here). Another Palestinian survey finding to throw into the mix is that in response to the October 7 attacks, 98 percent of Palestinians were more proud to be Palestinian (Arab World for Research and Development).
Quite frankly, I am sick of seeing these wars in the Middle East. It is exhausting to see the numerous times that Palestine (and in pre-1967 terms, other Arab polities) have refused to accept a peace deal with Israel because they don't want a two-state solution, but all the land....from the river to the sea. Back in 2012, I brought up that unless the Palestinians want peace with its Israeli neighbors, there will be a perpetual stalemate. Not only does war come with death tolls, it is a subpar usage of one's resources. Getting along and working together is a much better use of time, resources, and effort than warfare. Trump realizes that the situation in Gaza is untenable and that something needs to change. As out-of-the-box as this idea is, this shift in paradigm and actual foreign policy might work for the Middle East in the long-run. That being said, I have to wonder if this is a good idea.
Back in 2022, I made an argument that the United States should not militarily intervene in Ukraine. I am taking a similar approach to Gaza. Yes, Israel has been an essential part of the United States' Middle East policy since Israel became a nation-state in 1948. In 2013, then-Vice-President Joe Biden argued that support of Israel was both a moral and strategic commitment.
Where I hesitate in part is based on how the surrounding Arab nations will react. Will they be supportive of Trump's plan? Will a U.S. military presence in Gaza escalate the situation into a regional war or undermine the Abraham Accords that were a success from Trump's first term? It is a gamble because a U.S. military presence can either stabilize the region or it can make matters worse. The military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples of the doubt I am expressing.
Then there is the price tag to consider. Both a senior economist at the think-tank RAND Corporation and a program chief at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimate that rebuilding Gaza will cost $80 billion. This would be a low-bound cost estimate of Trump's plan because that is the cost for merely rebuilding Gaza. This does not include the cost of military intervention. As I have brought up on this blog numerous times, the United States is dealing with trillions in debt, a debt that is only projected to climb. Does the United States really need to get involved in geopolitics on the other side of the globe when it cannot manage its own finances? Conversely, the cost paid for this plan now could be a lot smaller than future costs if conflict continues or escalates in that region. Also, if this plan could result in actual peace in the region, the peace, stability, and increased economic transactions could offset the plan's costs in the long-run.
Regardless, I do not only refer to that cost in terms of dollars and cents. If the U.S. military enters Gaza, do you think Hamas is simply going to lay down its arms and surrender? The Palestinian cause is about wiping out Israel to create a unified Palestinian state. Hamas spent so much on a military infrastructure and building tunnels instead of economic development and peaceful trade with its Israeli neighbors. Since the Arab world is an honor-based society (شرف), Gazans are going to be even more reluctant to lose face when they have spent so much time and resources trying to wipe out Israel. More blood will be spilt if Trump goes ahead with this plan, whether that is that of Israelis, Gazans, or American soldiers. Will Trump be able to maintain the political support for annexing Gaza as U.S. soldiers are dying, especially since he promised no new wars during his second term? A poll from YouGov conducted last week shows that 22 percent of Americans support the plan, if that gives you a sense of political feasibility.
There is also the matter of where two million Gazans would relocate. Arab nations already expressed their opposition to this plan because they do not intend on absorbing Palestinian refugees. As the Brookings Institution mentions, that opposition makes sense since a) they do not want to have to pay to support more refugees, and b) the Palestinian national cause has been a central cause of Arab polities for decades, "often to the cynical benefit of their rulers." Jordan is especially going to be opposed because it could open up a Pandora's box for letting Palestinians in and threaten regime stability.
On the other hand, nations were able to absorb refugees from the Syrian Civil War, including Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan. Unless there is some other underlying reason, there should be no reason why Arab nations cannot help out their Arab brothers and sisters in a time of need. On the third hand, this has the potential to undo Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan if there is pressure from Trump to relocate the refugees to either Egypt or Jordan.
I do not have a crystal ball, so I do not know the answers for some of the questions I am asking because I do not have clairvoyance and foresight can only get you so far. The wars that have been fought simply because Muslim Arab neighbors have had difficulty handling the reality that there is a Jewish state in their midst is unfathomable. Something drastic needs to be done to end the cycle of violence in that region of the world to usher in an era of peace. At the same time, I am not 100 percent convinced that turning Gaza into another of Trump's real estate projects is the way to handle to the Middle East conflict. It will be interesting to see how this proposal develops in the upcoming weeks.
Much like Switzerland, Sweden developed a reputation for neutrality that dated back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Sweden was able to maintain its neutrality through the gruesomeness of both World Wars and the Cold War. It looks like its tradition of neutrality is coming to an end. The war between Russia and Ukraine has Sweden rattled enough that Sweden, along with its neighbor Finland, has petitioned to join the military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A couple weeks ago on June 28, Turkey lifted its veto to the Nordic nations' bids to NATO, which led to a memorandum being signed between Turkey and the Nordic nations of Sweden and Finland.
Before filing its petition on May 18, Sweden and Finland have been security partners to NATO. In 1994, they joined NATO's Partnership for Peace. They also contributed personnel to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. In 2014, Sweden and Finland were designated as Enhanced Opportunity Partners. This is about as close as one can be to NATO without actually being in NATO.
Bringing in Finland would expand NATO's border with Russia by an extra 800 miles. The ascension of these two countries would expand NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Circle. Sweden and Finland have military assets to contribute, as we see below. Given that Sweden and Finland are already part of the European Union, it seems to make sense to have these two nations make their security commitments align with the West, as well. Both countries ascending at the same time could lower risk in comparison to submitting bids separately. As intuitive as it might seem, is it really the right choice?
1. In spite of the war in Ukraine, the geopolitical dynamic between Russia and the Nordic nations has not fundamentally changed. Russia has made no threat against Finland or Sweden. There are no major disputes between the countries. Ukraine notwithstanding, post-Soviet conflicts that Russia was involved in entailed at least some form of a casus belli. Neither Sweden nor Finland have had a major military dispute with Russia since the Continuation War of 1941-1944 (also known as the Second Soviet-Finnish War). Plus, Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine and has been losing forces without near-term replacements. Factor in Russia's military engagements with the economic sanctions and one can see that given current geopolitics, the likelihood of war between Russia and the Nordic states is quite low.
2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine does not warrant NATO protection. You would think Russia would have been granted a swift victory, especially given its troop size and military might. As of July 3, Russia has only managed to invade the eastern portion of Ukraine (see below). If anything, Russia's lack of progress in the Russo-Ukrainian War signals that the Russian military has been dealing with its own deficiencies, ranging from intelligence, personnel, and training to corruption and low troop morale. Russia does not have the geopolitical clout, the land, or military might that it once had in the Soviet era. Russia's subpar performance combined with the economic sanctions that will most likely weaken Russia in the medium-term and the cost Russia is paying for the Russo-Ukrainian War should put Swedish and Finnish minds at ease.
3. Sweden and Finland joining NATO could create more geopolitical problems in the medium-term. Right now, Moscow does not hold any grudges against Stockholm or Helsinki. However, it is possible that the Russo-Ukrainian War does not go well. Russia could set its sight on Finland prior to Finland's ascension to NATO. Why? Not only to gain domestic support of the Putin regime, but also as a preventative measure to make sure it does not join NATO.
Another factor to consider is that post-Soviet Russia has instigated wars over three instances of potential NATO expansion: Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022). If Finland joins NATO, it would more than double the land border between Russia and NATO alliance members. Such a move would serve to give fodder to Putin's theory that the Western powers are closing in on him. Russia's ambassador to Finland, Pavel Kuznetsov, already said that Moscow would respond with retaliatory countermeasures in the event that Finland joins NATO. Deputy Chairman of Russia Security Council Dmitry Medvedev similarly said that Finland joining NATO would double the land border of the NATO alliance with Russia, which would mean refortifying Russia's borders.
Why give Putin a pretext for escalation and reinforce Moscow's security fears when the status quo has brought stability in the Baltic region for more than half a century? If Moscow were to act similarly in Latin America, or Mexico more specifically, it would be reasonable to assume that the United States would respond in an escalatory fashion. Sweden and Finland should not be allowed entry to NATO for the same reason that Ukraine was not allowed: for fear of escalation with Russia, nuclear or otherwise.
Bringing Sweden and Finland into the fold of NATO adds two more triggers to Article 5 of NATO, which is the Article that stipulates the collective defense of the alliance. It is true that Sweden and Finland would receive protection under Article 5 if they become members of NATO. It is a double-edged sword because they could also become potential targets, provided that Russia and NATO perceive one another in adversarial terms. Swedish and Finnish military capabilities would become part of the calculus of Russian targeting and strike prioritization in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO. Conversely, if Russia attacked Poland or another Baltic country, Sweden and Finland would be obligated by Article 5 to help out in a conflict that does not directly affect their national security.
4. There is doubt as to whether Sweden and Finland could contribute to collective defense. This is not to say that Sweden or Finland do not have military capabilities because they do. The Swedish island of Gotland could help NATO secure the Baltic region. Finland's military has 23,000 active military personnel and an extra 238,000 reservists it could muster up within a month. Finland's main weakness in its military is its lack of missile defense. Sweden's major source of national defense is its navy. While these countries have capabilities to defend their own borders, I have to wonder whether these resources would be adequate to "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (per Article 10 of NATO) and help NATO beyond the context of their own borders.
Historically, the modern states of Sweden and Finland have been much more focused on defending their own borders than collective defense. What's more is that the two nations have not spent much of their respective GDPs on military expenditures (see World Bank data below). According to World Bank data, neither Sweden nor Finland meet the NATO criterion of spending at least 2 percent of GDP on military expenditures, although increased spending suggests they could reach that minimum.
Also, Sweden had to reinstate its conscription in 2017, which could signal a weakness in its military readiness. Since Finland shares a border with Russia, its military has prepared its reservists have greater readiness. As another point to consider, Sweden and Finland are cozier with China than the U.S. government cares for, which would make it more difficult for Sweden or Finland to contribute anything significant to collective security policy as it pertains to eastern Asia. Overall, these factors suggest thatSweden and Finland would not provide much beyond territorial defense of their respective countries to the NATO alliance.
5. Even if Russia were to attack, it would notmean that Finland or Sweden would be hung out to dry without NATO membership. As we have seen with Ukraine, the Western powers are willing to give arms and resources in the event of war, even without NATO membership. Also, Sweden and Finland are part of the European Union. The European Union provides mutual defense under the Treaty of Lisbon. Sweden and Finland can receive military aid without having to join NATO. Refusing entry to NATO would not be leaving Sweden and Finland in the lurch, but rather maintaining a status quo that has been working for decades.
6. Defending Sweden and Finland would not be so easy. Neither Sweden nor Finland have a direct land route from continental Europe. Everything coming from NATO allies would need to be deployed by airlift. Russia's war with Ukraine has illustrated that Russia has the ability to neutralize air deployments. Sweden and Finland would be in range of Russia's ground missile, anti-ship, and surface-to-air systems. Furthermore, the Russo-Finnish border could be a challenge to defend given the terrain. While Finland could be a great launching site for attacks, the double-edged nature of this geographical relation means that it is vulnerable to Russian attacks. This is not to say that the task of defending the Nordic nations is impossible, but it would require considerable resources and coordination to make it work for NATO. The actual cost might be higher than the projected cost (see Point #8).
7. The larger the alliance, the more territory that NATO would have to defend in the event of a war. If the member countries proportionately contributed, that would be one thing. The issue is that the United States does the heavy lifting. The United States is de facto the primary source for providing security guarantees for 29 nations. Given NATO's history, it is reasonable to assume that the United States will be on the hook for Sweden's and Finland's security commitments, much like it has with other NATO allies. It is dubious that the Nordic nations would share the burdens of the military costs. Sweden has not even been admitted to NATO and it has already asked the Pentagon for naval assistance.
8.Much like with Ukraine, defending Sweden and Finland is not of vital geopolitical importance to the United States. I say this as someone who is almost half-Swedish and has an affinity for the Nordic region. Yes, there are multiple countries within the NATO alliance system. However, in practice, it would be the U.S. military that would disproportionately spend on Finnish and Swedish defense. Europe should bear more responsibility in preserving peace in Europe, but European powers have been content on letting the United States shoulder much of that burden.
As such, it makes sense to ask how adding Sweden and Finland would benefit U.S. interests. What is the exact threat that Finland or Sweden face? We already know that a Russian attack on these two nations is unlikely (Point #1). We know that Sweden and Finland would not be left to fend for themselves in the unlikely event of war (Point #4). What is the measurable benefit of adding Sweden and Finland to NATO? The United States arguably has more vital security interests, especially in Indo-Pacific Asia.
9. Since the United States would be paying for a large portion of the bill for the ascension of Finland and Sweden to NATO, we should ask what the cost of ascension would be. A 2021 analysis from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) asks what NATO enlargement would look like and what it would cost. According to CSIS, it would cost as much as $11.6 billion upfront and $1.8 billion annually after that (CSIS, p. 93, 104). In 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) spent $741.7 billion. If the United States were responsible for half of that $1.8 billion, it would mean a 0.1 percent increase of the DoD's budget.
Conversely, the United States has a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 100 percent, something the country has not seen since World War II. National debt issues will continue to haunt the United States for years to come, especially since there is no sign of government spending slowing down. The United States should be shrinking its military obligations in light of the long-term insolvency that such an expanded role costs. We should not add the defense of Sweden and Finland to the list of unnecessary military expenditures, especially since it would not improve the geopolitical situation for anyone.
[As a side note, the United States should examine how much they support Europe vis-à-vis NATO. A professor at MIT found that having European nations be more responsible for its regional security could save the United States up to $80 billion annually (Rosen, 2021).]
Conclusion
Yes, there is instability in Eastern Europe that we have not seen in decades. How Russia will act in the upcoming months is a wild card, especially with the Russo-Ukrainian War. I can understand how Finns and Swedes could feel a heightened sense of concern. At the same time, Russia's actions in Ukraine do not justify an expansion of NATO by allowing Sweden and Finland to enter. Forgetting the fiscal costs for a moment, allowing for these ascensions to pass has the real potential to exacerbate geopolitics in central and eastern Europe.
NATO membership for the Swedish and Finnish nations is superfluous at best and injurious at worst. Perhaps ascension to NATO could result in a deterrent effect. I'm not going to hold my breath because history and international political theory (specifically that of balance of power theory) have me think that an escalatory effect is much more likely. In any case, I hope that events do not reach to such a level where we have to read about this in future history books.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has the world on edge. Concerns range from the casualties and the refugees fleeing Ukraine to increasing gas prices and the possibility of nuclear war. People are scrambling to find solutions to end the conflict in Eastern Europe. Last week, I covered why the U.S. military should not intervene in Ukraine. This week, I would like to cover a different policy alternative, one that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested: a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
A no-fly zone (NFZ), or an air exclusion zone (AEZ), is when one military power establishes an area in which another military power is not permitted to fly its aircraft. These zones are most commonly set up during a military conflict with the intent of preventing an enemy power from flying in the designated demilitarized air zone. The modern idea of a no-fly zone did not exist until the 1990s, in no small part due to the development of stealth and precision-strike technologies. The first time that a NFZ was implemented was by the U.S. military in the Gulf War in 1991. The second time was when the United Nations prohibited military flights from the Bosnian air force in the Bosnian War. The third place was the military intervention in Libya: once in 2011 and again in 2018 and 2019. The NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia were successes, whereas the attempts in Libya did not work out as well. While we do not have hundreds of data points, three case studies are still better than nothing.
If the NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia were so successful, why would precedent not be a reason for me to support a NFZ in Ukraine? Because the case studies of Iraq and Bosnia really do not serve as guidance for Ukraine. With the Iraq and Bosnia examples, their air power was inferior in comparison to the powers that were implementing the NFZs. There was no doubt of who could command the skies in those conflicts. In Iraq and Bosnia, the NFZ acted more as a deterrent than anything else. That is not the case in the Russo-Ukrainian War. In terms of size of air force, the Russian Air Force is second only to that of the United States Air Force. And let us not forget that Russia has nuclear weapons. Let us keep that context in mind as we move forward.
It is not as if declaring a NFZ makes airspace free of enemy aircraft, no more than declaring a building a gun-free zone means that the space will not have guns or crime. Declaring a NFZ means making a commitment to shoot down planes. If the United States or NATO decides to declare a NFZ, it has one of two options. The first option is not enforcing it. If the United States or NATO declared a NFZ and decided not to enforce it, it would be a paper tiger. The reputation of the U.S. military or NATO forces would be severely undermined. The second option would be to enforce the NFZ, which would mean using firepower in the event that Russian pilots decide to violate the NFZ. Enforcing the NFZ would be an act of war. To declare war would be to make an undesirable situation worse.
Aside from the potential to start World War III or some other considerably larger military conflict, there are other considerations. One is that this is still early in the war. Russia only controls a small portion of Ukraine, and as such, cannot employ air forces in a country in which it does not have near or complete control. Furthermore, the Russian military possesses S-300 and S-400 long-range missiles, which can enter Ukrainian airspace without Russian pilots ever needing to enter said airspace. Even if NATO were itching to implement a NFZ, it would not make sense from a military strategy standpoint to do so at this time.
There is also the logistical component to consider. As the Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Dave Deptula brings up, the nation of Ukraine covers twice the air space than the Iraqi NFZs. To have around-the-clock patrols, there would need to be hundreds of fighters to cover that space, as well as the thousands of men to fuel, arm, and maintain the fighters. Combine that with the preparation and clear mission, it would be a huge undertaking to enforce the NFZ over Ukraine.
To quote Vox political correspondent Zac Beauchamp, "We can't treat Russia like it's ISIS or Qaddafi; the brute realities of the balance of military force change the kinds of tactics and strategies we can bring to bear." The no-fly zone is not some low-risk option that requires little effort. It is an option that takes a lot of resources, would risk military intervention, and would do very little to help the war efforts given that much of the Russian military is primarily using its army. President Joe Biden and NATO officials are correct in rejecting such an option, and I hope they continue to stay the course on this decision.
Conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not new. In 1917, the Bolsheviks fought with the Ukrainians for four years in the Soviet-Ukrainian War. More recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed the Crimean region in 2014 in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. Last Wednesday, Putin took the conflict to a whole new level by launching a general invasion of Ukraine.
What escalated the conflict between these two nations? In March and April of 2021, Putin amassed troops on the Russo-Ukrainian border. Putin was using this as an opportunity to pressure Ukraine to not join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as reducing NATO troops and hardware stationed in Eastern Europe. The Russian government made baseless allegations of genocide in the Donbas region, a claim that was refuted by the European Commission. The Donbas region, which had previously been in a stalemate for the past few years, had escalated fighting on February 17.
February 21 was a significant day for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Putin upped his rhetoric by accusing Ukraine of being a neo-Nazi nation. While there is a far-Right presence in the country, that allegation is nevertheless ironic given that both the President and Prime Minister of Ukraine are Jewish. The Russian government alleged that Ukraine was responsible for shelling a Russian border facility. That same day, Russia recognized the independence of two separatist regions in Ukraine: Donetsk and Luhansk. Finally, Russian troops entered the Donbas region.
By the time February 24 came around, Russia had launched its full-scale attack on Ukraine, which was a blatant violation of international law. A day later, Russia fired missiles on the capital of Kiev. For all we know, Ukraine could just be the beginning for Putin. We could see an expansion of Russian power and influence that has not been exhibited since Joseph Stalin was in power. Aside from the humanitarian crisis being created, there is concern that prices in global markets are going to increase as a result. The United States government has already imposed economic sanctions on the Russian financial institutions, including cutting off Russia from the U.S. financial system.
Imposing economic sanctions on Russia is enough for some to try to punish Russia for violating Ukraine's sovereignty. While we are less than a week into the conflict, it is already being declared the worst incidence of conventional warfare on European soil since World War II. Only U.S. military intervention will satiate those with a hawkish foreign policy. At least for now, President Biden is not looking to take that hawkish approach. As tempting as it might be to help in a humanitarian crisis and bring democracy to eastern Europe, here are seven reasons why the U.S. military should not get involved in Ukraine.
Ukraine is not of vital geopolitical importance for the United States. Ukraine is over 5,000 miles away from the United States on another continent. Saying that Ukraine is vital to U.S. national security is like saying Canada or Mexico is vital to Russia's national security. Even if Russia is successful in invading Ukraine, the invasion would not jeopardize the citizens of the United States, its borders, or its national prosperity. While Ukraine is not an enemy of the United States, Ukraine does not exactly stand out as a major ally of the United States. If Ukrainian sovereignty were of vital interest to the United States or other Western powers, Ukraine would have been a member of NATO by now. The United States has no treaty-based obligation to defend Ukraine (e.g., NATO Article Five). At best, the United States' geopolitical interest in Ukraine is peripheral.
Ukraine will always mean more to Russia than it will to the United States. For Russia, the geopolitical argument is different. Moscow's interest in Ukraine is existential in no small part because Russia shares a 1,200-mile border with Ukraine, not to mention a shared history and similar culture. Having a large country on Russia's border become more Westernized also has symbolic meaning. It signifies that Russia continues to lose power on the global stage, both in the militaristic sense and in terms of soft power. NATO's expansion eastward does not justify Russia invading Ukraine, but I at least can understand Putin's move through the balance of power theory. Russia will continue to view Ukraine as vital to its national security. Russia is willing to put more skin into the game to neutralize Ukraine than the United States is willing to secure Ukraine. If Russian history has taught us anything, it is that the current Russian regime is willing to subject its people to a lot of suffering to advance its geopolitical status. This is a way of saying that the probability of deterring Russia from its current military actions in Ukraine is next to nil.
Borders have changed as a result of conflict multiple times since WWII. One of the arguments for military intervention is that if we do not stop Russia, Russia will take over all of Europe and it will cause instability on a global level never witnessed. This is nothing more than the slippery slope fallacy in action. We had international borders change through conflict multiple times since 1945. To name a few: Kashmir; Taiwan; Israel's legally just annexation of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and Sinai Peninsula as a result of a defensive war (i.e., the Six-Day War); Sino-Indian border disputes; NATO member Turkey's invasion of Cyprus and establishment of the Turkish republic of North Cyprus; the separation of Kosovo from Serbia; the Indonesian seizures of West New Guinea and East Timor; the separation of East Pakistan by India; the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia; and the Moroccan seizure of the Western Sahara. All of these changes to international borders and we have not destroyed the international system or descended into chaos. There is no plausible explanation to suggest that a hypothetical annexation of Ukraine would be so unique compared to the aforementioned border changes that it would result in an apocalyptic outcome.
Russia is limited in what it can do. Let us assume that Russia is looking to expand territorially in the hopes of reliving its former glory days as Mother Russia. The only other bordering non-NATO nations aside from Ukraine are Moldova, Finland, Georgia, and Belarus. There is only so much territorial expansion that Putin could risk without triggering a full-scale war with NATO members. Even if Russia were to annex Ukraine and a few of these other states, it would most probably not be enough to threaten Western powers or become the superpower it was during the Cold War. But if Russia were to opt for fighting Western powers, its demographics do not suggest that it would prevail. Russia has a declining population, a small GDP relative to the U.S. and European powers, and its military spending cannot outmatch those of Western powers. Russia only has so many resources and it only has so many options it could take before triggering war with more powerful adversaries.
U.S. military intervention could lead to nuclear war. The United States and Russia account for about 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. Both nations have nuclear triads and secondary-strike capabilities. This nuclear reality points to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD states that two countries with full-scale nuclear capabilities would cause the complete annihilation of both sides. It would be irrational, dare I say mad, to escalate a conflict to that level. MAD helps explain why the United States and former Soviet Union fought proxy wars throughout the Cold War instead of fighting head-on in conventional warfare. As much as Putin is driven by ambition, he also will be disincentivized to escalate the conflict to the point where NATO feels they need to get involved, especially to the level where nuclear weapons are used. Even so, it is not out of the realm of possibility. That possibility of MAD is what is disincentivizing President Biden from getting militarily involved in Ukraine.
U.S. military intervention could lead to non-nuclear escalation. We do not need to go to the extreme of nuclear war to be worried about military escalation. First, Russia is a near-peer adversary that would have geographical advantage in the eastern European theatre and would be better positioned to dominate air, land, and sea space. The United States would need to heavily invest militarily speaking to outflank Russia. Otherwise, the United States is asking for a lot of trouble with little to no return on its military spending. The United States does not need a repeat of Vietnam or Afghanistan. Second, the United States provided $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014, which did not de-escalate the situation. Third, as the Cato Institute brings up, there are other ways that Russia could retaliate. Supporting a guerrilla war to stage a proxy war would intensify Russia's grievance of NATO's expansion, and thereby anger Putin. Russia's escalation could go beyond eastern Europe. Russia could improve its relations with Iran and China, thereby creating more headache for the United States on an international level. Russia could meddle in other countries where there are U.S. troops, such as Syria or Iraq. Russia could even make trouble for the United States by stirring up trouble in Central or South America. There is no shortage of scenarios that could make international relations get out of control if the United States decided to intervene militarily in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
The U.S. is not obligated to promote democracy. A chief obligation of the U.S. government is to protect the American people (see the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4), not to promote democracy across the world. Even if you were to argue that we need to promote democracy in Eastern Europe, the truth is that there are too many authoritarian regimes out there that would "need saving." We would need intervene in multiple countries, including Iran, Congo, Cuba, Venezuela, Vietnam, and China. There is too much authoritarianism in the world and not enough resources to bring democracy to these authoritarian nations. You would have thought we would have learned that lesson when the U.S. military failed to bring democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan, but here we are.
Postscript
I am not here to defend Russia's actions. Russia is in the wrong both morally and legally. Ukraine is tragically stuck in a dangerous part of Europe with a powerful, abusive neighbor on its eastern border that feels existentially threatened by the increased Westernization and democratization in Ukraine. As much as I hope that the casualties and humanitarian costs in the conflict are at a minimum, there is no rationale based on U.S. interests that would justify the U.S. military fighting in the Russo-Ukrainian War.
I know it sounds callous to some to say this, but the hard truth is that the U.S. government only has so many resources and it needs to be able to prioritize its alliances. Since World War II, the United States has been too quick to insert itself into faraway conflicts with dubious and unclear national security interests. The United States only recently (and rightfully) got out of Afghanistan. Recent polling from YouGov and Concerned Veterans of America suggests that about a quarter of the U.S. population favors going to war, and more importantly, that 60 percent of veterans are against U.S. military intervention in Ukraine. If Ukraine's sovereignty is that vital for peace on European soil, European allies should do the heavy lifting due to their geographical proximity to Ukraine. In short, I hope that President Biden remains steadfast in militarily staying out of the conflict so we do not make a bad situation worse.
On August 15, the Taliban took over the Afghan capital of Kabul and the Afghan President fled. A day later, President Biden stood by his decision that he made on April 14 to withdraw troops from Afghanistan (here is a timeline for the Afghanistan withdrawal for more details on the events leading up to now). Since then, the news cycle has been going on nonstop about Afghanistan.
The Righthas beenmerciless inblaming Biden for a messy withdrawal. Biden's exit strategy is worth criticizing, especially with regards to evacuating American personnel, leaving military materiel behind and in the hands of the Taliban, and helping the Afghans that assisted the U.S. military. At the same time, the Afghanistan debacle started long Biden chose to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Congress authorized the War in 2001 and President Bush led the charge on nation-building in Afghanistan. One could argue that Obama had inadequate resolve to fight in Afghanistan. We can blame Trump for entering peace talks with the Taliban or how he went about it. If you go through the Afghanistan Papers, which are assessments generated by a federal government project, there were also high-ranking officials who realized that the Afghanistan War was unwinnable while portraying the war with a rosy, Pollyannish view. There has been no shortage of imperfect actors in this war.
That being said, criticizing Biden for how the troops were withdrawn does not mean the troops should not have been withdrawn. My criticism of the Afghanistan Wardates backto 2009. U.S. involvement did not make sense in the 2000s, and it makes even less sense now. Afghanistan remains an exceptionally corrupt nation (Freedom House). The U.S. military still has not defeated the Taliban or reformed Afghan politics in a way where there is a democratic and stable government. What has been the cost of getting involved in another country's civil conflict? In terms of lives lost, there have been 65,000 Afghani soldiers, about 2,500 U.S. service members, over 3,800 U.S. contractors, and 47,245 civilians killed. The United States will probably have $2 trillion in war debts by 2030, which will creep up to $6 trillion by 2050 because of interest (Peltier, 2020).
I am not going to hash out the entire history of the War in Afghanistan here, but I will assert the opinion that the war has been mismanaged. If you want a expert analysis on the matter, go with the the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR], which is the government's oversight authority for the country's reconstruction. In its August 2021 report, SIGAR detailed how the U.S. government "continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve."
To continue quoting SIGAR: "The U.S. government consistently underestimated the amount of time required to rebuild Afghanistan, and created unrealistic timelines and expectations that prioritized spending quickly. These choices increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs." Again, those are not my words, although I do concur. That is the conclusion of the oversight agency meant to monitor and evaluate how the U.S. military was performing in Afghanistan. In other words, the U.S. military had no long-term strategy on its military involvement in Afghanistan and had no exit strategy.
Since the best military in the world is withdrawing, there is bound to be at least some effect on Afghanistan's internal affairs. At the same time, this was a civil war long before the U.S. entered Afghanistan for what was initially "a constrained counterterrorism operation in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks." The U.S. military went into Afghanistan to stop Al-Qaeda. As the think-tank Brookings Institution points out in its recent analysis, Al-Qaeda has a fraction of the power it had in 2001. At this point, terrorist groups from the Middle East and Africa are more of a threat to national security than Al-Qaeda, which diminishes the national security argument for staying in Afghanistan.
Some situations are truly hopeless, much like Sisyphus pushing that boulder up the hill. Afghanistan is a country plagued with tribal bickering, parochialism, corruption, lack of sound institutions, and a lack of willpower for actual reform. Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and the Soviets had issues when they invaded Afghanistan. Given the history of volatility in that part of the world, not to mention the geopolitical, ethnic, and cultural complexities, it was inevitable that there would have been havoc and chaos when U.S. troops entered Afghanistan. However, the United States has been attempting nation-building for twenty years in Afghanistan without significant reform. As frustrating as it might be to put in so much effort so little reward, it is about time that the United States cuts its losses and withdraws from Afghanistan.
La plus ça change, la plus c'est la même chose. The more things change, the more they stay the same. That is certainly how I feel about the Israel-Palestine conflict. There were a few recent events that led to the altercation between Israel and Gaza. One is the Sheikh Jarrah incident in East Jerusalem, a legal dispute over property rights and paying rent. Protests began over an eviction of six Palestinians in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Jewish landlords, a property which has been owned by the Jewish community since 1876. Without getting into "whose fault it is," there was also a clash between Israeli police and Muslim worshipers at the Al-Aqsa mosque at the end of the Islamic month of Ramadan. Hamas issued Israel an ultimatum to cease its police and military enforcement of Israeli law. Israel ignored it by reinforcing its borders with Gaza. Hamas fired rockets into Israel targeting civilians. Israel returned fire by targeting military outposts and now there is outrage on both sides.
All of this escalated conflict led to celebrities throwing in their two cents. The Daily Show host Trevor Noah was one of the earlier "commentators," framing the conflict in terms of power balance. Comedian John Oliver proceeded to outdo Trevor Noah by accusing Israel of "war crimes" and "apartheid." Needless to say, neither one of these comedians are a fan of Israel based on their monologues. Today, my goal is to take on their pseudo-intellectual comments and show where they both went wrong.
The nature of Hamas. Before getting into any of what Noah or Oliver had to say about what is going on in the Middle East, I think it is best to ask ourselves who Hamas is. Hamas is a terrorist organization that is governing the Gaza Strip. Calling Hamas a terrorist organization is not my opinion or an attempt to call names. Hamas is officially designated as a terrorist organization by such entities as the United States, Australia, and the European Union. Hamas is oppressing its own citizens, according to the NGO Freedom House. Life under Hamas is so authoritarian that I feel sorry for the Gazan civilians that are used as pawns in Hamas' ploy. Hamas' original charter called for the annihilation of Israel. Even its 2017 revision of its charter does not recognize Israel and views Israel strictly in adversarial terms. How do you broker peace with an enemy who would solely be satisfied if you no longer existed?
Body Count Argument. One of the main arguments used by these comedians is that a higher body count means that one side is right. Rather than look at motive, intent, or morality, Noah tells us that we should "ask who is dead and who is alive." Oliver similarly argues that because there are ten times as many casualties on the Palestinian side as their are on the Israeli side, the higher body count makes the Palestinian side right.
For one, the appropriateness or moral justification is not based solely on how many civilians die. But let's ask ourselves why the disparity exists in the first place. Hamas uses its citizens as human shields by planting its military complexes amongst residential areas. Its goal is to maximize casualties so that the international community, including Noah and Oliver, can feel a sense of outrage and support a terrorist organization. Conversely, Israel uses the Iron Dome to protect its citizens, something that Oliver takes issue with. Israel's goal is to minimize civilian casualties. Why should Israel doing a better job at protecting its citizens render Israel the bad guy? If it were not for Iron Dome, there would be considerably more dead Israelis. If the goal is equality, how many Jews need to die to make Noah or Oliver happy?
Power Balance and Military Might. One of the main arguments that Noah particularly uses is that because Israel is more powerful, it has more responsibility. He analogizes the situation to a teenager fighting his younger, four-year-old brother. Let's forget that most sibling rivalries do not entail one sibling trying to kill the other, as we see with Hamas trying to exterminate Israel. Essentially, the argument that both Noah and Oliver make are that "if you are weaker, you are in the right." By that "logic," that would mean the Taliban was right, as were the white nationalist protesters at Charlottesville in 2017. Military might does not have bearing on whether one side is right or not. If anything, both sides have a moral obligation to behave properly in a time of war, something which Hamas does not care about at all. All Noah and Oliver do in framing the problem in such a way is to absolve Hamas from any responsibility.
Let's bring up another point about military might. While Noah acknowledges that "Israel could crush Gaza 'like that,'" what he glosses over is that Israel has not done so. Those who criticize Israel love to lob the argument of "Israel is being disproportionate." If Israel were to be proportionate, it would use all of its military might to indiscriminately target civilians, which is exactly what Hamas has done for years. But Israel does not do that. It does its best to target military outposts only, which is all the more challenging when Hamas intentionally hides among civilians. Using civilians as human shields is a tactic that even the United Nations has criticized on more than one occasion. Israel even gives a one-to-two-hour warning to Gazan citizens, a painstaking courtesy that no other army has extended in such a situation. Military experts actually have lauded Israel for doing such a good job at minimizing Palestinian civilian casualties (Merriam and Schmitt, 2015).
What Would You Do? It's a fair question to ask, but it was one that neither Noah nor Oliver bothered to ask. How would the United States react if it were attacked? We have an idea: it's called Pearl Harbor. Could any country say that they would not defend their borders if their civilians were indiscriminately barraged with rocket-fire from a belligerent entity? Hamas has set its genocidal intent on Israel before, and has done so unambiguously. Noah and Oliver imply that Israel should just "sit back and see what happens" because they allege Israel is the oppressor. There have been multiple times in history where Jews were expected to "sit back and take it," and I can tell you it did not turn out well. If someone says they want to wipe you out of existence, that is the sort of threat you take seriously.
Oliver criticizes Israel for attacking civilian areas, but conveniently forgets is that this conflict is a war. As we already brought up, Hamas hides amongst its citizens and uses them as human shields. As previously mentioned, Israel does its best to minimize civilian casualties. At the same time, civilian casualties during wartime are as lamentable as they are inevitable, an inevitability that is acknowledged by the Rome Statute [Article 8(2)b(4)].
Conclusion. If nothing else, this has reminded me why I don't take my opinions on foreign policy from celebrities. They presented themselves as objective, unbiased observers of the conflict when they were far from it. Although Noah and Oliver have First Amendment rights to say what they want, there is still a moral obligation to not propagate one-sided lies, especially given the media influence they have.
I did not cover the West Bank today mainly because the current military conflict is with the Gaza Strip. Even so, Oliver's accusation of there being apartheid of Palestinians (particularly in the West Bank since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip back in 2005) is a baseless one (see my previous coverage of the allegations of Israel being an apartheid state here and here). My analysis today also does not cover treatment of Israeli Arabs within Israel's borders, something both Noah and Oliver briefly touch upon. Am I here to say that Israel is perfect? As I have said before and will say again, no nation-state is perfect. There are a lot of complexities within that part of the world, but other developed countries also have their issues with how they treat minorities. It does not render the United States, France, or Denmark apartheid states. I'm not here to say that Israel does not have serious internal issues (because it does, like any country), but it is disingenuous to disproportionately criticize and demonize Israel while ignoring or minimizing much more egregious human rights violations (e.g., the civil war in Syria or literal concentration camps in China).
The situation either inside Israel's borders or in the West Bank has more historical, legal, and moral nuance than the situation with Hamas, which may not be saying much given who Hamas is. With Gaza, it is clear-cut. Hamas is a known terrorist organization knowingly and belligerently targeting Israeli civilians. It has no qualms with oppressing its own citizens, disregarding norms about warfare, or using violence towards its desire to see a world without Israel. Israel unquestionably has the moral high ground when it comes to the conflict with Hamas. The fact that Oliver or Noah cannot see the qualitative difference between Israel and a terrorist organization such as Hamas makes me wonder why anyone listens to them in the first place.
The Syrian Civil War has been a thorn in U.S. foreign policy since it started in 2011. Since then, the U.S. has been involved in Syrian affairs in one way or another. Last month, President Trump did something that shook the Washington establishment: withdraw American troops from Syria. It is no surprise that many thoughtit was a mistake that will adversely contribute to regional instability. Did Trump make the right decision or not?
Not backed with congressional authorization. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 gives Congress the power to declare war. Both the Obama and Trump administrations have ignored this constitutional provision. Unless Congress can make a declaration of war, the U.S. has no business stationing troops in Syria.
What about ISIS? Trying to stop ISIS was the only remotely justifiable argument for the U.S. to be in Syria. Even then, ISIS was threatening the U.S.' Middle Eastern allies, not the U.S itself. While Syria is a humanitarian tragedy, Syria had not been a critical threat to U.S. national security. Fast-forward to the present: ISIS is greatly incapacitated. With the U.S. withdrawal, the Syrian government and other parties involved (e.g., Russia, Iran) have a major incentive to make sure ISIS doesn't reemerge. At the end of the day, it is not practical to try to stall every conceivable calamity that could befall the region. The United States has many allies in the region: Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia. Perhaps they could do some more of the lifting (especially since they are closer and have greater cultural understanding) instead of having the U.S. try to fix everything.
We can't counter Iran or Russia. As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace detailed, the U.S. already lost in Syria because Russia and Iran have much more influence than the U.S. was able to acquire. As the Brookings Institute brought up, it was never clear as to how the U.S. troop presence was going to shift the region's military balance.
As a matter of fact, the 2,000-plus troops were not capable of engendering the political reform necessary to stabilize the region. The situation in Syria favors Russia and Iran, so why should we spend millions more on a lost cause? Russia is now the broker of the conflict. Putin gets the joy of trying to manage Turkey, Syria, and Iran at the same time while making sure Russian interests are secure in Syria. Not saying it's impossible, but Putin can have fun trying.
Plus, there are two other things to consider. One, Syria not an appropriate place to contain Iran. Two, further attempts to sway things in a country where the U.S. is not wanted (whereas Iran and Russia were invited) would risk a proxy war with Russia.
Postscript: It is true that the withdrawal was not coherent because Trump did not coordinate with other countries or even his advisors. At the same time, our presence is not currently merited, which is noteworthy since the U.S. has already spent $54 billion in Syria (Brown University). Our presence would have beenmission creep that would have perpetuated the U.S.' presence in the region for decades to come. In spite of me criticizing Trump on such topics as international trade and immigration, I will give him credit where credit is due. I'll let the Foreign Policy Director at the Cato Institute sum it up: "Absent achievable goals and a strong national security imperative backed up by congressional authorization, the U.S. presence in Syria is illegitimate and better off wound down."
1-6-2019 Addendum: A senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace summarized five reasons why Trump was right to pull out of Syria.
