The political and religious musings of a Right-leaning, libertarian, formerly Orthodox Jew who emphasizes rationalism, pragmatism, common sense, and free, open-minded thought.
Wednesday, May 20, 2026
Trump's Golden Dome Is More Costly Than Simply Not Striking Gold
Friday, May 15, 2026
It Would Be a Gas If Trump Took the Fast Lane and Eliminated the Gas Tax
Every few years, when gas prices get high enough to be politically dangerous, politicians "discover" the idea of a gas tax holiday. Senator John McCain proposed it in 2008, President Joe Biden in 2022, and now President Donald Trump this week. It is peculiar to have politicians tacitly admit that high taxes harm consumers, but I will set aside that irony. Nevertheless, it does set an uncomfortable question: If temporarily suspending the tax would help consumers, why should the tax exist in the first place?
After all, nobody proposes a hiatus from something that is harmless or helpful. The very existence of multiple calls for a gas tax holiday should give us good reason to pause. Much like emergency waivers of the Jones Act after natural disasters, gas tax holidays inadvertently expose the hidden costs of a policy that politicians generally insist is reasonable.
Before delving into issues about the gas tax, it would be worth noting that the gas tax is 18.4 cents per gallon, which will not do that much to alleviate the average cost of a gallon, which is $4.50. Now let's get into the main issue of its regressive nature, meaning that it takes a larger share of income from lower-income households than from higher-income ones. That is hardly a surprise for a consumption tax tied to a necessity like transportation fuel. For many Americans, driving is a price of participating in the labor market.
The burden is uneven because transportation is not evenly substitutable. Higher-income households are more likely to have flexible work arrangements, shorter commutes, and/or access to multiple modes of transportation. Conversely, lower-income households are more likely to rely on older vehicles, need to take longer commutes, and have jobs that require physical presence. Rural commuters similarly have constraints, whether with longer baseline distances or fewer substitutes for automobile travel.
The broader economic problems with the gas tax are longstanding. I previously examined its inefficiencies in detail, including its distortion of transportation choices, weak alignment with actual road usage, and broader market-side effects. Much like the Cato Institute argues, this is why state governments should meet their infrastructure needs instead of the federal government.
The recurring gas tax holiday debate implicitly admits that the tax is burdensome. The question should be what to replace the federal gas tax with. States could implement their own, especially since most roads are not federally owned. But greater fuel efficiency and higher prevalence of electric vehicles is making the gas tax more passé. There is the option of mile-based user fees, as well as a "quant" framework that accounts for usage. Regardless of what it is replaced with, one thing is for certain: it is difficult to call a gas tax "necessary infrastructure funding" when it regularly needs a vacation to survive public opinion.
Tuesday, May 12, 2026
You Can't Deport Supply and Demand: How ICE Enforcement Contributes to Labor Shortages
For years, advocates of mass deportation insisted that aggressive immigration enforcement would strengthen the economy and help natives born in the U.S. find a job. The theory is that you remove enough workers, somehow businesses, customers, and local economies adjust without any pain. Beyond this political rhetoric begs an important empirical question: what actually happens to labor markets when Immigrant and Custom Enforcement (ICE) enforcement increases? Is ICE actually making the labor market better? A recent paper from the National Economic Bureau of Research (NBER) using data from areas affected by immigration raids and related enforcement policies.
Instead of relying on simple "before-and-after" comparisons, the author of this NBER paper use regional differences in ICE enforcement to examine how labor market outcomes diverged over time. One of the big conclusions is that greater ICE enforcement led to less employment for undocumented workers. But the effects did not stop there. The study found little evidence that this enforcement helped native workers. Meanwhile, businesses with immigrant-heavy sectors experienced labor shortages and operational disruption. The fact that this study compared changes across regions, as opposed to simple national trends, provides a stronger analysis than a basic correlation analysis.
Broader economic literature on immigration explains why this NBER study's findings are unsurprising. Despite the political rhetoric of immigrants taking jobs from native-born workers, economists have found very little evidence that immigration substantially reduces native employment overall. If that claim were true, we would have seen ICE enforcement generate clear increases in employment opportunities for native workers. Yet no such clear increase emerged in the study. As a matter of fact, the study points toward labor-market disruption and spillover effects.
That is because the economy is not a fixed pie. Economic literature already indicates that immigrants are often complements rather than simple substitutes for native labor. In industries such as housing construction, hospitality, agriculture, and food processing, different categories of workers frequently depend on one another to maintain production. Removing that part of the workforce can and does reduce productivity and labor demand elsewhere in the economy.
There is also evidence that immigrant workers can increase wages for native workers. That is because immigrants are not only workers competing for jobs. They are also consumers, renters, entrepreneurs, and customers. When policymakers treat the labor market like a fixed pie, they ignore this high level of interconnectedness.
It is that level of interdependence that makes these findings unexpected. Large-scale immigration enforcement acts as a supply shock. That shock propagates throughout supply chains and affects firms, consumers, and workers beyond the targeted population of the mass deportation. The fact that the pro-mass deportation argument is based in a simplistic view of the economy is part of why I was against mass deportation in 2024.
None of this determines the question of how much immigration enforcement is appropriate. What it does show is that mass deportation is not costless or uniformly beneficial. While "deport them and it will work out" is a snazzy political slogan, it still does not repeal arithmetic or basic laws of economics.
Thursday, May 7, 2026
Grounded by Government: How Blocking a Merger Helped Sink Spirit Airlines
Last Saturday, Spirit Airlines announced that it is shutting down its doors. Some were treating this bankruptcy as if it came out of nowhere or it were simply an issue of a poor business model. It is true that there are businesses that go under because they made poor life choices. With Spirit, however, the beginning of its demise was made with a key decision well before last Saturday.
The earlier decision did not happen in Spirit Airlines' boardroom or from the fact that Trump decided not to bail out Spirit (which would have been a terrible idea), but in Washington. Starting in 2022, Spirit Airlines and JetBlue attempted to merge. But Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wouldn't have any of that. She led the charge that would ultimately block the merger in 2024. The argument used was that Spirit needed to remain independent to maintain a competitive market in what a concentrated market.
Warren thought she was helping Spirit, but was in fact hurting it. Why? Because she had a static view of how the market worked. She thought the main factor for competition was the number of firms. But in a capital-intensive market like the airline market, there are times when mergers can help make the market more competitive.
When firms are structurally fragile as was the case with Spirit, consolidation can be a way to stabilize capacity, preserve service networks, and sustain price discipline over time. By focusing on firm count instead of capacity (e.g., routes, seats, financial viability), the policy gave the appearance of preserving competition. In practice, Spirit and JetBlue were less equipped to compete in the market while further solidifying the market concentration of the big four airlines: American, Delta, Southwest, and United.
If Spirit and JetBlue were able to merge, they would have created a larger and more financially resilient airline in the low-cost segment of the market. In industries like aviation, fixed costs are high and margins are thin. Scale can be the difference between restructuring to grow and failure. But Spirit and JetBlue were not given that opportunity to become a strong mid-tier competitor.
Spirit's employee count went from 11,331 employees in 2024 to 7,482 employees in 2025 before it went under. That decline reflects more than normal business cycles. It signals a firm in financial distress heading toward bankruptcy that could have been saved had it had the chance to merge. As Spirit's revenue weakened and restructuring pressures mounted, the airline reduced capacity, scaled back operations, and cut labor costs to stay afloat. Yet that was not enough to save Spirit.
While Spirit's ultimate demise is the most visible part of this unnecessary demise, the effects on JetBlue are still important. Without the merger, JetBlue was unable to expand. It remained in a constrained capacity focused on cost constraints and modest route expansion. In a capital-intensive industry, the absence of economies of scale shaped JetBlue's long-term competitiveness.
These firm-level decisions also made their way downstream. Changes in route activity affect airport activity, especially those who relied on these low-cost routes. Tourism flows are expected to feel a hit, especially those leisure-heavy destinations. This all affects airport revenue, local travel demand, and the availability of affordable travel destinations for travelers.
There is a broader lesson to be had. Look at Dodd-Frank's "too big to fail" approach. It was supposed preserve competition and market stability. Instead, smaller banks exited at larger rates, the number of new banks declined substantially, and larger banks increased their market share through consolidation. Instead of playing by the regulators' rules, markets adapt in a way that often benefits that largest market players. In retail and tech, the government had similar impulses of "the size of the firm matters" when blocking the Albertsons-Kroger merger and scrutinizing whether Amazon was a monopoly.
The airline industry was no exception. Spirit and JetBlue had a chance to be a better contender in the airlines market. Instead, the government stepped in to help in the name of "market protection" and ended up making the market less competitive. The deeper question is whether this "government knows best" model can meaningfully help if they misread the dynamic, evolving nature of markets. In case we did not have enough examples, Spirit Airlines is another casualty to remind us that the answer to that question is a resounding "No!"
