The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has the world on edge. Concerns range from the casualties and the refugees fleeing Ukraine to increasing gas prices and the possibility of nuclear war. People are scrambling to find solutions to end the conflict in Eastern Europe. Last week, I covered why the U.S. military should not intervene in Ukraine. This week, I would like to cover a different policy alternative, one that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky requested: a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
A no-fly zone (NFZ), or an air exclusion zone (AEZ), is when one military power establishes an area in which another military power is not permitted to fly its aircraft. These zones are most commonly set up during a military conflict with the intent of preventing an enemy power from flying in the designated demilitarized air zone. The modern idea of a no-fly zone did not exist until the 1990s, in no small part due to the development of stealth and precision-strike technologies. The first time that a NFZ was implemented was by the U.S. military in the Gulf War in 1991. The second time was when the United Nations prohibited military flights from the Bosnian air force in the Bosnian War. The third place was the military intervention in Libya: once in 2011 and again in 2018 and 2019. The NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia were successes, whereas the attempts in Libya did not work out as well. While we do not have hundreds of data points, three case studies are still better than nothing.
If the NFZs in Iraq and Bosnia were so successful, why would precedent not be a reason for me to support a NFZ in Ukraine? Because the case studies of Iraq and Bosnia really do not serve as guidance for Ukraine. With the Iraq and Bosnia examples, their air power was inferior in comparison to the powers that were implementing the NFZs. There was no doubt of who could command the skies in those conflicts. In Iraq and Bosnia, the NFZ acted more as a deterrent than anything else. That is not the case in the Russo-Ukrainian War. In terms of size of air force, the Russian Air Force is second only to that of the United States Air Force. And let us not forget that Russia has nuclear weapons. Let us keep that context in mind as we move forward.
It is not as if declaring a NFZ makes airspace free of enemy aircraft, no more than declaring a building a gun-free zone means that the space will not have guns or crime. Declaring a NFZ means making a commitment to shoot down planes. If the United States or NATO decides to declare a NFZ, it has one of two options. The first option is not enforcing it. If the United States or NATO declared a NFZ and decided not to enforce it, it would be a paper tiger. The reputation of the U.S. military or NATO forces would be severely undermined. The second option would be to enforce the NFZ, which would mean using firepower in the event that Russian pilots decide to violate the NFZ. Enforcing the NFZ would be an act of war. To declare war would be to make an undesirable situation worse.
Aside from the potential to start World War III or some other considerably larger military conflict, there are other considerations. One is that this is still early in the war. Russia only controls a small portion of Ukraine, and as such, cannot employ air forces in a country in which it does not have near or complete control. Furthermore, the Russian military possesses S-300 and S-400 long-range missiles, which can enter Ukrainian airspace without Russian pilots ever needing to enter said airspace. Even if NATO were itching to implement a NFZ, it would not make sense from a military strategy standpoint to do so at this time.
There is also the logistical component to consider. As the Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Dave Deptula brings up, the nation of Ukraine covers twice the air space than the Iraqi NFZs. To have around-the-clock patrols, there would need to be hundreds of fighters to cover that space, as well as the thousands of men to fuel, arm, and maintain the fighters. Combine that with the preparation and clear mission, it would be a huge undertaking to enforce the NFZ over Ukraine.
To quote Vox political correspondent Zac Beauchamp, "We can't treat Russia like it's ISIS or Qaddafi; the brute realities of the balance of military force change the kinds of tactics and strategies we can bring to bear." The no-fly zone is not some low-risk option that requires little effort. It is an option that takes a lot of resources, would risk military intervention, and would do very little to help the war efforts given that much of the Russian military is primarily using its army. President Joe Biden and NATO officials are correct in rejecting such an option, and I hope they continue to stay the course on this decision.
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