Last Saturday, Spirit Airlines announced that it is shutting down its doors. Some were treating this bankruptcy as if it came out of nowhere or it were simply an issue of a poor business model. It is true that there are businesses that go under because they made poor life choices. With Spirit, however, the beginning of its demise was made with a key decision well before last Saturday.
The earlier decision did not happen in Spirit Airlines' boardroom or from the fact that Trump decided not to bail out Spirit (which would have been a terrible idea), but in Washington. Starting in 2022, Spirit Airlines and JetBlue attempted to merge. But Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wouldn't have any of that. She led the charge that would ultimately block the merger in 2024. The argument used was that Spirit needed to remain independent to maintain a competitive market in what a concentrated market.
Warren thought she was helping Spirit, but was in fact hurting it. Why? Because she had a static view of how the market worked. She thought the main factor for competition was the number of firms. But in a capital-intensive market like the airline market, there are times when mergers can help make the market more competitive.
When firms are structurally fragile as was the case with Spirit, consolidation can be a way to stabilize capacity, preserve service networks, and sustain price discipline over time. By focusing on firm count instead of capacity (e.g., routes, seats, financial viability), the policy gave the appearance of preserving competition. In practice, Spirit and JetBlue were less equipped to compete in the market while further solidifying the market concentration of the big four airlines: American, Delta, Southwest, and United.
If Spirit and JetBlue were able to merge, they would have created a larger and more financially resilient airline in the low-cost segment of the market. In industries like aviation, fixed costs are high and margins are thin. Scale can be the difference between restructuring to grow and failure. But Spirit and JetBlue were not given that opportunity to become a strong mid-tier competitor.
Spirit's employee count went from 11,331 employees in 2024 to 7,482 employees in 2025 before it went under. That decline reflects more than normal business cycles. It signals a firm in financial distress heading toward bankruptcy that could have been saved had it had the chance to merge. As Spirit's revenue weakened and restructuring pressures mounted, the airline reduced capacity, scaled back operations, and cut labor costs to stay afloat. Yet that was not enough to save Spirit.
While Spirit's ultimate demise is the most visible part of this unnecessary demise, the effects on JetBlue are still important. Without the merger, JetBlue was unable to expand. It remained in a constrained capacity focused on cost constraints and modest route expansion. In a capital-intensive industry, the absence of economies of scale shaped JetBlue's long-term competitiveness.
These firm-level decisions also made their way downstream. Changes in route activity affect airport activity, especially those who relied on these low-cost routes. Tourism flows are expected to feel a hit, especially those leisure-heavy destinations. This all affects airport revenue, local travel demand, and the availability of affordable travel destinations for travelers.
There is a broader lesson to be had. Look at Dodd-Frank's "too big to fail" approach. It was supposed preserve competition and market stability. Instead, smaller banks exited at larger rates, the number of new banks declined substantially, and larger banks increased their market share through consolidation. Instead of playing by the regulators' rules, markets adapt in a way that often benefits that largest market players. In retail and tech, the government had similar impulses of "the size of the firm matters" when blocking the Albertsons-Kroger merger and scrutinizing whether Amazon was a monopoly.
The airline industry was no exception. Spirit and JetBlue had a chance to be a better contender in the airlines market. Instead, the government stepped in to help in the name of "market protection" and ended up making the market less competitive. The deeper question is whether this "government knows best" model can meaningfully help if they misread the dynamic, evolving nature of markets. In case we did not have enough examples, Spirit Airlines is another casualty to remind us that the answer to that question is a resounding "No!"






