Showing posts with label Sweden. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sweden. Show all posts

Thursday, March 14, 2024

New Swedish Study Is Yet Another Study Showing How Lockdowns Inflicted Collateral Damage

I wrote on how COVID vaccine mandates likely created greater vaccine hesitancy with other vaccines earlier this week, so I figured I would continued with the theme of the COVID pandemic for this week. Since the beginning of the pandemic, proponents of lockdowns (who I have dubbed Lockdown Lovers) maligned Sweden for not imposing a lockdown. For the Lockdown Lovers, they thought Sweden was playing Russian Roulette with Swedish lives. Whether Sweden's approach was the correct one is a question I have asked since June 2020 and asked again in August 2021. In August 2022, I wrote that Sweden fared quite well both from a public health and economic standpoint. A recent study from Economic Affairs shows more positive affirmation that the Lockdown Lovers were wrong (Andersson and Jonung, 2024). Here are the key findings from this study:

  • "Countries with more stringent lockdown measures did not experience a lower death rate, as might be expected a priori." This was a similar outcome in the U.S. context, mainly that states that implemented greater lockdowns did not see improved health outcomes. Sweden also fared relatively well in terms of COVID death rate and excess mortality rate. 
  • "Compared with an average annual pre-pandemic growth rate of 2.6 percent cent, the Swedish economy lost approximately one year of growth. Countries with a higher lockdown rate lost between one and three years of economic growth...It was nevertheless possible to maintain a positive growth rate by avoiding the more severe lockdown measures applied in other countries." 
  • "The more restrictions, the deeper was the downturn in the economy, and consequently, the larger was the budget deficit." The large price tag of lockdowns should not surprise us. When you shut down large swathes of the economy, there is less economic output. 
  • "The social costs are many, such as increased mental illness through isolation in homes; increased violence mainly directed against women and children; and postponed and cancelled surgeries." I expressed a number of these concerns about mental and physical health in May 2020, and sadly, they came to fruition. 
  • "School closures and the transition to online teaching impaired pupils' learning and could result in poorer opportunities later in life." 
  • "The political costs deserve a separate analysis. The restrictions seem to have inspired growing polarization, conspiracy thinking, and protests and demonstrations in many countries. The lockdowns may thus have undermined liberal democracy and economic freedom. Freedom of the press was curtailed...In authoritarian countries, restrictions were used as a pretext for increased repression." 
Because of a low lockdown rate and intensity along with fiscal moderation, Sweden fared well during the pandemic. As the researchers conclude, the lockdowns "had negligible positive health effects despite the evidence available at the time pointing towards the limited benefits of such broad measures." And they are right. The lockdowns were implemented in spite of no evidence in support of them. 

The lockdowns ended up having negligible positive outcomes, especially when compared to the gargantuan costs. Not only did lockdowns fail in saving the number of lives the Lockdown Lovers were hoping for, but there were economic, social, and political costs that we are still reeling from to this day. As vindicating as "I told you so" feels, what I would much rather have is the politicians and decision-makers held accountable and answer some important questions about how we let such an anti-science policy come into existence so we do not have this hell on earth thrusted upon humanity the next time there is a pandemic. 

Monday, July 3, 2023

Is Sweden's "Immigration Problem" Due to Too Many Immigrants, Its Welfare State, or Lack of Integration?

Last week, I came back from a wonderful and enjoyable vacation in Sweden. While I was walking the streets of Stockholm, an article from the Right-leaning Heritage Foundation came up on my feed. I found it fitting because the article is entitled "Lessons from Swedish Border Ignored by Biden, Mayorkas." Since 2012, Sweden's foreign-born population has grown from 15 percent to 20 percent of the overall population. This is certainly higher than the 4 percent it was in 1960. As the Migration Policy Institute mentions in its profile on Sweden and migration, a lot of this uptick was due to a wave of Syrian, Afghan, and Somali refugees in 2015. Since 2018, support for immigration in Sweden declined and views of whether immigration is good for Sweden have become more divided. Last month, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson admitted that "large-scale immigration and poor integration simply do not work." So I have to ask what happened in Sweden that made it not work. 

Based on the title and tone of the aforementioned Heritage Foundation article, part of Heritage's issue is a "open-border policy." It should be no surprise that being libertarian, I am for a more open immigration policy. In 2014, I explored the possibility of an open borders policy. This past March, I showed how immigration is good for economic growth. It does not matter that a lot of Sweden's uptick was due to refugees. In response to the Afghan refugees coming to the United States, I illustrated how refugees can be a net benefit to society. While Sweden does have a higher-than-average level of foreign-born, OECD data below show that Sweden is not the highest. Other countries (including Canada) are able to have a comparable level of foreign-born citizens and function fine.  

Maybe Prime Minister Kristersson's suggestion is correct in that poor integration is what really fueled Sweden's immigration problem. In his article, Kristersson suggests a focus on social contract, common values, and an emphasis on newly arrived immigrants learning Swedish. I think there is merit to the integration piece. Pathway to citizenship is not simply entrance to the country. Not knowing a language can be a huge barrier to finding a job, making friends, or acquiring basic services. As I brought up in my 2015 analysis on multiculturalism and immigration, a lack of social cohesion or something to unite a people creates social conflict. A study from Economic Research concluded that Sweden's migration is a net benefit "provided that migrants gain quick entry to, and a high employment rate, in the market" (Hajighasemi and Oghazi, 2021).

Instead of being able to function in greater society, we isolate foreign-born citizens from participate and live their lives. Foreign-born citizens in Sweden are 3.2 times more likely to commit crime. Immigrants are not inherently more likely to commit crime, as we see in the United States where immigrants (including "illegal" immigrants) are less likely to commit crime. It is plausible that a poor integration policy is the culprit, and not immigration per se.

Then there is the matter of the welfare state. According to OECD data, Sweden does not spend the most in social spending. That title goes to France. While Sweden has an otherwise relatively capitalist system, Sweden is well-known for having a welfare state, one that goes back to 1642 with the 1642 års tiggareordening (the Beggar Regulation of 1642). Its extensive welfare state provides such services as tax-funded healthcare, free preschool, tuition-free college, and Social Security. I am not here to get into whether the Swedish welfare state is too large. That is another topic for another time. I have to wonder about whether Sweden's welfare state attracted immigrants in 2015. When I explored the welfare magnet theory in 2019, there was some evidence to suggest that a large welfare offering attracts migrants, although I maintained my skepticism. 

It is possible that the welfare benefits could have sweetened the deal a bit in the 2015-16 exogenous shock of refugees to Sweden. The economist Milton Friedman once said that open immigration and a large welfare state did not mix. This did not mean that Friedman was against open immigration. For one, open immigration was how his parents arrived to the United States. But is more than that. Friedman was in favor of a more liberal immigration system while reducing the welfare state. 

Given the influx of migrants that Sweden experienced last decade, I can see how it can put strain on Sweden's welfare state. Much like Friedman, I would see that as an argument to shrink the welfare state, not immigration flows to Sweden. I also see how the Swedish government needs to improve its integration process if Sweden is able to handle more immigrants in the future, as well as help the vast majority of its foreign-born citizens to be productive members of society. 

Bringing it back to the Heritage Foundation's initial point of contention, Sweden's immigration issues are not the same as those of the United States. Immigration can be a beautiful thing. It was an essential component that transformed the United States into the powerhouse that it is today. Sweden has a different dynamic, but the Swedish case study does bring up questions about how integration and welfare state size potentially play a role in the overall effectiveness of immigration policy. Sweden's immigration system is at a crossroads and it will be interesting to see how it all plays out. 

Wednesday, May 24, 2023

Evidence Base for Youth Gender-Affirming Care Is Quite Weak: Should We Ban It, Encourage It, or Try Something Else?

While cancel culture has made its way into the United States' culture wars, there is another issue that has become prevalent: transgender issues. The pro-LGBT Williams Institute estimated in June 2022 that 0.5 percent of U.S. adults are transgender. In spite of transgender individuals representing a small percentage of the overall population, they have become a focal point for the political Left and Right alike. This has become clear when discussing the theme of gender transition, or what is also commonly referred to as gender-affirming care. The phrase "gender-affirming care" has become a catch-all for such procedures as puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and gender reassignment surgeries (e.g., mastectomy, penectomy). 

The U.S. political Left along with various U.S. medical organizations are unquestionably convinced that gender-affirming care is about sound health care practices and saving lives. For the U.S. political Left, you would either have to be an idiot or a monster to get in the way of someone's happiness and wellbeing like that. If only it were that simple and if only the topic of gender medicine did not become so politicized. 

For adults, I believe that they should be able to make an informed decision about what to do with their bodies as long as they do not harm others. If an adult discusses it with a doctor or other health professional and decides they want to transition, that is their life and their choice. 

Much like children in libertarian philosophy more generally, the theme of gender-affirming care for adolescents is more nuanced. Childhood is a formative time in one's life. Children do not know what is best in part because they are not fully autonomous beings with mens rea. To quote Bill Maher, "Kids do have phases. Kids are fluid about everything. If they know at age eight what they wanted to be, the world would be filled with princesses and cowboys. I wanted to be a pirate. Thank God no one scheduled me for eye removal and peg leg surgery." 

Take it from Dr. Riittakerttu Kaltiala, who is Finland's leading expert on pediatric gender medicine and has presided over gender transition treatments since 2011. Looking at the data in 12 studies, Dr. Kaltiala found that about four out of five children with cross-gender or gender variant behavior and are left to develop naturally do come to terms with their bodies and accept their biological sex.    

While the U.S. political Left might see this topic as a no-brainer, things are more nuanced on the other side of the Atlantic. There are multiple LGBT-friendly European countries that have conducted systematic reviews of the available data on the topic of gender-affirming care for adolescents, whether it is Sweden, Finland, Norway, or the United Kingdom. What they have concluded that gender-affirming care is not evidence-based medical practice. Even The Economist recently published an article entitled "The evidence to support medicalised gender transitions in adolescents is worryingly weak." 

Rather than hand out gender-affirming care as if it were candy, the aforementioned European nations are using it as the exception rather than the rule. Especially in Sweden and Finland, there are strict requirements for adolescents to qualify for gender-affirming care (e.g., no co-occurring mental health problems, undergo at least six months of psychotherapy, parental consent for hormonal therapy) and for any procedures to be done as part of clinical testing. France's main medical association, l'Académie National de Médicine, recommends that hormones should be used "in the greatest reserve." In these European countries, gender-affirming care is seen as a last resort rather than as a first resort.   

The British media outlet Unherd covers in further detail how the U.S. political Left selects low-quality studies to draw a conclusion instead of conducting systematic reviews like they do in Sweden. To quote the Economist, "Medical science is not supposed to work this way. Treatments are supposed to be backed by a growing body of well-researched evidence that weighs the risks and benefits of intervention. The responsibility is all the heavier when the treatments are irreversible and the decisions about whether to go ahead are being taken by vulnerable adolescents and their anxious parents." 

It is not only the irreverence for the scientific process or for finding evidence-based practice that I find troubling. It is the irreversible nature of these procedures. If you opt for a mastectomy or a penectomy and regret the decision later, it is not as if you can grow those body parts back. There have also been concerns about bone density, brain development, and infertility as a result of these procedures.     

I generally think that bans are unwise policy and have harmful effects, which is why I will not go as far as saying that gender-affirming care should be outright banned. A lack of evidence does not justify a ban in so far as that proponents very well could be proved correct once proper clinical trials are complete and if there is adequate evidence to show its benefits. 

I see the United States making a similar mistake with gender-affirming care that it did with its approach to the COVID pandemic. With the COVID pandemic, the U.S. political Left politicized the pandemic. It nearly exclusively obsessed over the costs of COVID. This one-sided view led to multiple harmful policies, including lockdowns, school closures, and travel bans. The cherry-picking of low-quality studies on the theme of gender-affirming care instead of more robust systematic reviews is reminiscent of what many on the U.S. political Left did with face masks. Ignoring the science during the pandemic not only increased non-COVID health costs, but it resulted in the accumulation of economic, education, and social costs. The powers that be silenced that debate and dissent during the COVID pandemic and we continue to pay the price for such folly. 

I hope that the United States can learn from the mistakes of ignoring the science and silencing dissent that took place during the pandemic. We should be able to balance the concerns on both sides of the gender-affirming care debate while gathering more clinical data. In the meantime, this much is true: European nations had been practicing gender-affirming care for about a decade and realized that the evidence base is too weak to justify an implementation as liberal as it is in the United States. If given too freely, the harm can easily outweigh the benefits. 

This is why the Scandinavian approach encourages psychotherapy and only allows for gender-affirming care sparingly and in a clinical trial setting. As we gather more clinical data, we can better determine whether or not gender-affirming care actually works and under what conditions it could be most beneficial, especially for children. Given the irreversible effects of gender-affirming care, not to mention the possibility for long-term harm, I agree that the caution within the Scandinavian approach is the more prudent and appropriate approach as we ascertain the truth on this procedure.

Tuesday, July 12, 2022

Should Sweden and Finland Be Joining NATO? Here Are 9 Arguments Against the Proposal

Much like Switzerland, Sweden developed a reputation for neutrality that dated back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Sweden was able to maintain its neutrality through the gruesomeness of both World Wars and the Cold War. It looks like its tradition of neutrality is coming to an end. The war between Russia and Ukraine has Sweden rattled enough that Sweden, along with its neighbor Finland, has petitioned to join the military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). A couple weeks ago on June 28, Turkey lifted its veto to the Nordic nations' bids to NATO, which led to a memorandum being signed between Turkey and the Nordic nations of Sweden and Finland. 

Before filing its petition on May 18, Sweden and Finland have been security partners to NATO. In 1994, they joined NATO's Partnership for Peace. They also contributed personnel to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Balkans. In 2014, Sweden and Finland were designated as Enhanced Opportunity Partners. This is about as close as one can be to NATO without actually being in NATO. 

Bringing in Finland would expand NATO's border with Russia by an extra 800 miles. The ascension of these two countries would expand NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Circle. Sweden and Finland have military assets to contribute, as we see below. Given that Sweden and Finland are already part of the European Union, it seems to make sense to have these two nations make their security commitments align with the West, as well. Both countries ascending at the same time could lower risk in comparison to submitting bids separately. As intuitive as it might seem, is it really the right choice?   




1. In spite of the war in Ukraine, the geopolitical dynamic between Russia and the Nordic nations has not fundamentally changed. Russia has made no threat against Finland or Sweden. There are no major disputes between the countries. Ukraine notwithstanding, post-Soviet conflicts that Russia was involved in entailed at least some form of a casus belli. Neither Sweden nor Finland have had a major military dispute with Russia since the Continuation War of 1941-1944 (also known as the Second Soviet-Finnish War). Plus, Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine and has been losing forces without near-term replacements. Factor in Russia's military engagements with the economic sanctions and one can see that given current geopolitics, the likelihood of war between Russia and the Nordic states is quite low. 

2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine does not warrant NATO protection. You would think Russia would have been granted a swift victory, especially given its troop size and military might. As of July 3, Russia has only managed to invade the eastern portion of Ukraine (see below). If anything, Russia's lack of progress in the Russo-Ukrainian War signals that the Russian military has been dealing with its own deficiencies, ranging from intelligence, personnel, and training to corruption and low troop morale. Russia does not have the geopolitical clout, the land, or military might that it once had in the Soviet era. Russia's subpar performance combined with the economic sanctions that will most likely weaken Russia in the medium-term and the cost Russia is paying for the Russo-Ukrainian War should put Swedish and Finnish minds at ease. 


3. Sweden and Finland joining NATO could create more geopolitical problems in the medium-term. Right now, Moscow does not hold any grudges against Stockholm or Helsinki.  However, it is possible that the Russo-Ukrainian War does not go well. Russia could set its sight on Finland prior to Finland's ascension to NATO. Why? Not only to gain domestic support of the Putin regime, but also as a preventative measure to make sure it does not join NATO. 

Another factor to consider is that post-Soviet Russia has instigated wars over three instances of potential NATO expansion: Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022). If Finland joins NATO, it would more than double the land border between Russia and NATO alliance members. Such a move would serve to give fodder to Putin's theory that the Western powers are closing in on him. Russia's ambassador to Finland, Pavel Kuznetsov, already said that Moscow would respond with retaliatory countermeasures in the event that Finland joins NATO. Deputy Chairman of Russia Security Council Dmitry Medvedev similarly said that Finland joining NATO would double the land border of the NATO alliance with Russia, which would mean refortifying Russia's borders. 

Why give Putin a pretext for escalation and reinforce Moscow's security fears when the status quo has brought stability in the Baltic region for more than half a century? If Moscow were to act similarly in Latin America, or Mexico more specifically, it would be reasonable to assume that the United States would respond in an escalatory fashion. Sweden and Finland should not be allowed entry to NATO for the same reason that Ukraine was not allowed: for fear of escalation with Russia, nuclear or otherwise.  

Bringing Sweden and Finland into the fold of NATO adds two more triggers to Article 5 of NATO, which is the Article that stipulates the collective defense of the alliance. It is true that Sweden and Finland would receive protection under Article 5 if they become members of NATO. It is a double-edged sword because they could also become potential targets, provided that Russia and NATO perceive one another in adversarial terms. Swedish and Finnish military capabilities would become part of the calculus of Russian targeting and strike prioritization in the event of a conflict between Russia and NATO. Conversely, if Russia attacked Poland or another Baltic country, Sweden and Finland would be obligated by Article 5 to help out in a conflict that does not directly affect their national security.  

4. There is doubt as to whether Sweden and Finland could contribute to collective defense. This is not to say that Sweden or Finland do not have military capabilities because they do. The Swedish island of Gotland could help NATO secure the Baltic region. Finland's military has 23,000 active military personnel and an extra 238,000 reservists it could muster up within a month. Finland's main weakness in its military is its lack of missile defense. Sweden's major source of national defense is its navy. While these countries have capabilities to defend their own borders, I have to wonder whether these resources would be adequate to "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" (per Article 10 of NATO) and help NATO beyond the context of their own borders. 

Historically, the modern states of Sweden and Finland have been much more focused on defending their own borders than collective defense. What's more is that the two nations have not spent much of their respective GDPs on military expenditures (see World Bank data below). According to World Bank data, neither Sweden nor Finland meet the NATO criterion of spending at least 2 percent of GDP on military expenditures, although increased spending suggests they could reach that minimum. 

Also, Sweden had to reinstate its conscription in 2017, which could signal a weakness in its military readiness. Since Finland shares a border with Russia, its military has prepared its reservists have greater readiness. As another point to consider, Sweden and Finland are cozier with China than the U.S. government cares for, which would make it more difficult for Sweden or Finland to contribute anything significant to collective security policy as it pertains to eastern Asia. Overall, these factors suggest that Sweden and Finland would not provide much beyond territorial defense of their respective countries to the NATO alliance.  




5. Even if Russia were to attack, it would not mean that Finland or Sweden would be hung out to dry without NATO membership. As we have seen with Ukraine, the Western powers are willing to give arms and resources in the event of war, even without NATO membership. Also, Sweden and Finland are part of the European Union. The European Union provides mutual defense under the Treaty of Lisbon. Sweden and Finland can receive military aid without having to join NATO. Refusing entry to NATO would not be leaving Sweden and Finland in the lurch, but rather maintaining a status quo that has been working for decades. 

6. Defending Sweden and Finland would not be so easy. Neither Sweden nor Finland have a direct land route from continental Europe. Everything coming from NATO allies would need to be deployed by airlift. Russia's war with Ukraine has illustrated that Russia has the ability to neutralize air deployments. Sweden and Finland would be in range of Russia's ground missile, anti-ship, and surface-to-air systems. Furthermore, the Russo-Finnish border could be a challenge to defend given the terrain. While Finland could be a great launching site for attacks, the double-edged nature of this geographical relation means that it is vulnerable to Russian attacks. This is not to say that the task of defending the Nordic nations is impossible, but it would require considerable resources and coordination to make it work for NATO. The actual cost might be higher than the projected cost (see Point #8). 

7. The larger the alliance, the more territory that NATO would have to defend in the event of a war. If the member countries proportionately contributed, that would be one thing. The issue is that the United States does the heavy lifting. The United States is de facto the primary source for providing security guarantees for 29 nations. Given NATO's history, it is reasonable to assume that the United States will be on the hook for Sweden's and Finland's security commitments, much like it has with other NATO allies. It is dubious that the Nordic nations would share the burdens of the military costs. Sweden has not even been admitted to NATO and it has already asked the Pentagon for naval assistance. 

8. Much like with Ukraine, defending Sweden and Finland is not of vital geopolitical importance to the United States. I say this as someone who is almost half-Swedish and has an affinity for the Nordic region. Yes, there are multiple countries within the NATO alliance system. However, in practice, it would be the U.S. military that would disproportionately spend on Finnish and Swedish defense. Europe should bear more responsibility in preserving peace in Europe, but European powers have been content on letting the United States shoulder much of that burden. 

As such, it makes sense to ask how adding Sweden and Finland would benefit U.S. interests. What is the exact threat that Finland or Sweden face? We already know that a Russian attack on these two nations is unlikely (Point #1). We know that Sweden and Finland would not be left to fend for themselves in the unlikely event of war (Point #4). What is the measurable benefit of adding Sweden and Finland to NATO? The United States arguably has more vital security interests, especially in Indo-Pacific Asia. 

9. Since the United States would be paying for a large portion of the bill for the ascension of Finland and Sweden to NATO, we should ask what the cost of ascension would be. A 2021 analysis from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) asks what NATO enlargement would look like and what it would cost. According to CSIS, it would cost as much as $11.6 billion upfront and $1.8 billion annually after that (CSIS, p. 93, 104). In 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) spent $741.7 billion. If the United States were responsible for half of that $1.8 billion, it would mean a 0.1 percent increase of the DoD's budget. 

Conversely, the United States has a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 100 percent, something the country has not seen since World War II. National debt issues will continue to haunt the United States for years to come, especially since there is no sign of government spending slowing down. The United States should be shrinking its military obligations in light of the long-term insolvency that such an expanded role costs. We should not add the defense of Sweden and Finland to the list of unnecessary military expenditures, especially since it would not improve the geopolitical situation for anyone. 

[As a side note, the United States should examine how much they support Europe vis-à-vis NATO. A professor at MIT found that having European nations be more responsible for its regional security could save the United States up to $80 billion annually (Rosen, 2021).]

Conclusion

Yes, there is instability in Eastern Europe that we have not seen in decades. How Russia will act in the upcoming months is a wild card, especially with the Russo-Ukrainian War. I can understand how Finns and Swedes could feel a heightened sense of concern. At the same time, Russia's actions in Ukraine do not justify an expansion of NATO by allowing Sweden and Finland to enter. Forgetting the fiscal costs for a moment, allowing for these ascensions to pass has the real potential to exacerbate geopolitics in central and eastern Europe. 

NATO membership for the Swedish and Finnish nations is superfluous at best and injurious at worst. Perhaps ascension to NATO could result in a deterrent effect. I'm not going to hold my breath because history and international political theory (specifically that of balance of power theory) have me think that an escalatory effect is much more likely. In any case, I hope that events do not reach to such a level where we have to read about this in future history books.

Tuesday, May 24, 2022

Lockdown Advocates Were Wrong to Mock Sweden's COVID Policy Strategy

When the pandemic began, multiple countries reacted in panic with lockdowns, school closures, mask mandates, and travel bans. There was one country that tried a light-touch, more laissez-faire approach: Sweden. Sweden had mask recommendations starting in June 2020, but never a mandate. Sweden never locked down or imposed curfews, although there were bans on crowds over five-hundred people, and later fifty people. Restaurants and bars in Sweden had more restrictions, but businesses by and large stayed open. There were moments where secondary schools went to remote learning, but primary schools and preschools stayed open. Sweden did not have a complete travel ban, but did ban those outside of the European Union, a policy that has since been rescinded. 

It is not as if Sweden did nothing to slow the spread. Sweden still had COVID-related restrictions in place, but that did not stop Sweden from getting walloped with criticism. Fortune called Sweden a failure. The New York Times referred to Sweden as "the world's cautionary tale." Foreign Policy thought Sweden's approach was botched. The Guardian believed it was a catastrophe. The fear ramped up to the point where being strict, regardless of outcome, was optimal. Anything else was seen as selfish, careless, and bordering on sociopathic. It turns out that the lockdown advocates were wrong to mock Sweden. Here are five reasons as to why:

1. Sweden's economy held up without lockdowns. There were those who thought that there was no tradeoff between lockdowns and the economy. Some prominent economists thought that we needed more aggressive lockdowns at the beginning because earlier control of the virus would have meant a smoother return to a pre-pandemic level of economic productivity. If short-term pain in the form of lockdowns were the solution, Sweden's economy should have performed terribly since they never had a lockdown. However, that was not the case. The Economist ranked 23 wealthy countries on their economic performance during the pandemic using multiple factors, including GDP, household per income, share prices, investment, and public debt to GDP. Sweden ended up ranking third on this list. Sweden's performance helped to disprove the hypothesis that the lockdowns were needed for longer-term economic performance. 


2. Number of total COVID deaths in Sweden have been way fewer than predicted. The Imperial College model, which was the model that scared the United Kingdom into locking down in 2020, predicted that in early 2020, as many as 40 million people would die if we did not take drastic measures (e.g., lockdowns). The Imperial College model inspired a similar study in Sweden (Gardner et al., 2020). This study's modeling predicted that without lockdowns, Sweden would have experienced a median 96,000 COVID deaths by the end of July 2020. That sounds scary, doesn't it? That would have been terrible for Sweden. Where did Sweden actually end up by the end of July 2020? According to the Swedish Health Minister's data from Folkhälsomyndigheten, at 5,723 deaths. The scary modeling exaggerated the threat by a factor of almost seventeen. This is May 2022. Where is Sweden at now? As of May 22, 2022, Sweden has had 18,941 COVID deaths, which is still about a fifth of the deaths that the scary modeling predicted. 

3. Sweden's COVID death rate in comparison to other countries is relatively low. Mortality data from Johns Hopkins University show Sweden has one of the lowest COVID death rates per 100,000 people in Europe. As of May 22, 2022, Sweden has 187.55 deaths per 100,000 people. Sweden has fared better than about 50 countries that had more heavy-handed COVID regulations, including Peru (646), the United States (304), Chile (302), Argentina (285), Greece (284), Belgium (276), Italy (274), the United Kingdom (273), France (228), and Spain (226).

4. Sweden's mortality rate did not spike due to COVID. If Sweden's policy were really that careless, we would have seen a huge surge of death in Sweden. However, the historical mortality rate data from the Swedish government's Statistiska Centralbyrån show that COVID did not cause major spikes in Sweden's death rate. The 2010-2019 average morality rate for Sweden was 9.27 deaths per 1,000. In 2020, that figure was 9.48 deaths, which was a 2.3 percent increase. In 2021, the mortality rate dropped to 8.83 deaths per 1,000, which is a 6.9 decrease from the previous year. When comparing Sweden to past years within its own history, its COVID response does not suggest a calamity befell Sweden. 

5. Sweden's excess death rate is one of the lowest among developed nations. A more superior metric is the excess death rate. As the Left-leaning Washington Monthly illustrates, excess mortality includes all deaths, whether from COVID, deaths caused by COVID policy (e.g., lockdowns, delayed non-COVID healthcare, mental health caused by social isolation), or another cause. It removes underlying differences between regions and countries. Another point I would like to make is that excess deaths are a better metric in the sense that you do not need to get into the debate of "death with COVID" (i.e., incidental death) versus "death because COVID" versus "COVID was not the primary cause, but was a contributing factor."

Using this metric of excess death rate, Sweden fared even better than it did on COVID-specific death rates. A Kaiser Family Foundation found that Sweden was the only wealthy country that did not have any excess mortality for those under 75 years old (Amin and Cox, 2021). Earlier this month, the World Health Organization released global data on excess death rates in 2020 and 2021. It turns out that in 2020 and 2021, Sweden had one of the lowest excess death rates in Europe (see below).  

This does not surprise me in the least. When I took the time in June 2021 to analyze the available literature on lockdowns, I came across a study from scholars at Rand Corporation and the University of South California (Agrawal et al., 2021). The study analyzed 43 countries and all 50 states in the United States, and found that lockdowns actually increased excess death rates. 



Side Note About Comparing Other Nordic Countries to Sweden

There are some that like to lambast Sweden because their death rates are higher than their Nordic counterparts of Denmark, Finland, and Norway. While the the WHO shows that was indeed the case, I have pointed out in response that for much of the pandemic, Oxford's COVID-19 Stringency Index showed that Sweden was more stringent than the other Nordic countries for much of the pandemic. There is also the "dry tinder" hypothesis, which states that Sweden had higher deaths in 2020 and 2021 because they had fewer flulike deaths in previous years (e.g., Klein et al, 2020). There was also the issue with the Swedish strategy shielding the elderly (Rizzi et al., 2022), a point I made in August 2020. The "dry tinder" likely exacerbated the nursing home policy in Sweden. Since this was likely the major driver in Sweden's COVID deaths, it still has no bearing on the discussion of whether lockdowns, mask mandates, or school closures were necessary. 

Conclusion

Pointing out the Swedish case study does not by itself refute the pro-mandate side. A single case study can be suggestive, but you need more evidence than a single case study to prove something true or false. Conversely, if keeping business shut down or having mask mandates were that vital to public health, Swedish health metrics should have been a disaster relative to other countries. Yet that was far from being the case. The "Swedish experiment" adds to the evidence base that lockdowns are harmful, mask mandates are ineffective, and school closures were by and large unnecessary. I'm not here to say that Sweden got everything right. The main flaw is that at the beginning of the pandemic, Sweden did not handle its nursing home pandemic policy in a fashion that would have adequately protected its most vulnerable. Even so, as this report from a Swedish government commission concludes, Sweden's light-touch approach to the pandemic was "broadly correct."

The facts mentioned above help explain why the "better safe than sorry" crowd cannot stand the Swedish example. It means that argument of "If we didn't have lockdowns, it would have been much worse" does not withstand scrutiny. It means that the lockdowns were not needed to avoid disaster and mask mandates (or masks generally) were not statistically significant in helping quell COVID transmission. It means that the lockdowns did come with considerable costs. 

I do not think the doubling down of lockdown advocates is simply a matter of ego or an incapability of admitting one was wrong. If these advocates were to accept that Sweden was successful in its overall approach, it would mean that delaying children's education, denying people freedom, disrupting (or in so many cases, causing the loss of) employment of millions, or exacerbating physical and mental health issues were undergone for no reason whatsoever. It is difficult to be on the side that took a sledgehammer to multiple institutions and to our way of life. The takeaway from the Sweden example should not simply be that the overly and unnecessarily stringent approach was the improper approach. It should be that we learn from this painful lesson so that we do not make the same mistake of panicking and ignoring best practices when the next pandemic happens.

Friday, August 6, 2021

The Swedish COVID Approach: A Case Study Pandemic Control Freaks and Lockdown Proponents Prefer to Ignore

Last year, Sweden was the target of derision on the Left, particularly those who were gung-ho about more pandemic restrictions. What did Sweden do that was so terrible? On the one hand, Sweden did recommend masks in certain scenarios (e.g., public transit), banned large gatherings, closed upper-secondary schools, and imposed travel bans. On the other hand, it didn't implement lockdowns, curfews, or mask mandates. This approach has been seen so lax by the pandemic control freaks that Sweden has been called a disaster, a catastrophe, a failure, an example of "how not to handle COVID", and has been accused of killing its own people. 

There was a model coming out of Sweden, one that was based on the infamous Imperial College model that got the United Kingdom to go into lockdown mode, that predicted that 96,000 Swedes would die by June 2020 if Sweden would not implement lockdowns, mask mandates, or other stringent measures (Gardner et al., 2020). Much like I asked last August, I would like to see how well Sweden has fared, even in spite of its seemingly lax approach.

Let's start with number of deaths. How close was Sweden to the predicted 96,000 deaths? According to the Swedish Health Ministry (Folkhälsomyndigheten), the number of dead in Sweden as of August 6, 2021 is 14,657. It has been about a year-and-a-half since the pandemic started, and Sweden has had less than a sixth of what the doom-and-gloom crowd predicted. Additionally, 9,771 of those deaths (or 66.7%) were of those who were 80 or older. The next argument I can anticipate is "well, maybe that is so, but it would have been better with lockdowns." Is that so? I took a look at the academic literature on lockdowns in June, and the data-driven evidence is showing that lockdowns were ineffective at its goal of saving lives. Not only that, it is likely that lockdowns have actually increased excess deaths.

Speaking of excess deaths, Sweden had a much lower excess death rate than many of its counterparts that locked down, including Spain and Belgium (Reuters; Eurostat). Deaths per 100,000 play out a similar finding (Johns Hopkins), mainly that other countries that locked down (e.g., Italy, France, Spain) fared worse than Sweden. Before mentioning Norway or Finland, it is worth mentioning that the Scandinavian counterparts ranked lower than Sweden in terms of restriction stringency on Oxford's COVID-19 Stringency Index during much of the pandemic.


How has the laxer approach working out for Sweden? Whether we look at Sweden's deaths (avildna), cases (sjukdomsfall), or intensive care admissions (nya intensivvårdade), what we see from the statistics from the Folkhälsomyndigheten [below] is that the pandemic seems to be subsiding in Sweden. While Sweden is looking at a denouement, other countries are looking to impose another round of restrictions. 

It is not that Sweden did nothing. What Sweden did was its best to truly follow the science, as opposed to being needlessly stringent under the guise of "following the science." In the meantime, those who want to continuously impose restrictions ignore the likes of Italy, Spain, or Peru, the latter of whom has the highest per capita death rate in spite of having locked down hard and early. While the Swedish case study is not definitive proof unto itself that excessive restrictions do not work, it adds to the growing evidence base that a less onerous and more laissez-faire approach rooted in science was the better way to handle the pandemic.

Tuesday, August 25, 2020

Exploratory Analysis on Sweden's Coronavirus Strategy: How Successful Has the Swedish Approach Been So Far?

Many on the Left, particularly Senator Bernie Sanders, laud countries such as Sweden because the "Nordic model." Forget for a moment that Sweden abandoned actual socialism in the 1990s because it had failed, that Sweden economic freedom comparable to the United States, or that Sweden has some features that are undesirable to the self-identified "democratic socialists," whether that be school choice, abolishment of the wealth tax, or the fact that Sweden deregulated significant portions of its economy in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In spite of these counterfactuals, it had been common for the Left to idolize Sweden.....at least until the pandemic began.

Once we were in full lockdown mode, Sweden received considerable derision. Why? Because Sweden did not implement a lockdown. On top of that, there was no face mask mandate. Granted, they closed down secondary and tertiary schools and gatherings exceeding fifty people, but a lot of businesses and institutions remained open while multiple countries implemented lockdowns and stay-at-home orders. Sweden largely relied on voluntary social distancing. I can understand why lockdown proponents would throw shade at Sweden. Imagine if a country proved that the goals of the lockdown could have been achieved without a lockdown. It would mean that so many of us went through lockdowns for nothing. Those who get angry at Sweden for their approach to handling COVID-19 do so because they have skin in the game. They want to know that their sacrifice was worthwhile. But enough of psycho-analyzing (at least for now). Let's answer an important question here: how successful has the Swedish model been so far?

One way to answer this question is to look at the death rates. If keeping things open like Sweden were as bad as lockdown proponents purported, Sweden would be an unfortunate outlier. However, that is not the case. Looking at John Hopkins' Coronavirus Resource Center, Sweden has a death rate of 57.05 per 100,000 people. This is certainly a higher rate than multiple countries, including its Nordic neighbors: Denmark (10.73), Finland (6.05), and Norway (4.97). On the other hand, Sweden has fared better than four European nations that locked down: Belgium (87.48), the United Kingdom (62.44), Spain (61.72), and Italy (58.64). France was not so far behind, with 45.56. Another noteworthy example is when you compare the state of New York to Sweden. Andrew Cuomo touted his work on defeating COVID-19 at the Democratic National Convention last week, although the death rate for New York is almost three times that of Sweden, at 169 per 100,000 people (Kaiser Family Foundation).

Let's take a look the raw number of COVID deaths. One Swedish model, which was inspired by the Imperial College model that got the United Kingdom to go into lockdown mode, predicted back in April that if they did not "change their evil ways" by implementing stringent social distancing measures, there would be 96,000 deaths (Gardner et al., 2020). Where are we with that?  If you look at statistics at Folkhälsomyndigheten (FOHM), which is Sweden's health ministry, the deaths are slightly over 5,800. When looking at the FOHM death data by age, you have some interesting findings:
  1. Nearly 4,000 of the deaths of those who are 80 and older. About half of Sweden's COVID deaths in Sweden during its peak were in nursing homes. If I were to have any criticism about the execution of Sweden's strategy, it was the inadequate protocol at long-term care facilities at the onset of the pandemic (Stern and Klein, 2020). 
    • Although elderly deaths were high in Sweden, it still was nothing in comparison when New York governor Andrew Cuomo mandated that COVID patients stay in nursing homes, thereby significantly contributing to New York's COVID deaths.
  2. As we see below, COVID deaths in Sweden peaked in April, but in recent weeks, COVID deaths have come to a grinding halt (Worldometer). 
  3. One study from Sweden shows that those in nursing homes in Stockholm had an average about 5 to 9 months of life remaining (Stern and Klein, 2020). While we should not minimize anyone's death, looking at it from the angle of years of life lost (YLL) due to premature mortality also should play a role in assessing Sweden's success. For example, someone who dies from COVID at age 30 would have more years of life lost to COVID than someone who is in their twilight years. About 500 of Sweden's COVID deaths come from those who are 50 and younger. This is significant because setting the initial nursing home policy aside, you see there are not that many deaths for most age demographics. 




The other scary COVID model that came from Sweden had to do with hospital capacity. This model predicted that intensive care unit [ICU] would reach 10,000 beds, well above the pre-pandemic capacity of 526 beds (Sjödin et al., 2020). Sweden was quickly able to ramp up its capacity to 1,100 ICU beds, but if we took the model seriously, Sweden would be screwed in either case. Guess what happened? Did Sweden exceed hospital capacity? Svenska Intensivvårdregistret (SIR), which is Sweden's intensive care registry, has data on COVID ICU bed usage. There was a two-day peak of 558 ICU beds in April, but it has declined considerably ever since (see SIR data below). Not only did the model exaggerate by almost twenty-fold, but Sweden still had plenty of ICU capacity left. In other words, Sweden was able to accomplish one of the lockdown's main goals without locking down, i.e., making sure that hospitals did not exceed capacity.



I would like to say a word about herd immunity. When the pandemic began, experts postulated that herd immunity would be around 60 to 70 percent. In May, an antibody study showed that Sweden only reached about 7 percent (see here), which is a far cry from 60 percent. By late July we started to see a decline in cases, hospitalization, and deaths. If it is not the antibodies, what could it be? It could be possible that T-cell immunity is contributing to herd immunity, as is implied by studies from Karolinska University in Sweden (Sekine et al., 2020) and University Hospital Tübingen in Germany (Nelde et al., 2020). Even better is that herd immunity might not be so high. One study from Science magazine calculates a possible herd immunity rate of 35 percent (Britton et al., 2020), whereas a preprint study from Oxford suggests that it could be as low as 10 to 20 percent (Aguas et al., 2020). While this evidence is preliminary, it does suggest that Sweden could be closer to herd immunity than we might realize. If Sweden did inadvertently reach herd immunity sooner than expected, it could mean that Sweden has experienced the bulk of its COVID deaths as a result. And if that is true and other countries end up going through a second wave, it means that it is too early for lockdown proponents to use death rates as a metric.

While this a pandemic, there is more to consider than the health aspect. There has also been the question of whether keeping the economy open would help Sweden. If you would have asked me at the beginning, I would have expected the Swedish economy to get pummeled along with the rest of the world. After all, Sweden is more dependent on imports, not to mention greater dependence on international demand for Swedish goods. Not even the Riksbank, which is the Swedish central bank, was that optimistic. They were predicting an annualized contraction of 6.9 percent. Yet the GDP for the first half of 2020 surprised me. Although economists were predicting a 0.6 percent contraction for Sweden in Q1, it actually grew at 0.1 percent (or an annualized rate of 0.4 percent).

Sweden did experience a contraction in Q2, but it was not nearly as bad as their European neighbors (BBC). Sweden had a quarterly decline of 8.6 percent, which was still less than half of the United Kingdom (19.1 percent) and Spain (18.5 percent). As a reminder, the United Kingdom and Spain locked down, yet they both had higher death rates and a higher economic contraction than Sweden. The European Union average was a contraction of 11.9 percent, which is also worse than that Sweden. Capital Economics found that Sweden is going to have the least shallow recession in Europe, even in comparison to its Nordic neighbors.

Since the Swedish economy did not experience economic contraction in Q1, they technically are not in a recession yet. That could change in Q3, but as of now, economic growth is faring better than other developed countries.

Unemployment figures are less encouraging. Sweden has an unemployment rate of 8.9 percent (Statistika centralbyrån [SCB]), whereas the Euro Zone average is 7.8 percent (Eurostat). While it is still higher than the Euro Zone average, it is still lower than the U.S. unemployment rate of 10.2 percent.

Postscript: Yes, the Swedish government made some clear mistakes at the beginning, most notably with long-term care facilities. But even after that rough start, Sweden seems to have gotten the virus under control. The decline in deaths, hospitalizations, and cases since its April peak has been encouraging. The GDP figures are also higher than forecasted, which is also good news. Sweden's economy seems to be faring better than its European peers.

While there is some reason for initial optimism, it is still too soon to definitely determine if Sweden's light-touch method was the correct one. Whether Sweden gets hit with a second wave will help determine if its more lax, voluntary approach was the right one. If Sweden does not get a second wave, I would most likely give Sweden a rating of B/B+ for its overall response. For Sweden's sake, I hope that it does not get a second wave.

Tuesday, August 6, 2019

Financial Transaction Tax: An Oversold Idea That Won't Die

The 2020 Democratic Party presidential primaries are bringing out a litany of horrible public policy ideas: the wealth tax, baby bonds, expanding national service programs, capping credit card interest rates, and forgiving student debt. I have another one to add to the list: the financial transaction tax (FTT). Back in May, Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Kristine Gillibrand (D-NY) introduced the Inclusive Prosperity Act. This Act sets up a few FTTs: 0.5 percent for stocks, 0.1 percent for bonds, and 0.005 percent for derivatives. The United States is not the only country eyeing the financial transaction tax. Last month, France and Germany set out to persuade other European Union member states to enact a 0.2 percent FTT on equity trades in the EU from 2021.

What exactly is the FTT? It is like it sounds. It is a levy imposed on the buyer or seller of a financial instrument (e.g., stock, bond, FX, derivative, security). There are three common policy justifications: reducing financial market volatility, more tax revenue, and pay for the federal assistance to the institutions that are viewed by some as the source of the financial instability, a.k.a. Wall Street. In the case of Sanders, he would like to take the tax revenue to fund his proposal for free college tuition and erasure of college student debt. Sanders hopes that such a tax would generate up to $2.4 trillion over the next decade. Sanders would like to mitigate income inequality while "sticking it to Wall Street." What could possibly be wrong with a financial transaction tax? Non-rhetorically, I can think of a few reasons.

  1. It is not clear as to whether it would mitigate financial volatility. The main argument used is to prevent another financial downturn similar to the Great Recession. However, financial transaction taxes might not work so well. In 2012, the Bank of Canada released a study on FTTs. They concluded there is little evidence that it would mitigate financial volatility. If anything, it would likely "increase volatility and bid-ask spreads and decrease trading volume." Jared Bernstein, the former economic adviser of Vice President Joe Biden, came to a similar conclusion, as did the International Monetary Fund [IMF] (Matheson, 2011; also see Wang and Yau, 2012; Habermeier and Kirilenko, 2001; Hau, 2003).
  2. It is a poorly targeted tax. Sanders would like to target the more speculative aspects of Wall Street that supposedly got us into trouble. The problem is that the FTT would indiscriminately target speculative and productive trading, thereby disincentivizing investment. 
  3. Revenue Estimates are Too Optimistic. This is not the first time that Sanders proposed a FTT. He previously did so in 2016, and estimated it would bring in $3 trillion over a decade. The left-of-center Tax Policy Center found that Sanders' 2016 version would only bring in $400 billion. This means that Sanders exaggerated by a near ten-fold! The Congressional Budget Office also estimated the tax revenue back in December, and it was only $776 billion over ten years. This phenomenon is not unique to Bernie Sanders. The European Union has come across similar issues with rosy FTT revenue estimates. France and Italy also did not acquire the revenue they anticipated.
  4. It would negatively affect retirement savings. As the Tax Policy Center points out, financial transaction costs have lowered since the 1970s. This has made way for such retirement vehicles as the 401(k), mutual funds, and the IRA, which has made retirement more accessible for those who aren't rich. Sanders' FTT would increase transaction costs by ten-fold, which would make retirement more difficult for the working class that Sanders purports to help. This means that the FTT doesn't target Wall Street speculators like Sanders would like because the costs are passed on to the investors. 
  5. There would be significant tax avoidance. A paper from an economist at the University of Berkeley outlines how the FTT incentivizes tax avoidance, and uses Italy and France as examples (Coelho, 2016). Some forms of tax avoidance are portfolio substitution, market-making exemptions, platform and derivative shifting, and geographic evasion.
  6. This would negatively affect liquidity and price discovery. This might sound like some financial jargon, but ensuring liquidity, or the ability to purchase or sell an asset without causing a drastic change in the asset's price, is important. As the IMF found, a decrease in liquidity increases the price impact of trade, which increases price volatility (Matheson, 2011). This same paper also found that the reduction in liquidity makes it more difficult to "incorporate the effect of new information into asset prices," which only makes it more difficult to prevent asset bubbles. 
  7. European Case Studies. While the United States has yet to implement the FTT on the level that Bernie Sanders would like, there have been some European countries that have implemented the FTT. How did it fare?
    • Sweden: Sweden introduced a FTT in the 1980s, and it ended up reducing 60 percent of the trading volume (Umlauf, 1993). 
    • France: France's attempt at the FTT in 2012 resulted in lower trading volumes and reduced market liquidity (Colliard and Hoffman, 2017). 
    • Italy: The Italian government imposed a FTT in 2013. A 2016 report from the European Central Bank found a "reduction in liquidity for the stocks hit by the reform (Cappeletti et al., 2016)." Credit Suisse also estimated that Italy's stock trading fell 34.2 percent two years later as a result of the FTT.
    • United Kingdom: To be fair, the United Kingdom has had a stamp tax since 1694 [on stock transactions], and it doesn't seem worse for wear (Burman et al., 2016). On the other hand, a paper from the IMF shows that the market for "contracts for difference" in the U.K. grew rapidly when they were exempted from the stamp tax (Matheson, 2011). The U.K. stamp duty has also been found to depress share prices and distort how investors interpret share prices (Bond et al., 2004; also see 2008 European Commission paper).

Conclusion
In theory, a FTT could be broad-based and low enough where it could minimize damage to investing. What is observable in practice is that the FTT does not create nearly as much tax revenue as estimated. As Professor Moorad Choudhry from the Bank of Scotland points out, "An FTT would actually produce lower government revenue due to falling profits in the financial industry. And that benefits precisely no one." On top of that, the FTT depresses trade volumes, damages savings, incentivizes trading in other countries, and increases transaction costs. The irony is that those who advocate for the FTT do not realize that the FTT increases market volatility, which is the very thing they are trying to avoid. It would behoove the Democrats, and indeed anyone advocating for the FTT, to think twice before trying to enact this atrocity.

Wednesday, January 16, 2019

Is Sweden's Path Towards a Cashless Society the Right One?

When we think of waves of the future, driverless cars and artificial intelligence (AI) come to mind. There was something that I recently came across that I did not think could become a relic of the past, and that was cash. For some, the idea of a cashless society might seem like something in the distant future. However, a cashless society might not be so distant. Sweden is well on its way to having a cashless society. In November 2018, the New York Times reported that a fifth of Swedes do not use ATMs, and that cash only represents one percent of the Swedish economy (compared to eight percent of the U.S. economy or ten percent of the European economy). It has reached the point where half of Sweden's 1,400 commercial bank branches do not accept cash deposits. While the Swedish financial market is trending more towards the e-krona and more away from traditional cash, it makes me wonder if the benefits of a cashless society outweigh the costs. I'm not going to be able to cover every single point in great detail here, but I hope to provide an overview in attempts to answer the question.

Advantages of a Cashless Society

  • Reduced business risk. Cash comes with a certain amount of risk, including robbery of cash, theft of cash from employees, and counterfeit money. If cash gets stolen, it is gone. If a credit card or some form of e-payment gets stolen, it has a better chance of getting recovered.
  • Reduced crimes. A cashless society would make it more efficient for governments to collect money. This would not only reduce the size of the underground market, but it would also reduce rates of tax evasion and money laundering.
  • More efficient method of paying. With the removal of cash, it would mean not wasting time at the checkout line for customers, improved customer experience for businesses.
  • Simplification of international transactions. When you travel abroad, you don't have to worry about exchange rates: the mobile device can calculate it for you. 

Disadvantages of a Cashless Society

  • Identity theft and data breaches. The 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal made us realize just how vulnerable our data can be to hackers. If successful, hackers could potentially wipe out savings with a few keystrokes. This vulnerability is especially problematic with the retail industry, which is more dependent on electronic payment transactions. Cash payments have the advantage of being able to work with minimal infrastructure when there are breaches or outages. Speaking of outages.....
  • What happens if the Internet or electricity is down? As Sweden's central bank (Riksbank) explains, ATMs need electricity. The Riksbank also acknowledges that alternative forms of payment would need to exist in order to deal with times of crisis. 
  • Financial crisis. Some would view cash as more reliable during a financial turndown. On the other hand, the odds of there being adequate cash reserves are slim to none (Bank of Canada).
  • Smartphone Issues. This disadvantage assumes that transactions are conducted with smartphones. If so, this would make losing your smartphone or having it stolen all the more damaging.
  • Could lead to more overspending. A premier research paper showed how people react to certain types of payments (Raghubir and Srivastava, 2008). The more transparent the payment outflow, the more aversion towards spending. In short, it means that people feel "the pain of paying" more when using cash than when using electronic funds. This would be troublesome for a country with a low savings rate, such as the United States.
    • A study from the Journal of Consumer Research (Thomas et al., 2011) showed that those who use electronic payments are more likely to purchase unhealthy foods, whereas another study from the JCR shows a better attachment to the products purchased with cash (Shah et al., 2016). 
  • Increased inequality. It can lead to the vulnerability of the elderly because they are not used to digital media (see U.K.-based "Access to Cash" report). Immigrants are also less technologically savvy. Beggars typically receive their alms in cash. The Riksbank is confident that it can market to the elderly and get them more capable of managing day-to-day transactions digitally. That's for Sweden. On a global level, there are currently 1.7 billion people without a bank account. In the United States, 8.4 million households were unbanked, with an additional 24.2 million that are underbanked (FDIC 2017 Household Survey). This would mean that a quarter of U.S. households are inadequately banked, which could spell trouble for transitioning over to a cashless society.
  • For more detailed skepticism on a cashless society, read the Cato Institute's 2018 policy analysis here. 
  • Also read the argument as to how the "war on cash" is an assault on freedom.

Postscript
It is difficult to predict the effects of a cashless society at least in part because there has yet to be a cashless society. The overall trend line towards a cashless society also depends on the dynamics of each country. Swedish demand for cash has declined over the years. A country like Canada, on the other hand, has its demand for cash growing at a similar rate to its nominal GDP (Bank of Canada). The Bank of Canada also notes that the declining demand in Sweden is an outlier. Sweden also has developed a cultural shift away from cash in a way that other countries have yet to develop.

Given technological advancement, I would say that as time passes, there will be less cash in the world. I would surmise that at least for a while, it would not be a straight-up cashless society, but I can certainly see less cash. This trend could be comparable to printed books versus e-books in that in spite of the technological gains, there is still a preference for doing things "the old-fashioned way." In the meantime, we'll see how quickly the change happens.

Monday, January 25, 2016

Bernie Sanders' Medicare For All And Why Single-Payer Generally Doesn't Work So Well

Right before the Democratic presidential debate, Bernie Sanders released his latest bombshell of a policy alternative: Medicare for All, which is Sanders' plan for single-payer health care. Sanders' federally administered universal single-payer health care plan would abolish private health insurance and would "cover the entire continuum of health care from inpatient to outpatient care; preventative to emergency care." Sanders' plan would supposedly do away with copays and deductibles. This plan, according to Sanders, would integrate the system that would contain costs, thereby being able to "avoid provider shortages" and "negotiate fair prices for the American people collectively." In spite of the name, this plan hardly resembles Medicare since Medicare requires cost-sharing and premiums, not to mention that Medicare is nowhere near as comprehensive or generous as what Sanders is promising. It sounds lofty to provide the American people with comprehensive, affordable health care with very little obstacles. However, taking a look at the plan, one has to ask whether Sanders' plan would work in America or even be a good idea.

Let's talk about political feasibility first. Sanders attributes political infeasibility to the health insurance companies since it's in their self-interest not to have a single-payer health care system. While insurance companies would lose out under a single-payer program, Sanders is conveniently forgetting about some other obstacles. A majority of Americans historically have not been in support of a single-payer system. Although there has been some wavering on whether the government should be responsible for providing healthcare, more Americans have been against government intervention in healthcare since Obamacare's main provisions took into effect in 2014 (Gallup). It won't just be the loss of freedom that annoys Americans, but the increased tax rates under Sanders' plan (more on that momentarily). Also, most people like their current plan. Sanders' proposal is that you can't keep your current plan because he is going to replace it with a single-payer system. Even Obama realized that such upheaval was a bad idea. It's why he had to keep promising that one could keep their plan under Obamacare, even though that ended up being a lie. Threatening to disrupt that contentment is not going to make voters happy. An even bigger obstacle is that the Republicans will most probably either have one or both chambers of Congress after the November election. Even when the Democrats controlled both chambers back in 2010, they were unable to pass the public option. Also consider that Bernie's home state of Vermont, which is the one of the most liberal states in the Union, could not pass single-payer health care because it was unaffordable. What makes Sanders think that he could possibly pass such a bill with Republican control of Congress?

But let's assume that Sanders had the votes to pass such legislation. While it is commendable to see Sanders put out actual numbers, the numbers he presents should give us great reason to pause. Health care spending reached $3.0T in 2014. Sanders' plan promises to only cost $1.38T in addition to current health care costs. A 54 percent price differential from the status quo seems too good to be true, so let's see how he plans on paying for the plan, and then I can go item-by-item as to the feasibility of each figure:
  • 5.9 percent income tax on the employer: $630 billion
    • Sanders is disingenuous if he is passing this off as a tax on the employer. With the employer-sponsored tax exemption, the amount that the employer pays into that translates into lower wages for the employee. Although the employer and employee pay roughly the same for the payroll tax, guess where the brunt of the incidence falls? On the employee in the form of lower wages. Commentators have already picked up on this idea, and there is no reason to believe that Sanders' so-called "tax on the employer" would be any different. Regardless of tax incidence rate, saying that there would be a new 8.4 percent payroll tax would in net terms (the current 15.3 percent FICA tax, and removing current Medicare still only accounts for 2.45 percent, which still translates into a net increase of 5.5 percent, i.e., 8.4-2.45=5.5) that creates a net total of a 5.95 percent FICA increase doesn't have as good of a ring to it. 
  • 2.2 percent flat income tax on households: $210 billion
    • Sanders' tax exemption would still have a family of four making $50K a year only pay $466 (if said family is making $40,000 a year, it's still a 1.16 percent tax). If you are a family of four making beyond that, well, you're paying the full tax on your income. In 2014, the median household income in this country was $53.6K. For someone who is campaigning to help the "shrinking middle class" and said only a month ago he would only raise taxes for the middle class for paternity leave, it seems odd that he would now be open to increasing taxes for the middle class.  
  • Increasingly progressive income tax with marginal rates at 43.9 percent for those making at least $500K, and 52 percent for those making at least $10M: $110 billion
    • This tax hike would affect not quite 5 percent of the population. While it might sound nice to "stick it to the rich," the benefits of marginal income tax hikes are overstated. Historically, tax revenue as a percent of GDP has hovered between 14 and 20 percent since the end of WWII [mostly between 15 and 18 percent], regardless of what the marginal income tax rate has been. High income taxpayers are more responsive to marginal tax rates (Gruber and Saez, 2000), and a drop in the marginal tax rate would have a positive effect on the GDP (Mertens, 2013). The Brookings Institution also published a report last year saying that increasing marginal income taxes to 50 percent would have a negligible effect on income inequality, which has indirect effects on the health care market. This all gives me reason to doubt that Sanders' marginal income tax-based estimations are high. 
  • Taxing capital gains and dividends the same as income from work: $92 billion
    • This is effectively supposed to increase the top rate on investment income from 23.8 to 54.4 percent. However, taxing capital gains in this country is not the same as taxing income from work because capital gains and dividends are double-taxed in this country. First, 35 percent of one's profits are hit by the corporate tax. Then, Bernie would take 54.4 percent of the remaining 65 percent, which would only leave 35 percent. Going from taxing 50 percent of investment income to 65 percent is a bit much, even for liberal economists like Peter Diamond and Emanuel Saez, who think the peak of the Laffer Curve is effectively at 54 percent. I would go as far as to say that lower capital gains tax rates are better because such a high tax rate would greatly disincentivize investment (see here, here, here, and here). 
  • Limit tax deductions for the rich: $15 billion
    • Sanders does not state which tax deductions will be limited, so I cannot comment further on the efficacy. Even if Sanders could actually deliver on these tax deductions, it would still account for a little over 1 percent of the overall revenue for this proposal.
  • Responsible Estate Tax: $21 billion
    • Sanders makes this sound nice with having something "responsible," but I don't know how responsible it is to not thinking something through. In 2014, the revenue collected on the estate tax was $19.3B. The estate has an exemption of $5.34M and a 40 percent top rate. In order to reach this goal, Sanders would have to more than double current revenues. Sanders could either lower the exemptions, raise the estate tax rates, or a combination thereof. Estate taxes are already unpopular, not to mention that the Republicans tried repealing the estate tax last year (see more about that in my analysis on the estate tax). Sanders provides no plausible way of doubling estate tax revenue to fund "Medicare for All."   
  • Projected savings on health care expenditures: $310 billion
    • Sanders' argument is that because there is a single payer, it is more efficient than having multiple insurance companies, which cuts down on the costs. Under these figures, Sanders predicts that his plan would cost $6.9T less for the American people than the status quo, which is hardly a ringing endorsement for Obamacare. I am not skeptical of Sanders simply because our president already promised us lower healthcare costs, and all the American people received was higher health care costs.  
    • Intuitively speaking, Sanders is promising much more health care coverage than what even Obamacare is covering. Even with no cost-sharing requirements and the elimination of the $150B employer-sponsored health insurance tax deduction, people will no longer have a reason to question the price of their health care. If anything, health care costs are going to skyrocket. 
    • Larry Levitt at the Kaiser Family Foundation thinks that Sanders being able to save $6T over ten years is an unrealistic form of aggressive cost containment. We also have evidence showing that single-payer actually drives up costs, mostly due to waste: 
      • Ezra Klein recently mentioned the Rand Corporation's Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Although conducted from 1971 to 1986, it is still the largest and most comprehensive study on U.S. health policy to date. The purpose of the study was to find out two factors regarding health care financing: 1) whether people consumed more health care when it was free, and 2) whether it caused a change in one's health. Not only was there a negligible difference in health quality, but less services were used, which also led to less health care expenditures. In this Experiment, 34 percent of spending under the free health care system was waste, whereas it was only 4 percent under the cost-sharing system. 
    • His cost containment figures are specious at best. Sanders assumes that the slowdown in health care costs of 3.6 percent is going to continue, when in fact, actuaries over at the the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service show that health care inflation is going to pick up once more, which is to say that his estimation here is rosy. 
    • Sanders also fails to take in account another factor in terms of cost savings. In the United States, there is a significant amount of health care spending done at the state and local levels. Sanders' plan assumes that all of health care spending is done at the federal level, which means Medicare for All would also be replacing state-level spending. Essentially, Sanders fails to take in account the state-level spending into his figures. As Avik Roy of the Manhattan Institute points out, once Bernie's plan accounts for state-level spending, Sanders' plan does not save us $6T, but rather, it ends up costing an extra $28T over the next decade! What that means for Sanders' tax numbers for this plan is that he would either increase them more in hopes to acquire more tax revenue or run up a whole lot of debt to make it work. 
    • In his proposal, Sanders leaves out deadweight loss. Deadweight loss is the "loss of economic wellbeing imposed by a tax." This loss occurs because the price differential induced by taxes causes a good or service to be less attractive to consumer. Whether or not Sanders likes it, the economic reality is that higher taxation creates less incentive to consume. The fact that Sanders does not remotely address deadweight loss renders the proposal to be, at the very least, incomplete.  
I have taken a good look at the particulars of Sanders' "Medicare for All," and they don't work. Perhaps we need better figures. Perhaps seeing if there are any success stories of single-payer health care would help the case of proponents. I took a look at the single-payer system about three years ago, but it was more from the lens of economic theory. This time, I would like to take a look at three large countries that use a single-payer system: Canada, the United Kingdom, and Taiwan. Before continuing, let me differentiate between universal health care and single-payer. Single-payer is a form of universal health care that refers to the the funding mechanism, i.e., health care is financed by a single [public] fund. Single-payer says nothing about how the health care is delivered or for whom the doctors work. There are other types of universal health care, such as the two-tier system and mandated insurance. The countries I selected fall under the definition of single-payer. The countries I selected are also on the larger end, which is important considering the diseconomies of scale that take place with larger countries. By getting a better sense of how single-payer is implemented in other countries, we can see whether the argument for single-payer health care has merit or if it's mere speculation.

Canada
Canada is one of the most infamous cases of single-payer health because of notoriety. Even with the rise in the rate of doctors in Canada, it has not done anything to mitigate Canada's waiting times, which are horrific. According to a 2015 report from the Canadian think tank Fraser Institute on Canadian waiting times, waiting times in Canada for a general practitioner is 8.5 weeks, which is 130 percent longer than it was in 1993. A consultation with a specialist takes 9.8 weeks on average. These long waiting periods have created a backlog of 894,449 procedures. This has cost the average waiting person $1,289, or the entire Canadian health care system $1.2B per annum. These waiting times also affect the mortality rate by causing an estimated 44 thousand female deaths between 1993 and 2009 (Barrua et al., 2014). This could explain why in 2014, 52,000 Canadians received non-emergency treatment abroad. The province of Ontario, which accounts for nearly 40 percent of the Canadian population, is dealing with an acute case of hospital cuts.

Single-payer systems use the immense bargaining power to lower prices for health care services. Artificially pushing health care costs below the equilibrium point, i.e., what the prices would be in a competitive market without government interference, creates fiscal solvency issues in the long-run. The World Health Organization has estimated health care expenditures for each country, and Canada comes out at 10.9 percent of GDP. Granted, this is better than the USA's 17.1 percent. However, Canadians pay still pay a substantial amount because many health care expenditures are not earmarked as such, which makes them all the more difficult to track and compare. According to Canadian government statistics, total expenditure has increased in real dollars, and health care expenditures as a percent of GDP have increased by 3 percentage points since the implementation of single-payer in Canada. So much for cost containment!

Single-payer uses bargaining power to lower the prices not just for doctors, but for those doing research and development in pharmaceuticals and medical devices As such, a single-payer system provides little incentive to invest in new medical technology. Canada's investment in pharmaceutical research has dropped 35.8 percent between 2004 and 2013. Even the Canadian government concedes that the United States has a 36.3 percent market share in the medical devices market that is disproportionate to its overall representation in the world economy of 23 percent (see IMF data here).

Taiwan
The Brookings Institution published a policy brief (Cheng, 2015) highlighting some of the major metrics to determine health care success. In Taiwan's favor are healthcare costs as a percent of GDP (only 5.4 percent), high public satisfaction, near-universal coverage (99.6 percent coverage), and short waiting lines. To be fair, those short waiting times seem to exist because Taiwan's average consultation time is lower than average. Even looking at Taiwan's budget numbers, it had been running deficits up until a few years ago, all of which have been paid off (p. 31). Cheng, however, did point out some disadvantages. One is that Taiwan's population is rapidly aging. All developed nations are dealing with a rapidly aging population, but it's more pronounced for a single-payer system because the system relies on tax revenues. Much like with Social Security, if we reach the point where there are more beneficiaries and less taxpayers, the accounting is not in favor of long-term solvency. Aging population won't just put pressure on revenues, but also on doctors. Taiwan already has a doctor and nurse shortage. Taiwan has 1.7 doctors and 5.7 nurses per 1,000 people, while the OECD average is 3.3 doctors and 8.6 nurses.

Another is that by the the admission of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the agency that runs that National Health Insurance Administration (NHI), Taiwan does not provide high-quality care. Taiwan is one of the Four Asian Tigers, so it's not as if it's some dysfunctional, developing country that is incapable of providing high-quality health care. The lack of quality is predictable because lower prices provide less incentive for quality or even research and development.

PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) published an interesting report on Taiwan's healthcare system last year. There are worries that low prices are delaying development in the development of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Taiwan already has to import the high-quality medical devices because it only produces lower-quality devices. Related to the idea of quality is that the number of hospitals has been decreasing in Taiwan, while the number of clinics has been increasing.

United Kingdom
Great Britain has the National Health Service (NHS) that directly funds health care through tax revenue. What's more is that most of health care practitioners in the United Kingdom are government employees, which is a facet that turns single-payer into a bona fide system of socialized medicine. The King's Fund Quarterly Monitoring Report sheds some light on the problems that the NHS presently faces. The waiting list size is 3.5 million people, which is about five percent of the overall population. 64.4 percent of provider organizations are recording deficits at year end. Professor John Appleby, the chief economist of the King's Fund, stated last year that "the next government will inherit a health service that has run out of money and is operating at the very edge of its limits."As the King's Fund brought up in its Budget Brief last July, the NHS is facing real financial challenges.

Quality also suffers as a result of single-payer. In the United Kingdom, cancer survival rates are much lower than those in the United States. The same issues of quality can be said for strokes. For those who were worried about "death panels" in the United States, it is a reality under the British health care system. The National Institute on Clinical Effectiveness (NICE) is the entity that rations health care by declaring what services are too expensive. When drug prices hit around the £30,000 mark (around $44.5K), the government won't pay any further. Effectively, the puts a price tag on the life of each citizen at £30,000.

Postscript
The effects of single-payer health care are not just sound economic theory. In practice, single-payer health care results in creating considerable barriers to access health care, reduces quality of health care, disincentivizes health care innovation, and does nothing to contain health care costs. With the rapidly aging populations of the countries in the developed world, the problems with single-payer and its ability to be solvent in the long-run will be more pronounced with time.

To think this is what Sanders wants for the American people: Medicare for All. With how single-payer systems perform, why should we destine ourselves to such mediocrity? The fact that Sanders wants Medicare for All says lot, considering how Medicare presently performs. In 2014, Medicare made $60B in improper payments. Medicare has been labeled "high risk" by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) since 1990. When Sarah Kliff over at the Left-leaning Vox, who is by no means a free-market advocate, says that Medicare is not great to begin with, it should make us wonder why we should entrust the government with providing "Medicare for All" when the federal government cannot even handle what it manages now.

Sweden recently switched from single-payer to a system with private insurers, and Switzerland rejected single-payer last year via a referendum. It is possible to provide universal healthcare coverage and keep the healthcare market relatively free, much like we see in Switzerland and Singapore. Just because I do not like single-payer system doesn't mean that I am going to defend the American health care system as the best system of health care. There is plenty to criticize regarding the American health care system, including employer-sponsored health insurance, including insurance mandates under Obamacare, and FDA regulations over research and development for pharmaceuticals. Government regulations have made it difficult for the health care industry to innovate. As the Manhattan Institute elucidates in its recent report on health care reform, government intervention in health care has made it impossible to use the digital revolution to innovate health care, an "Uber for healthcare" of sorts. Multi-payer health care systems that have a semblance of a liberalized health care system work best. I hope that as voters head to the voting booth for the presidential primaries, they can see Sanders' single-payer plan for what it is: a snake oil cure completely divorced from reality.


1-31-2016 Addendum #1: Emory University health care expert Kenneth Thorpe, who was the same expert who created the plan for the failed single-payer plan in Vermont, released a study on Sanders' plan. Unsurprisingly, this study found that Sanders' plan would cost the American people twice the amount that Sanders had estimated.

1-31-2016 Addendum #2: The Tax Foundation released their analysis of Sanders' tax plan, of which the taxes for the single-payer plan play a major role. When looking at Sanders' tax plan as a whole, it is projected to shrink the size of the United States economy by 9.6 percent over the next decade.

2-4-2016 Addendum: The bipartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) released their analysis on Sanders' plan. Even assuming that Sanders' cost-savings are accurate, the CRFB calculates a shortfall of $3T over the next decade, which would translate into an additional 13 points to the debt-to-GDP ratio. However, if Thorpe's calculations are accurate (see first 1-31-2016 addendum), then the extra $14T that Thorpe estimates will increase the debt-to-GDP ratio to about 150 percent.

1-30-2018 Addendum: Evidence continues to pile up that rationing in the single-payer healthcare system causes considerable problems. Not only did the BBC put out an article showing how "patients are dying in hospital corridors," but the Fraser Institute released a report showing how Canadian waiting times reached an all-time high average of 21.2 weeks.