Wednesday, April 13, 2011

Parsha Acharei Mot- Does Leviticus 18:22 Condemn Homosexuality?

Homosexuality in religion is an intriguing topic not only because it's a hot-button issue, but up until very recently, it has been considered taboo to the point where the issue is simply swept under the rug.  It becomes even more stimulating of a topic in Judaism because from a historical perspective, Judaism is the source of anti-homosexual sentiment, a sentiment which later influenced Christian and Muslim definitions of marriage.

Just a brief overview of the denomination's views on homosexuality.  If you look from a traditionalist perspective, the Orthodox Jews unanimously agree that homosexual acts are unambiguously a violation of G-d's decree.  The Conservative Movement, at least here in the United States, still feels more divided about the issue.  The other movements (i.e., Reform, Renewal, Reconstructionist) have accepted same-sex marriage.

With the increasing momentum of the gay rights movement and awareness of what homosexuals endure in a religious environment, not even the Orthodox can hide from the fact that their stance of anti-homosexuality has caused religious homosexuals an unbearable amount of pain.  After all, if one of the premises of Judaism is that G-d is a loving deity and G-d allowed a certain percentage of [Jewish] individuals to be homosexual, can Leviticus 18:22 really prohibit all homosexual activity? 

At this time, I do not want to discuss how to grapple with the issue of the frum homosexual since that conversation would remain fruitless until we discuss the genesis of this viewpoint, Leviticus 18:22:

ואת-זכר--לֹא תשכב, משכבי אשּה:  תועבה, הוא.

"Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind; it is an abomination." (JPS Translation) 

The JPS translation is the rough equivalent of what many Christians use to justify their anti-homosexual stance.  Before I begin with analysis of the text, I would like to bring up two main points.  First, and this is the joy I have from linguistic work, is that translations are inherently limiting.  When going from a Semitic language to a Germanic language, much gets lost in translation, which is what merits this blog entry in the first place.  The second issue is that when you put a text in man's hand, even if the text is claimed to have divine status, interpretation is inevitable.  This is a scary notion for the other two Abrahamic faiths.  In Judaism, however, interpretation have existed for quite some time.  With that in mind, let's embark on an age-old, Jewish tradition.

The most objective way of approaching a text, especially with such gravitas, is to look at what the text itself has to say, and subsequently put the text in its context.  If you cannot do that, you can take any text out of context, thereby rendering the text meaningless.  As such, we need to know what the text is really saying before we can sufficiently say what it's condemning and what it's not condemning.  

 ואת-זכר: The word את is a direct object indicator in the Hebrew language.  את points what you do to somebody (זכר), rather than what you do with (עם) someone.  Although this seems like a nuanced form of semantics, the preposition makes a huge difference, especially if we are to claim that the text is divine and G-d chose His words with the utmost care.  If you look at any homosexual act in the Tanach, there is a common element--domineering.  The domineering connotation in Leviticus 18:22 is one of the main points of R. Steven Greenberg's book "Wrestling with G-d and Man: Homosexuality in the Jewish Tradition." Actually, when you look at the verse in the context of the entirety of Leviticus 18, the motif of power plays in domineering relations predominantly emerges.

Ham wanted to teach his father, Noah, a lesson, so he dominated him (Talmud, Sanhedrin 70a).  The Sodomites were so inhospitable and hostile to poor people that they were willing to dominate the two "wayfarers" to chase them out.  Even in ancient societies, much of homosexual relations consisted of the older man dominating the younger one.  This leads me to my final comment on these words: there is not a single condemnation of a consensual, loving homosexual relation in Tanach.

לֹא תשכב: This means "do not lie [in]," deriving itself from the infinitive לשכב.  In its simplest sense, it means "to lie down" or "to recline."  However, within the context of the verse, it is in reference to lying in the sexual sense.

משכבי אשּה: The phrase משכבי אשּה is best translated as "[in] the lyings of a woman."  A good question to ask is "what does this phrase mean?"  If G-d wanted to give a blanket prohibition against homosexual acts, he simply would have said, "ואת-זכר--לֹא תשכב ,תועבה, הוא," and He would have left out משכבי אשּה, but He didn't.  If anyone would have chosen His words carefully, it would have been G-d.  To say otherwise would be blasphemous.  Therefore, G-d must have had something more specific in mind than a blanket prohibition.  Aside from Leviticus 20:13, the phrase משכבי אשּה does not show up in the Tanach, which does not help us give a contextual sense of what משכבי אשּה really means.  We do, however, have an equivalent, which is "the lyings of a man,"  משכב זכר (Numbers 31:18, 35, Judges 21:11).  From these verses, we can figure, through extrapolation [and Jewish tradition of interpretation], that we are talking specifically about penile penetration. We additionally have Rashi's commentary on Leviticus 20:13 that states that we are talking about one act that is prohibited in Leviticus 18:22, mainly that of male-to-male anal intercourse.  Also, the fact that the Tanach is silent about lesbian relations all the more confirms that we are talking about one specific sex act.

תועבה: This is a tricky word to translate.  Many have rendered it as "abomination," although it hardly scratches the surface of the word's meaning, as is describe in this teshuva by the Conservative movement.  In most instances, it is better to translate תועבה as "taboo."  The word תועבה is used to describe Egyptians eating at the table with Israelites (Genesis 43:32), eating shrimp (Deuteronomy 14:3), and even marriage to one's sister (Leviticus 18:9) or to two sisters (Leviticus 18:19), something which two out of three of the Patriarchs did.  On the other hand, something such as using incorrect weights (Deuteronomy 25:16) is also a תועבה, which by most standards, would be considered intrinsically problematic. When תועבה is used as "intrinsically problematic," it is used to bemoan an ethical wrongdoing, which sexuality is not. When it is "intrinsically problematic," the phrase "unto G-d" is included. In Leviticus 18:22, no such indicator exists, thereby implying that the prohibition is more contextual in nature.

Although in most instances the word תועבה is translated as "taboo," one could still theoretically argue an ambiguity of what the word means in this context, since the word can have more than one meaning. I would still opine that given the context, its most probable meaning is closer to the concept of being taboo. To help sort out the ambiguity, we can look at what the rabbis of yore had to say. They had three interpretations of the word and why this act was so problematic: innate repulsiveness, a defiance of procreation, and a disturbance of peace in the home.  Let's look at these claims individually:

  1. The Ralbag (1288-1344), as well as R. Moshe Feinstein, argued that this verse existed because homosexual sex was prima facie disgusting, hence the prohibition.  This argument fails on two levels.  First of all, if it is inherently disgusting to do, why the need for the prohibition in the first place?  Second, this verse fails to account for the fact that around 5-10% of all humans are exclusively homosexual, not to mention the sizable amount of other individuals that would not mind partaking in such activities.
  2. According to the Midrash Lekach Tov, as well as the Sefer ha-Chinnuch, the reason for this prohibition is because it "frustrates the Divine plan of procreation."  Unlike Christianity, Judaism permits non-procreative sex.  Furthermore, infertile heterosexual couples are permitted to still be together.  This does not mean that Judaism has not viewed procreation as optimal, but to say that it views it as an absolute is not Jewish, thereby diminishing this argument.  
  3. There is a third argument postulated by the Tosafists.  According to the Talmud Bavli (Nedarim 51a), the word תועבה is an acronym for "to'eh attah ba'ah," which means "and you shall not stray."  The Tosafists were perplexed by a lack of indirect object, and they had concluded that "one would stray from his wife because of this."  Homosexual acts would disrupt the family life, and all the more so than normal adultery.  Why?  Because the man can provide something that the wife could not, and for that, the tension rises all the more.  שלום בית, or "peace in the home," would be greatly disrupted.  Out of the three traditional arguments, this is the one I find most compelling.
Postscript: I can go into further non-textual analysis.  I could say that many of homosexual relations in ancient societies were about dominance, and not about love.  I could say that from a pragmatic standpoint, in an agrarian society, having as many children as possible was a necessity to survive, and up until the Industrial Revolution, a homosexual relation could not be fathomed.  I can even attempt to juxtapose the surrounding verses and limit the act to an idolatrous context.  However, I will conclude with this: the Torah is described as (Talmud, Eruvin 13a) "black fire upon white fire," meaning that one can find many interpretations of the Torah, some of which can be totally contradictory, and some meaning which we have yet to find.  In this verse alone, we have found the potential to read this verse in multiple fashions.  The verse can be viewed as a condemnation against domineering sex.  It can be viewed as solely a prohibition against male-to-male anal intercourse.  It can be viewed as simply a taboo for the given time period.  Whatever the case may be, the last thing that one can argue is that the verse is a blanket prohibition against any form of homosexuality whatsoever.  I find that the beauty of studying Torah is that even in a verse as controversial as this one, one can find multiple forms of interpretation, thereby bringing multiple ways to bring this verse alive.  However you decide to read this verse, may it be done so in the goodness of Torah, as well as the dignity of your fellow man.


UPDATE 7/25/2012: I have been reminded that the word את can also mean "with," which can make a case against our modern-day concept of homosexuality and loving, homosexual couples. However, given the overall context, I would contend that the more substantiated argument is in favor for loving, homosexual couples. Even if we were to give this argument to those against homosexuality or homosexual acts, the argument that the verse confines the prohibition to a single sex act between two males still stands. 

9 comments:

  1. A few points:
    (1) "Ham wanted to teach his father, Noah, a lesson, so he dominated him (Talmud, Sanhedrin 70a)" -- I did not find this in the text. The text suggests that either Ham "riv'o" or "sir'so" -- the latter means "castrated," the former means "lie with or copulate"-- no indication of "domination." Furthermore, this is Midrashic (and the plain meaning is that Ham saw his MOTHER's nakedness "Ervat Aviv" in all other contexts refers to the father's wife, i.e. in this context, the son's mother).

    (2) "There is not a single condemnation of a consensual, loving homosexual relation in Tanach." Can you find a source for a commendation of a consensual, loving, HETEROSEXUAL relation? (Perhaps you'd argue Shir haShirim, although--despite its original meaning--its including in the canon is clearly because of the Rabbis' allegorical reading of the text). Generally, in describing sex, the Torah says "yes" or "no"--it doesn't attach "love" to the act (the idea of "love" attached to marriage is a fairly modern notion, in both hetero/homosexual marriages, anyway).

    (3) "First of all, if it is inherently disgusting to do, why the need for the prohibition in the first place?"-- Weak rejection. Legal codes are filled with prohibitions against things that are inherently disgusting (e.g. indecent exposure).

    (4) "This verse fails to account for the fact that around 5-10% of all humans are exclusively homosexual." Also weak -- something can be "inherently disgusting" (note: I'm not taking a normative position--I'm just making the argument) yet a percentage of the population may still have a proclivity toward it (we may argue that orgies are inherently disgusting; or child pornography; etc. but people still do it).

    (5) "Frustrates the Divine plan of procreation." I think the assumption here is that if homosexuality is an "accepted norm" in Halakha, more people--perhaps people who aren't sure about their sexuality--will feel inclined to enter into a homosexual relationship and not procreate. Also, the openness about homosexual relationships may actually have a physiological effect on people; perhaps the less pervasiveness, the less chance there is that people will "realize" they're gay, and they'll continue to procreate in heterosexual relationships. Whether or not this is true is probably an empirical question we can answer fairly quickly--but it's worth considering.

    (6) " The verse can be viewed as a condemnation against domineering sex. It can be viewed as solely a prohibition against male-to-male anal intercourse. It can be viewed as simply a taboo for the given time period." As to the first point, I disagree (see my above comment about Ham). As to the second point, I think Orthodox Rabbis will agree with you. Other sexual acts are Rabbinically prohibited, not Torah-prohibitions (except spilling one's seed is a separate prohibition in and of itself, which may result in any prohibited sexual relationship, not just homosexual, non-anal relations). As to the third point---this is a risky argument, as it can be applied to almost any prohibition in the Torah that one feels uncomfortable with.

    (7) All in all, good post and thought provoking.

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    1. I would like to make a point. An extremely important point.Why is it, that no one can see the context of the text. Et is before Zachar-,so Zachar- is the subject. Zachar- means "Malekind" A kind of male. The command is directed to "Ish" a Man.And the man, reflects a woman. The subject then, is to protect the Zachar-from man, as man views a woman. this command,when broken, causes men and women to create an idea,of sexuality,reflective of their own nature,attributed to a Zachar-. All of this talk about "penetration" is in itself a violation of Mishkav Zachar-. If we are not to lie with a Zachar-Homosexuality is an earthly view, applied to heavenly people. And their is no word in Hebrew for it. If we followed Mishkav Zachar-, we would see, that the gay people in Sodom were actually the angels, and homosexuals are those who have a problem imagining a Holiness of people that reflect humanity's earthly nature.

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  2. David, as always, I appreciated your response. I'll address your responses point by point.....

    (1) I will have to disagree with you. Castration is one of the most emasculating things a man could do to another man. Except of a few eunuchs throughout history, castration is not something a man would do willingly. Let’s argue that it wasn’t castration, but lying with his father. Not only would this be incest, but Noah was also the patriarch of the family (i.e., the alpha male). Noah was also drunk during the incident. It is much easier to coerce anyone to do anything while drunk versus being sober. Being the patriarch in a hierarchical society, it’s a safe bet that the sex between these two was not consensual. Whether it was castration or non-consensual sex, Ham dominating Noah is implicitly a motif in both interpretations in the verse.

    (2) The argument I was trying to make with [my interpretation of] ואת-זכר was contextual. The common denominator of all homosexual acts in Tanach is that they are violent and occur because one male wants to dominate another male. If the direct object indicator does indeed imply that the prohibition is solely within the context of domineering intercourse, it would change the overtone of the discussion within the traditional Jewish community since there are a large amount of gay Jews that would actually like to raise a Jewish family (more on that below).

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  3. (3-4) It is easier to group these two together since my argument will be the same for both. Jewish concepts of modesty and tznius were more or less adopted by Christianity and Islam. During their expansions, they engrained those notions within their surrounding cultures, which have influenced much of the world, particularly in the West. However, when you look at ancient societies, what we would consider normative mores were considered strange. Many ancient societies dressed in a manner that we would consider lewd. Romans were known for their orgies. Cult prostitution was commonly practiced. The same thing could be said for the norms regarding homosexuality. The only ancient civilization that downright rejected homosexual practice was the Israelites. All other civilizations either tolerated or accepted it to a degree. The near-universal permissibility of homosexual acts in the ancient world tells me that it’s not inherently disgusting. Even today, you can still find a sizable minority of men that wouldn’t mind having sexual relations with either gender.

    (5-6) I will agree that when you accept something (as opposed to prohibit), you get more of it. It works the same way in public policy—more open borders leads to more immigration. Holland’s legalization of marijuana led to more pot smokers. I could use more examples, but the point remains the same. If I read your Point #5 correctly, then it seems that the issue you’re trying to mitigate is male bisexuality. Otherwise, if procreation were so normative and “natural”, why legislate marriage and procreation in halacha in the first place?

    I’m glad that you brought up that any other homosexual act would be considered d’rabannan. I know we’ve been having the discussion for quite some time regarding the nature of rabbinic law and the [in]ability for halacha to change. Even with laws such as the death penalty, keeping alive the Canaanites, shmitta (i.e., with the prozbul), all of which are considered d’oraita, have had rabbis use their legal genius to find ways around them. I’m not going as far as to argue that mishkav zachar be made permissible, but I would definitely advocate at taking a look at everything that is d’rabbannan (i.e., everything else).

    This leads to a fundamental question that has been in my mind, and that I would love to ask every Orthodox Jew. If halacha didn’t permit an infertile [heterosexual] couple to stay together, I wouldn’t even bother asking this question, but I know that the halacha does permit it. But fundamentally, what’s the difference between a homosexual couple and an infertile heterosexual couple? Both couples are in a lasting domestic relationship. Both couples have a commitment to family and community. Unless I’m missing something, the only difference is the potential for categorical confusion, which I could easily argue is societal and not innate.

    I’m sure that if the rabbis were clever enough to come up with ways to get around laws that were d’oraita, we could all the more so find a way to do so now with this issue. I understand the issues with not encouraging procreation. Without procreation, how can you perpetuate a people? On the other hand, allowing 5-10% of Yiddishkeit to feel inferior and second-rate while having a “hell on earth” experience is unacceptable. There has to be a way to say that heterosexual marriage is expected, but if you are [exclusively] homosexual, we can provide an alternative option that mimics the [infertile] heterosexual couple. With surrogate mothers and adoptions, I find this to be an unprecedented option. The catch is getting past the taboo nature of the topic first before discussing any potential possibilities from an institutional standpoint.

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  4. Steve:
    (1) You misread my first point. I didn't say Ham's father--I said his MOTHER (see, for example, this week's parasha, 18:8, where you'll see another example of "ervat aviv" = father's wife). And also, I was merely pointing out that your citation of Sanhedrin is an incorrect translation of that line in the Gemarah. If you want to argue castration is about domination, fine--but it's a stretch to say that since castration = domination, therefore homosexuality is all about domination (since if you choose the "castration" interpretation of the Gemarah, then the Gemarah is no longer about homosexuality).

    As to points (3)-(4)-- I wasn't arguing your point on whether homosexuality is inherently disgusting (I don't think it is). I was just pointing out that your argument was flawed: if the author of the Torah BELIEVED it was inherently disgusting, he still would have had good reason to prohibit the act (i.e. just because "everyone knows", in his eyes, that it's disgusting doesn't mean he wouldn't include it--just like "everyone knows" certain things are inherently disgusting in our society, but of course we codify those things into law).

    (5)-(6)--Again, this idea that you wouldn't "legislate procreation" if it were "so natural" is REALLY flawed--religion legislates things that may or may not be "natural." Also, it's tough to put "procreate" and "marriage" in the same breath as though they are the same; clearly, religion values procreation but values it in the context of a sacred marriage--the two go hand-in-hand. Yes, procreation may be natural, but according to halakha, it's important that it occur in a particular context.

    (5)-(6): "which I could easily argue is societal and not innate." I don't know why this would make your point stronger. On one hand, you argue that "natural" things do not need legislation; on the other hand, your argument here makes it sound like halakha shouldn't subject itself to "societal" pressures but only be interested in "innate" matters. Can't have it both ways. And yes--the infertile couple doesn't go into the marriage knowing they will not have children. Many rabbis would probably prohibit such a marriage; sure, a couple can get married when they're beyond their reproductive ages, but that, again, speaks to the public policy/societal concerns re: heterosexual marriage. So yes, "categorical confusion" is not something to so easily push aside merely because it is "societal;" and secondly, your example of an infertile relationship would have the status of bdi'avad (i.e. after the fact of marriage has already occurred, the couple finds out they are infertile) as opposed to l'chatchila.

    As to your last point---I don't know where halakha will move on this issue in the coming years. I know my Orthodox Rabbi encourages gay couples to adopt (though he does not perform marriages for gay couples). I think allowing gay marriages in Judaism is a bad idea: since it is very likely that a Torah-prohibited sexual relationship would be going on in a gay marriage, it is hard to justify condoning performing such a marriage and, again, I don't think your arguments justify changing the Torah prohibition. That said, I think it's important for gay couples to feel comfortable in a Jewish community -- they should be full-fledged members of synagogues and be allowed--as is anyone else (at least adult males)--to fully participate in any davening/torah-reading/Torah-teaching activities. There's a difference between condoning a "Jewish marriage" that will result in a Torah-prohibited sexual act, and "minding one's business"--in the case of a gay couple at shul, people should not worry about what goes on in other peoples' bedrooms, and that couple should feel equally welcome as everyone else in the shul.

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  5. David,

    • If my memory serves me correctly, I had been under the impression that “seeing your mother’s nakedness” was a general euphemism for stating that a sexual act occurred, regardless of with whom. I’m going to check with my rabbi on that one. In the interim, let’s say that you’re right, and that this incident with Ham and Noah has nothing to do with a homosexual act whatsoever. I would be willing to concede that point because the fact that all homosexual acts were done in a domineering fashion would still remain untarnished.
    • “[I]f the author of the Torah BELIEVED it was inherently disgusting, he still would have had good reason to prohibit the act.” We are dealing with a mishpat here, so I would have to agree that there is a reason. In the initial blog posting, I had laid out the reasons that Jewish tradition has given. However, I am more interested to hear your view as to why this would be prohibited in the first place.
    • You’re in law school right now, and I have a background in political science and governance. We both well know that law has a theoretical function. In that respect, secular law and halacha are the same. To put in Jewish parlance, we all have a yetzer hara that can kick in at any given moment. As human beings, we have a propensity towards self-interest (e.g., Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith). Most human beings are not inherently altruistic, a trait that Richard Dawkins would consider to be a “genetic defect.” With ritual set aside, the purpose of halacha is to legislate what man would normally NOT do in a given situation. If a man could steal and get away with it, his motivation of self-interest would incline him to do so. The same goes with any interpersonal mitzvot. That is the premise behind interpersonal mitzvot—to transcend one’s self-interest. With that in mind, marriage is not natural for a man. From a normative standpoint, man’s natural tendency is towards promiscuity, and in a number of cases, towards either being bisexual or possibly omnisexual. The reason the Torah prescribes marriage and procreation is precisely because it goes against the grain of the typical sexual impulses of a man. Yes, there is a propensity towards procreation for many in the name of perpetuation [of the species], but that doesn’t exclude man’s premarital and extramarital proclivities. With this in mind, I’ll re-pose the question of “why prohibit mishkav zachar in the first place?”
    • “And yes--the infertile couple doesn't go into the marriage knowing they will not have children. Many rabbis would probably prohibit such a marriage; sure, a couple can get married when they're beyond their reproductive ages, but that, again, speaks to the public policy/societal concerns re: heterosexual marriage.” You are arguing that under normal circumstances, if a rabbi knew that a couple was infertile before marriage, he would prohibit the marriage from occurring. On the other hand, you then state that a couple that is beyond their reproductive ages CAN get married. Either marriage and procreation go hand-in-hand or they don’t. Can’t have it both ways.

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  6. • “I think allowing gay marriages in Judaism is a bad idea: since it is very likely that a Torah-prohibited sexual relationship would be going on in a gay marriage, it is hard to justify condoning performing such a marriage.” If this is your argument for prohibiting the institution of gay marriage, then I would have to say that using the logical fallacy of the slippery slope argument is a weak refutation. With this argument, I could just as easily argue that, by extension, if we want to prevent couples from violating niddah, we should just not allow heterosexual couples to get married. Obviously, that sounds ridiculous, but that is the logical extension of the argument being made. You have two fallacious assumptions underpinned in your argument. The first is that homosexuality solely includes mishkav zachar. There is a wider array of sexual expression than just that. The second is that the argument assumes that if you open the floodgates of homosexual permissibility, then it’s a free-for-all, which would de facto imply that homosexuals have no sense of impulse control or self-restraint. If we can trust that heterosexual couples are keeping niddah, we should be able to give homosexuals the same benefit of a doubt that they can draw the line at mishkav zachar.
    • “That said, I think it's important for gay couples to feel comfortable in a Jewish community.” I agree with you on this one. The “modesty police” should mind their own business on such a matter. After all, this a matter that is “bein adam la-Makom.” If they were monitoring this, they would have to monitor heterosexual couples to make sure they’re upholding the laws of niddah, something I am sure would feel highly intrusive by a vast majority of observant Jews. It would be great to see a nurturing, frum environment that can help the homosexual Jew while things are getting hammered out on an institutional level. But as we both know, there is a considerably large gap between theory and practice that would have to be closed for the typical gay frum Jew to feel comfortable in such a community.

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  7. Steve, I would love to use your blog as a reference point in a presentation I am doing on June 3rd in a Christian church service. In order to professionally reference your blog, I would like to be able to reference your full name, or do you think that the Libertarian Jew's blog will do?

    Thank you for writing this post. In my limited understanding of Jewish tradition, this blog has been very helpful in helping me place ancient text within the possible context of their time.

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  8. Dear Micheaelia,

    I am honored that you want to cite my blog as a reference material for your presentation. You can actually cite the blog name using MLA citation. Other books I would recommend in your research, which have helped me better grasp the topic, include Wrestling with God and Men by Rabbi Steven Greenberg, Judaism and Homosexuality by Rabbi Chaim Rapoport, and God vs Gay? by Jay Michaelson.

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