Thursday, February 6, 2020

Is Trump's Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plan Really "The Deal of the Century?"

President Trump likes to think of himself as the master of "The Art of the Deal," a book that he wrote back in 1987. Part of the image that the President cultivates is that he is second to none when it comes to transactions. It would explain help explain why he calls the Israel-Palestine peace plan he released last week "The Deal of the Century." You can read the peace plan for yourself (see here), but I would like to see if the President still can conjure "The Art of the Deal" or if his plan is a dud. Let's get in the main features of this deal before answering that question.



  •  A unified Jerusalem belongs to the State of Israel. Palestinians have wanted part of Jerusalem as part of the peace process. Trump's plan keeps Jerusalem united while giving the Palestinians a separate East Jerusalem that is outside the Israeli security barrier. A unified Jerusalem should remain the capital of Israel. Not only has the State of Israel done a good job ensuring that Jerusalem is open to worshipers of all religions, it would be political suicide to give up Jerusalem after its unification in the Six-Day War. Plus, let's remember that Palestine has never administered the city of Jerusalem, and thus has no legitimate claim to it. 
  • Slight modification of the borders. The State of Israel gains 20 percent of the West Bank while relinquishing part of the Negev, a move that would triple the size of Gaza (see map above). Israel can maintain its borders while giving Palestine enough land to create a state. 
    • Asking Israel to go back to pre-1967 borders was never a reasonable request because it would put Israel's security in jeopardy. It is nice to see a peace plan recognize that reality. 
    • Israel would still cede about 70 percent of the West Bank, even though it had rightfully annexed the West Bank as part of a defensive war. 
  • No absorption of Palestinian refugees in the State of Israel. The Palestinian government and activists have been clamoring for "the Right to Return" since after the War of Israeli Independence of 1948, or what the Palestinians call النكبة (Al-Nakba, literally "the catastrophe"). I have covered the "Right to Return," but let's cover it again. 
    • One, there have been larger refugee crises that have since been resolved, and that is not only regarding Kashmir or World War Two. This is also true for the Jewish refugees who were kicked out of Arab nations when the Arab nations retaliated as a result of the creation of the State of Israel. When those Jewish refugees left, the State of Israel absorbed those refugees and dealt with it. 
    • Two, a "Right to Return" is a nonstarter for Israel because it would mean erasing the Jewish identity of Israel. 
    • Three, these refugees could have settled in other Arab nations if the Arab states weren't more interested in using the Palestinian refugees as political pawns.  
  • Creation of a Palestinian state. The deal does not immediately create a Palestinian state. It comes with contingencies, such as acceptance of the plan from the Palestinian government, the Palestinian government discontinuing its funding of terrorists, Hamas ending its jihad on the Jewish state, and the Palestinian government ending the use of school curricula and textbooks that incite hatred towards Jews. 
    • The creation of a Palestinian state comes with an even larger caveat: "The State of Palestine will not be able to develop military or paramilitary capabilities inside or outside  of the State of Palestine." It essentially puts the security issues into Israeli hands. Regardless of how you feel about that caveat, this could not be called a sovereign state because, not to be tautological, it could not exercise sovereignty without its own military or capability to tell outside forces to bugger off. Palestine would only be quasi-autonomous at best. 
  • Regional Development Plan. Upon the Palestinian government accepting this plan, the U.S. government would inject over $50 billion over a ten-year period for various infrastructure and business projects with the goal of vitalizing the Palestinian economy. 
Now let's get back to the question of the hour: is this "the deal of the century?" Sure, we could be cynical about the deal by saying that Trump is helping out his friend Bibi Netanyahu in the upcoming Israeli elections while positioning himself for the November 2020 election. But let's assume this is a deal genuinely offered as a potential solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While I think there are meritorious aspects of the plan, I still do not think it is the deal of the century because it is inoperable. Those who have criticized the plan have done so because they think it does not take into account the Palestinian side and leans heavily towards Israel. I find there are three reasons why this plan seems to lean in favor of Israel.
  1. Israel is an ally of the United States. It always seemed peculiar to me to have the United States arbitrate past peace processes as if it were some neutral, objective third party. 
  2. Having the Palestinian government ask for such concessions as Right to Return, control of all the land in the West Bank and Gaza, a divided Jerusalem, or pre-1967 borders either erode the Jewish nature of the State of Israel or are simply a security threat. What Palestine asks of Israel are de facto non-starters, which is anything but surprising. 
  3. With the increased divisiveness between Israel and Palestine, the Palestinian government wants peace less than ever, and even the Israeli side has gotten tired of trying to negotiate after hearing "no" multiple times. The last time Palestine came to the table to talk was in 2014, and look how that turned out. 
In order to broker peace, all sides need to have an actual desire for peace. If you cannot do something as simple as recognize the other side's right to exist, then it's no wonder there has yet to have been an accepted peace plan. Rejecting a peace deal is hardly new. Arab leadership rejected the Peel Commission of 1937. They rejected the United Nations Partition Plan (Resolution 181) in 1947, as well as the Kharotum Resolution of 1967, the 2000 Camp David Summit proposal, the 2008 Olmert Plan...you get the idea. To be fair, the Oslo Accord was derailed by the Second Intifada, but that is beside the point. Arab leaders have never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity. What the Palestinian recalcitrance combined with their unreasonable demands signals is that they do not want peace with their Jewish neighbor. They would rather have a Middle East without a Jewish state. If that is the ultimate aim, nothing short of Israel's non-existence is the only acceptable solution.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir said that "we [Israel] will only have peace with the Arabs when they love their children more than they hate us [the Israelis]." Although that was uttered in 1973, that quote is sadly still relevant. It wouldn't matter if Trump were "more sensitive" to Palestinian needs on settlements or if he tried to set up a fund for Palestinian refugees. Perhaps Trump's plan could set precedent in which the Palestinian government would consider something more realistic in the future. But until there is a genuine desire of peace from both sides, any Israeli-Palestinian peace plan is mere pageantry.

No comments:

Post a Comment