Last week, I came back from a wonderful and enjoyable vacation in Sweden. While I was walking the streets of Stockholm, an article from the Right-leaning Heritage Foundation came up on my feed. I found it fitting because the article is entitled "Lessons from Swedish Border Ignored by Biden, Mayorkas." Since 2012, Sweden's foreign-born population has grown from 15 percent to 20 percent of the overall population. This is certainly higher than the 4 percent it was in 1960. As the Migration Policy Institute mentions in its profile on Sweden and migration, a lot of this uptick was due to a wave of Syrian, Afghan, and Somali refugees in 2015. Since 2018, support for immigration in Sweden declined and views of whether immigration is good for Sweden have become more divided. Last month, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson admitted that "large-scale immigration and poor integration simply do not work." So I have to ask what happened in Sweden that made it not work.
Based on the title and tone of the aforementioned Heritage Foundation article, part of Heritage's issue is a "open-border policy." It should be no surprise that being libertarian, I am for a more open immigration policy. In 2014, I explored the possibility of an open borders policy. This past March, I showed how immigration is good for economic growth. It does not matter that a lot of Sweden's uptick was due to refugees. In response to the Afghan refugees coming to the United States, I illustrated how refugees can be a net benefit to society. While Sweden does have a higher-than-average level of foreign-born, OECD data below show that Sweden is not the highest. Other countries (including Canada) are able to have a comparable level of foreign-born citizens and function fine.
Maybe Prime Minister Kristersson's suggestion is correct in that poor integration is what really fueled Sweden's immigration problem. In his article, Kristersson suggests a focus on social contract, common values, and an emphasis on newly arrived immigrants learning Swedish. I think there is merit to the integration piece. Pathway to citizenship is not simply entrance to the country. Not knowing a language can be a huge barrier to finding a job, making friends, or acquiring basic services. As I brought up in my 2015 analysis on multiculturalism and immigration, a lack of social cohesion or something to unite a people creates social conflict. A study from Economic Research concluded that Sweden's migration is a net benefit "provided that migrants gain quick entry to, and a high employment rate, in the market" (Hajighasemi and Oghazi, 2021).
Instead of being able to function in greater society, we isolate foreign-born citizens from participate and live their lives. Foreign-born citizens in Sweden are 3.2 times more likely to commit crime. Immigrants are not inherently more likely to commit crime, as we see in the United States where immigrants (including "illegal" immigrants) are less likely to commit crime. It is plausible that a poor integration policy is the culprit, and not immigration per se.
Then there is the matter of the welfare state. According to OECD data, Sweden does not spend the most in social spending. That title goes to France. While Sweden has an otherwise relatively capitalist system, Sweden is well-known for having a welfare state, one that goes back to 1642 with the 1642 års tiggareordening (the Beggar Regulation of 1642). Its extensive welfare state provides such services as tax-funded healthcare, free preschool, tuition-free college, and Social Security. I am not here to get into whether the Swedish welfare state is too large. That is another topic for another time. I have to wonder about whether Sweden's welfare state attracted immigrants in 2015. When I explored the welfare magnet theory in 2019, there was some evidence to suggest that a large welfare offering attracts migrants, although I maintained my skepticism.
It is possible that the welfare benefits could have sweetened the deal a bit in the 2015-16 exogenous shock of refugees to Sweden. The economist Milton Friedman once said that open immigration and a large welfare state did not mix. This did not mean that Friedman was against open immigration. For one, open immigration was how his parents arrived to the United States. But is more than that. Friedman was in favor of a more liberal immigration system while reducing the welfare state.
Given the influx of migrants that Sweden experienced last decade, I can see how it can put strain on Sweden's welfare state. Much like Friedman, I would see that as an argument to shrink the welfare state, not immigration flows to Sweden. I also see how the Swedish government needs to improve its integration process if Sweden is able to handle more immigrants in the future, as well as help the vast majority of its foreign-born citizens to be productive members of society.
Bringing it back to the Heritage Foundation's initial point of contention, Sweden's immigration issues are not the same as those of the United States. Immigration can be a beautiful thing. It was an essential component that transformed the United States into the powerhouse that it is today. Sweden has a different dynamic, but the Swedish case study does bring up questions about how integration and welfare state size potentially play a role in the overall effectiveness of immigration policy. Sweden's immigration system is at a crossroads and it will be interesting to see how it all plays out.
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