Israel Recognizing Somaliland and the Awkward Truth About Secession

For most of the world, Somaliland is not even a blip on the radar when it comes to international politics. Formerly a British protectorate, Somaliland voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland in 1960 to form what is known as Somalia. But after years of dictatorship and civil war, Somaliland declared independence in 1991. Out of the wreckage of Somalia's collapse emerged the semi-free, democratic, mostly peaceful nation of Somaliland. It has held elections, collected taxes, and policed its borders. In spite of governing itself for over three decades, the international community has largely pretended that Somaliland is not a real state. 

Israel changed that equation a little over a week ago by recognizing Somaliland. By becoming the first country to acknowledge the nation, Israel took a step that other countries have avoided for years. To be perfectly clear, Israel is not doing this out of the kindness of its heart. It is a geopolitical move in which two rational actors voluntarily enter diplomatic relations. 

Why Recognition Benefits Both Parties

Somaliland sits on the Gulf of Aden, which would give Israel better access to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This is more useful given that Yemen lies along the Gulf, which would help Israel with maritime security and intelligence gathering. Generally speaking, Israel's diversification of its diplomatic and economic relations has been a part of its international policy. I pointed it out in 2017 with Israel and India, and I would point out that the Abraham Accords are another example of that. 

Israel is not the only one that stands to benefit. For Somaliland to receive recognition from even one state can break the years of diplomatic isolation that has plagued Somaliland. This recognition and subsequent recognition from other nations could improve foreign investment and trade relations, all of which can integrate Somaliland into the global economy and the diplomatic community. This recognition is another reminder that Jews and Muslims can indeed get along, but I will set that aside for the moment. 

The Objections: Borders, Precedent, and Institutional Norms

Mutual benefit is a feature of sound foreign policy, but that did not stop critics from coming out: 

• Somalia believes it is aggression and a violation of their sovereignty. Its claim has nothing to do with governance, consent, or control. It is solely based on legal continuity, not the reality of Somaliland's governance, which I will cover more momentarily. 
• The African Union objects because the borders at the time of independence should be preserved. This is in spite of the fact that Somaliland's borders are by and large the same as they were when it was a British protectorate prior to its unification in 1960. 
• China is upset for two reasons. One is that it has significant investments in the region, and does not want to risk losing money. The second is that it could set precedent or inspire Taiwan or Tibet. 
• The United Nations is less than thrilled because Israel and Somaliland bypassed their institutional norms. I can hardly blame Israel for not wanting to deal with the UN given its long-standing bias. And it is not exactly as if the UN has been there for Somaliland in terms of security or development. This recognition undermines the UN's institutional legitimacy while exposing its limitations. 

Debunking the Criticisms 

When you scrutinize these arguments, they strain credulity. Somaliland has not engaged in war since its independence in 1991, which minimizes the "regional instability" argument. As for the "borders are sacrosanct" argument, critics worry that Somaliland sets precedent other entities to want to secede, such as Scotland, Quebec, or Catalonia. Yet the world accepted the unilateral secessions of Bangladesh, South Sudan, and Kosovo without the outcry that is going on with Somaliland. And yet none of those secessions led to a secession domino effect. 

Somaliland Meets the Montevideo Convention

The reality is that Somaliland has functioned peacefully and autonomously from Somalia for over three decades. When I discussed other countries recognizing Palestinian statehood last September, I brought up the Montevideo Convention, which is the most widely used definition in international law to define a state. To be intellectually consistent, I will use those four criteria: 

Defined territory - Somaliland has a clearly defined territorial claim that corresponds almost identically to the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.

Permanent population - Somaliland has a permanent population over 6 million people who have resided there on a long-term basis.

Capacity to conduct diplomatic relations - Somaliland has maintained informal diplomatic relations with other countries, hosts representative offices, and engages with international organizations. Israel's recognition of Somaliland strengthens the argument for its capacity. 

Single functioning government - Somaliland has had a single functioning government since 1991. It operates under a constitution approved by referendum, holds regular elections, has functioning courts, collects taxes, and maintains overall good control over its borders. This governance has been internal and self-sustaining, and has not needed foreign peacekeepers or international administration.  

Political Reality Trumps Abstract Norms

Ultimately, the objections to recognition are about maintaining territorial claims, avoiding precedent, and defending institutional authority, not about the people or their political reality. Somaliland has existed peacefully and autonomously for over three decades. To deny recognition in the name of abstract principles or potential "inspirations" for other secessions is to ignore the empirical reality on the ground. Pragmatic recognition, as Israel has undertaken, acknowledges what Somalilanders have built: a stable, self-governing polity whose place in the international system is long overdue. Refusing recognition to preserve theoretical rules that are outliving their usefulness is merely authoritarianism disguised as diplomacy. If countries want to operate in the empirical state of what is going on in Africa in 2026, they ought to recognize Somaliland, engage constructively, and let political reality guide diplomacy, instead of clinging onto delusions of what borders should be like.