In response to the weakening yen, the U.S. Treasury decided on July 31 to commit up to $10 billion to prop up the yen. The yen initially strengthened upon the news. But it begs the question as to why America came to the rescue. It's not like Japan is some weak, unstable country. Japan is a sovereign and developed nation with one of the world's largest economies. Plus, it's not like Washington doesn't have enormous deficits, a national debt that has exceeded $40 trillion, and the U.S. Treasury has its own problems.
Neither is this an isolated incident. Last year, the U.S. Treasury allocated $20 billion for a currency swap with Argentina. I know a currency swap is different, but it makes me wonder if Washington should be the currency backstop of every country that shows the slightest hint of struggle.
From a look at the data, it looks like currency intervention does something, at least in the short-term. A study from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) examining 26 countries shows that intervention can affect exchange rates positively in the short-run. Plus, the IMF points out that Japan intervened twice to prop up the yen in the 1990s. Guess what happened? Those gains were reversed within two weeks.
Granted, that doesn't tell us what will happen this time. But if past economic history is any indication, the effects are likely to be temporary and should not substitute for macroeconomic adjustment. So if intervention simply buys time without fixing the underlying problem, what happens when it wears off?
Japan can either allow the yen to return where market forces push it, or it can intervene again. If it chooses the latter, we could end up with a cycle of "yen falls, governments intervene, yen rises, intervention wears off, yen falls again." Sounds like a blast, doesn't it?
This isn't theoretical. The yen is already showing signs of weakening. As of August 12, it was trading at around ¥159 per dollar, after briefly being at ¥155 per dollar at the beginning of the intervention. That doesn't automatically mean Japan will run out of money or that the intervention was necessarily unjustifiable, but it makes me wonder how many times governments will intervene in response.
What began as a one-time rescue can turn into dependency, and that is where moral hazard enters the scene. The basic problem is one I discussed when Washington was deciding whether to bail out Silicon Valley Bank in 2023. The problem with rescuing people from the consequences from their decisions is the incentive created for the next decision.
If Japan can count on the U.S. to help support the yen whenever it comes under serious pressure, some of the consequences of Japan's economic policies are de facto being insured by Washington. That could reduce the pressure on Japanese policymakers to make difficult choices. The IMF is similarly concerned about moral hazard because investors may become less inclined to protect themselves against currency losses. The IMF also recommends against using currency intervention as a way to avoid monetary or fiscal adjustments.
Speaking of which, Japan is avoiding its own adjustments. As for what those are, they are not mysterious. The American Enterprise Institute points to Japan's massive debt and low interest rates as major culprits. The Brookings Institution takes it one step further by arguing that Japan has capped long-term government bond yields, which transfers those bad fiscal dynamics into the yen further.
So what happens after the U.S. spends its $10 billion? Japan will still have a ton of debt. It will still face its interest-rate dilemma. And investors will still be staring at the same fundamentals as they were before the intervention.
In short, the U.S. government will have spent billions trying to fight market forces, but it cannot fight the economic reality that Japan's underlying fiscal and monetary problems won't disappear simply because Washington decides to buy yen. At best, it will buy Japan some time. But that will only do a smidgen of good if Tokyo addresses its fiscal and monetary woes. Otherwise, the yen will come under pressure again, and Washington will be doing the same song and dance.
At some point, the U.S. has to recognize that Japan's currency is Japan's problem and that the U.S. shouldn't become the world's currency backstop, especially when Washington is incapable of managing its own finances.
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