The Sanctioning Russia Act Won't Stop Putin, But the Tariffs Will Expand Presidential Power

When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Western governments responded with one of the most sweeping sanctions regimes in modern history. At the time, I questioned whether economic sanctions would compel Vladimir Putin to change course, noting that they often impose heavy economic costs while producing mixed political results. 

Four years later, Russia remains at war, and Congress is now debating legislation that would expand presidential tariff authority in an effort to increase pressure on Moscow. Instead of rushing forward, lawmakers should consider what the past four years have actually taught us about sanctions, tariffs, and constitutional government.

Ryan Young, a senior economist at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, scrutinizes the argument that the Sanctioning Russia Act would have any meaningful impact on the war in Ukraine. Since direct trade between the United States and Russia is already minimal, new tariffs would do little to reduce Russian export revenue. The bill's broader use of secondary tariffs against countries buying Russian energy also raises concerns. Young argues that these tariffs are unlikely to change the policies of major trading partners while potentially creating diplomatic conflicts and disrupting broader U.S. trade relationships.

The National Taxpayers Union's chief concern is not simply the size of the proposed tariffs, but the uncertainty surrounding them. The legislation gives the president broad discretion to determine which countries are targeted and what tariff rates they receive, while requiring the list of affected countries to be recalculated every 180 days. 

As global energy markets change, countries could move on or off the list with little warning. Businesses can adapt to almost any rule, but they struggle when the rules themselves are constantly changing. This is why Congress should write clear, predictable laws rather than leave fundamental trade decisions to executive discretion.

If that were not enough, there are issues with constitutional governance. Rather than asking whether additional sanctions on Russia are warranted, the Cato Institute asks whether Congress should grant the president another broad source of unilateral tariff authority. 

The bill allows the executive branch to determine which countries are targeted, what data are used to identify them, what tariff rates apply, and which nations qualify for exemptions. Such discretion extends far beyond Russia policy and could easily be used as leverage in unrelated trade negotiations. Congress should be reclaiming its constitutional authority over tariffs, not delegating even more of it to the executive branch.

Russia's aggression deserves a firm response, but good intentions are no substitute for sound public policy. If additional tariffs are create uncertainty for businesses, further erode Congress's constitutional authority, and are unlikely to change Putin's behavior, lawmakers should think twice before rushing this bill into law. 

Effective foreign policy requires realism, constitutional restraint, and a willingness to question politically popular ideas. Otherwise, Washington risks punishing everyone except the people it intends to punish. Hope is not a strategy, and tariffs are not a substitute for one.