I'm a clarinetist at heart. I've played the clarinet since the fifth grade, and I'd be lying if I say I didn't truly enjoy playing clarinet. As a matter of fact, I enjoy it so much where I'd personally say that one of the most meaningful acts in Judaism for me is klezmer clarinet, which, ironically enough is not religious in origin. That being said, I cannot help but wonder why denying such a joy on Shabbos could possibly enhance anything. The prohibition, I have been told, can be divided into three reasons:
1: Concern out of repairing the instrument if it breaks, as it violates the concept of doing work on Shabbos (Beitzah 36b).
2: Producing sound is prohibited (Eruvin 104a).
3: The Talmud states that we are mourning for the destruction of the Second Temple (Gittin 7a), and as such, music is not allowed to be played in a state of mourning.
Given what we have, I find this traditionalist prohibition to be poorly based for a few reasons.
Repairing an instrument: Back in the days of yore, instruments were highly simplistic creations. Modern instruments don't merit such a description. For argument's sake, let's take the example of the clarinet, which was invented early eighteenth century. Has anybody seen how complex a clarinet is?! There are so many keys, pads, and screws where if something, G-d forbid, would happen to my clarinet, I wouldn't have the foggiest idea of how to repair it; I'd have to take it to a repairman. This leads me to the question of "how can I be tempted to do something I am quite literally unable to do?" Since most clarinetists such as myself do not know how to repair our instruments, due to the complexity, the law becomes moot. I'm just glad that Tosafot agrees with me on this one (Beitza 30a)! As for smaller "repairs," such as a broken reed, there already is a precedent set for the permissibility of replacing a broken string (Tosefta Eruvin 8:19). Not even the tuning of an instrument is mentioned in Jewish law, thereby making it permissible.
Tehillim 92 and 150: Psalm 92 is known as the Psalm for the Sabbath. The following caught my eye:
לְהַגִּיד בַּבֹּקֶר חַסְדֶּךָ; וֶאֱמוּנָתְךָ, בַּלֵּילוֹת.עֲלֵי-עָשׂוֹר, וַעֲלֵי-נָבֶל; עֲלֵי הִגָּיוֹן בְּכִנּוֹר.
"To declare Thy lovingkindness in the morning, and Thy faithfulness in the night seasons, with an instrument of ten strings, and with the psaltery; with a solemn sound upon the harp." -Psalm 92:3:4
Now, I'm sure my Orthodox friends would retort by saying this analysis is all well and good, but this was before the destruction of the Temple, and this brings me to my next point...
Reverence for Beit Mikdash: Prior to the falling of the Second Temple, musical instruments were an integral part of temple services. (This also means that prohibiting it on the basis of "imitating the Gentile" is also refuted) Afterwards, the Jewish people [supposedly] went in a state of mourning by putting up this prohibition (Gittin 7a), which is codified and expanded upon by Rambam (Hilchot Ta’aniyot 5:14) and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 560:3). There are two basic flaws within this prohibition. The first is that it applies to every day of the week, not just Shabbos. It doesn't matter if it's Sunday, Wednesday, or Friday evening, you cannot play. Second, and more importantly, this applies to ALL music! Just to re-iterate, it doesn't matter if it's vocal or instrumental, ALL music production is prohibited. (NOTE: the prohibition of vocal music has been ignored from the get-go). This implication is profound, particularly for Chassids who sing niggunim at the Shabbos dinner table. Either they're incosistent for not allowing instrumental music on Shabbos or they're hypocritical for singing their songs of joy. You can't have it both ways, even though you'd like to! It's safe to say that this prohibition is not widely followed, if at all. If you make a concession with vocal music, you have to make it with instrumental music as well.
Producing noise: This Talmudic prohibition (Eruvin 104a) is beyond ridiculous, mostly because nobody practices it. Jews sing and bang the table on Shabbos. Our voices, by definition, produce noise. If we weren't able to produce noise, Shabbos wouldn't be much of a joyous occassion, now would it? Even if you go with the Rishonim that believe that producing noise is limited to music, like Rambam does (Hilchot Shabbat 23:4), then you still have to deal with the aforementioned inconsistencies.
Bringing Joy to the Sabbath: Numbers 10:10 states that "[O]n your joyous occasions, your fixed festivals and your new moon days, you shall sound the trumpets over your burnt offerings and your sacrifices of well being.” The Sabbath, by definition, is a fixed festival, not to mention a joyous occassion. I would like to point out that the supposed prohibition of musical instruments is in junction with the prohibition of clapping and dancing on Shabbos (Beitzah 36b), something which Chassids are infamous for doing. If the purpose of clapping and dancing are to bring joy to Shabbos, then, in the name of consistency, the same should be done for musical instruments. It's also worth pointing out that HaMeiri already noted the fact that Nachmanides' students played instruments during Shabbat (Meiri, Sefer Magen Avot 10). Hearing Shalom Aleichem on the violin or Eishes Chayil on the clarinet would not only preserve the spirit of the holiday (particularly since there's no real basis for the prohibition), but also enhance its celebration.
Discussing this with one of my friends, who happens to be an Orthodox rabbi, he was kind enough to respond to some of the concerns I had regarding this prohibition via, which I will have to post and divide in multiple comments:
ReplyDeleteClapping, smacking legs, and dancing-- First, let us consider the Talmud in Beitzah. The Talmud on folio 36b has a mishnah which forbids clapping, smacking one’s leg, and dancing on Jewish holidays on the d’rabanan level. The g’mara there explains that the reason for this is a decree lest one come “לתקן כלי שיר,” a phrase which I am deliberately not translating because the commentaries dispute its meaning in a manner which is highly material to this discussion.
The Talmud on folio 30a there cites this line from the mishnah in the middle of an amoraic debate:
“Rava the son of Rav Chanin said to Abaye: We are taught in a mishnah, ‘One may not clap, smack his leg, or dance [on Jewish holidays].’ And nowadays, that we see that this is done, we do not say to them anything [in protest]? He said to him ... here, too, leave the Israelites – it is better that they be unintentional sinners and that they should not be intentional sinners.”
Here we see that the practice of clapping, smacking legs, and dancing in violation of the mishnah is not accepted by the amoraim, and yet since they realize that their rebuke will not be heeded they decide that it is better for the Jews to be sinning unintentionally than intentionally (resulting in a lesser Divine punishment for their misdeeds).
The rishonim debate what the meaning of the phrase “לתקן כלי שיר,” is. According to Rabbeinu Chananel (36b) and the Tosafists (30a), the meaning is that a person might come to make a musical instrument. Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Sabbath 23:5) and the Meiri (Beit HaB’chirah, Beitzah 36b) state that one might come to fix a musical instrument. It is unclear as to which side Rashi supports as his language is somewhat ambiguous. It stands to reason that he sides with the Tosafists as they would likely have either followed in the footsteps of their grandfather or called attention to Rashi’s misinterpretation of the nature of the decree as they are wont to do. The Ran and Rosh simply cite the Talmud and do not provide any clear explanation as to where they lie in the above debate.
It is on folio 30a that the Tosafists make the famous claim to which you made reference. It is important to pay attention to the actual formulation of this leniency because even the slightest misquotation can result in an errant ruling. The Tosafists say, “And however, for us it is permitted, for only in their days, when they were experts in making a musical instrument, does it belong to decree. But for us, we are not experts to make a musical instrument and it is not fitting to decree.”
Again, the Tosafists emphasize that the decree is against making a musical instrument, not simply fixing one. Further, it will be instructive to note the fact that their comment is made with regard to the discussion in the Talmud about clapping, smacking legs, and dancing, and particularly about the words, “We are taught in a mishnah, ‘One may not clap…or dance.’” We shall revisit these points later in our discussion.
Making sounds-- The Talmud in Eruvin 104a recalls a story in which Ula went to the house of Rav Menasheh. A man knocked on Rav Menasheh’s door and Ula thought him to be violating the Sabbath. Rava (or Rabbah, depending on the version of the Talmud) defended the man’s actions, stating that only musical kinds of sounds were forbidden. The Talmud attempts to contradict Rava’s limitation of the decree, hoping to prove that in fact all sound making is forbidden on the Sabbath. The Talmud explains all of the contradicting laws in a different manner, seeming to uphold Rava’s limitation.
ReplyDeleteRabbeinu Chananel (104b) holds that Ula is, in fact, correct. Other rishonim, including Rosh (Eruvin 10:20) and Rif (Eruvin 35b), explain that he may have supported his argument from the fact that the Jerusalmean Talmud indicates that it accepted an opinion identical to Ula’s. They themselves disagree and uphold the apparent conclusion of Rava. The gloss on the Rosh indicates that the Or Zarua was stringent and that the Maharam Mirutenberg was lenient. The Maharam Mirutenberg’s student, the Mordechai, was lenient in Beitzah (sign 696), as was the Meiri (Eruvin 104a). The Tosafists (Eruvin 104a) add that Rabbi Yehudah son of Barzilai also was lenient, though their own conclusion is ambiguous. Rambam (23:4) also rules like Rava. The Magid Mishnah there mentions the dissenting opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel but affirms Rambam’s ruling.
Whereas we saw the rationale for the prohibition of clapping articulated in the Talmud, the logic behind the prohibition to cause noise is not immediately apparent in the Talmud, and in fact many of the rishonim do not offer an explanation for the prohibition. Meiri (Magen Avot 10) and Rambam (23:4) are the only ones who shed light on the cause for the prohibition, stating that it is lest one come to repair a musical instrument.
In your blog, you correctly identified a logical absurdity which occurred to Chazal when they enacted this decree: one cannot possibly be expected not to talk, sing, or otherwise use his voice on the Sabbath. Whether Chazal realized that including song in a decree would be too restrictive to be observed or they observed that people singing did not wind up pulling out their guitars and playing them, Chazal deliberately omitted such a prohibition from their decree. As the ones who formulated the decree, after all, they had the full right to formulate it as they saw fit, and indeed they agreed with you that forbidding singing would be too much of a stretch. All that they forbade with this decree was using some sort of object to create a sound.
Ramban’s students-- The Meiri in Magen Avot 10 mentions that the students of the Ramban were accustomed to playing musical instruments on the Sabbath. As mentioned before, the Meiri viewed this as categorically forbidden because of the decree lest one come to repair a musical instrument. He notes that not only is it logical to forbid playing musical instruments lest one come to repair a musical instrument since even clapping and smacking one’s legs are forbidden as is explicit in Beitzah, but in fact the Talmud explicitly forbids such activities in Eruvin.
ReplyDeleteIt is worthwhile to note that Ramban himself never permitted such an activity against the explicit statement in the Talmud, and furthermore it is important to be aware of the fact that we find people acting wrongly throughout Jewish law books. Recall the discussion between Rava the son of Rav Chanin and Abaye above. We see that even in the Talmud itself is there mention of unlawful behavior on the part of Jews, yet it is not approved of by the amoraim.
But wait! Isn’t this precisely what the Tosafists were permitting in their comment on Beitzah 30a? We will investigate precisely this question later on, but for now let us note that Meiri, a contemporary of the Tosafists, might have at very least disagreed with the Tosafists’ assertion that the decree no longer applied during his time.
On nullifying decrees-- The matter of a decree no longer having effect upon its reason becoming obsolete is one which you and I discussed over Skype. When looking into the contemporary ruling in our discussion, I chanced upon an instructive passage in the Beit Yosef (Orach Chayim 339) which overturns our misunderstanding of the idea. The Beit Yosef comments on the ruling of the Tur forbidding clapping, smacking one’s legs, and dancing, mentioning the aforementioned leniency of the Tosafists:
ReplyDelete“And even though in the first chapter of Beitzah (5a-b) we say that even though the reason of the decree is null, the decree is not null, the Tosafists compared it (the decree against clapping, smacking one’s legs, and dancing) to uncovered fluids, which are now permitted since snakes are not found, as they of blessed memory wrote in the second chapter of Avodah Zarah (35a s.v. Chada).” (Emphasis added)
The case to which the Beit Yosef is alluding is the prohibition to consume fluids that have been left uncovered overnight for fear that snakes may have injected their venom into said fluids, meaning that they may now be poisonous. The Tosafists state that the decree forbidding such fluids was made only in places where it is common to find snakes. Where it is not common to find snakes, though, the decree never applied in the first place. So in houses that are sealed off from snakes there is no prohibition to consume fluids that had been left uncovered throughout the night. Similar logic would prevail here, based on the general principle of "מילתא דלא שכיח לא גזרו ביה רבנן" – “Matters that are uncommon: the rabbis did not decree by them,” according to the Rama (389:3, see below).
This point is really meant to be tangential, so I will not go through the Talmud in Beitzah 5a-b, but I did look at the source inside and have found the Beit Yosef’s claim to be accurate. It is noteworthy that the Darkei Moshe (339) and other acharonim also understood the g’mara there as the Beit Yosef did, and that seems to be the simple and undisputed understanding of that piece of g’mara.
What I really meant to do by introducing the Beit Yosef here was to call attention to the passage I put in boldface. Note that even when a decree’s reason is not applicable does the actual law in the decree still have effect. So any notion to the contrary is clearly not to be entertained based on the g’mara in Beitzah 5a-b.
Acharonim-- The Shulchan Aruch (338:1) brings the prohibition against making sound with musical instruments on the Sabbath in a musical manner, ruling like most rishonim in accordance with the opinion of Rava over Ula and ruling that musical instruments are forbidden to be played on the Sabbath.
ReplyDeleteIn the next chapter, the Shulchan Aruch (339:3) brings the law forbidding clapping, smacking one’s legs, and dancing on the Sabbath. He then brings some cases that were mentioned in Eruvin 104a in the debate between Rava and Ula, stating that they too are forbidden. The reason in both cases, says the Shulchan Aruch, is lest one come to repair a musical instrument. The Rama then notes that in his time, there were those who clapped and danced on the Sabbath without receiving rebuke from anyone. With language that is nearly identical to that on Beitzah 30a, he states that it is better that such people be accidental sinners rather than intentional ones. He then offers a secondary explanation, stating,
“And some say that in this time all is permitted, for we are not experts in making musical instruments and there is not to decree ‘שמא יתקן כלי שיר,’ for it is a matter that is uncommon. And it is possible that on this they were accustomed to be lenient by everything.”
There is a general rule for understanding rulings given in the Shulchan Aruch and Rama, which is that if there is an authorless opinion followed by an opinion attributed to, “And some say,” the ruling is like the authorless opinion. I believe that the reasoning is that the nameless opinion represents the basic and fundamental opinion of the author, whereas the one from “And some say” is secondary and not subscribed to by the author. In any case, the rule is what it is. In this case, it is clear where the Rama’s loyalties lie: with those who would forbid the practice of clapping and dancing on the Sabbath. Note how, even after the Tosafists’ time, the Rama thinks that there’s still enough of a concern to uphold the prohibition. No commentaries on the Rama dispute this ruling.
It thus seems that no one other than Tosafists has permitted clapping or dancing on the Sabbath, including the Shulchan Aruch HaRav, a highly authoritative Lubavitch code of law, who rules like the Rama (339:2). We will investigate the opinion of the Aruch HaShulchan below.
Now wait a minute! Let’s ignore just for a moment that the Rama rejects the Tosafists’ leniency. Didn’t the Rama say that “all” is permitted according to this rejected opinion? Shouldn’t that include the things which the Shulchan Aruch included in this very law from the dispute in Eruvin 104a, which presumably should also extend to playing musical instruments?
The L’vush, whose work is essentially an expanded form of the Shulchan Aruch that explains the rulings at greater length; the Eliyah Rabbah; the Tosefet Shabbat; and the Mishnah B’rurah here all state unequivocally that the Rama was only permitting clapping and dancing but not any of the other things mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch, thus excluding playing musical instruments as well. The Tosefet Shabbat has indisputable proof for this claim: the Rama himself said just one chapter earlier that he was going to explain why there were those who were lenient about clapping and dancing (338:2). Note further that the Rama did not mention this leniency in 338:1 when the Shulchan Aruch brought his prohibition of making music with musical instruments. Obviously, the Rama was only trying to explain this one practice of clapping and dancing.
Inference by omission-- Something smells terribly fishy. If it’s the case that clapping and dancing are forbidden because of the decree שמא יתקן כלי שיר and making sound is forbidden for precisely the same reason, then why is the Rama only lenient by clapping and dancing and not by musical instruments? It’s the same decree with the same reasoning, so why isn’t the leniency the same?!
ReplyDeleteThe answer is so mind-numbingly obvious that it’s even been staring us in the face this whole time. Let us briefly recall the explanations given by the rishonim for the various prohibitions we have noted.
Tosafists, Rabbeinu Chananel
Clapping, smacking legs, dancing: Lest you make a musical instrument
Making sound: None given
Rambam, Meiri
Clapping, smacking legs, dancing: Lest you repair a musical instrument
Making sound: Lest you repair a musical instrument
Are you ready for this?
According to Rambam and Meiri, there is no difference between clapping, smacking your legs, dancing, and making sound: all of them are forbidden lest you repair a musical instrument. The Meiri is actually quite explicit about this in Magen Avot 10. We’re dealing with one decree, and the moment that the decree no longer applies, all of these activities are permitted; however, Rambam and Meiri never subscribe to the idea that the decree no longer applies, and so they forbid all of these activities. The Shulchan Aruch, as is often his practice, rules like the Rambam, even underscoring the fact that the law is common to both cases by incorporating the rulings into one law in Shulchan Aruch.
But what happens with the Tosafists and Rabbeinu Chananel? They don’t explain the prohibition of making sound at all, leaving one to wonder what exactly the problem is. Doesn’t it make sense to suggest that the prohibition is lest you make a musical instrument as by clapping, smacking legs, and dancing? Absolutely not! Behold, one of the ways in which one can go about making a sound is by playing his musical instrument. Does it make any sense that Chazal should decree that you can’t make sound with your musical instrument lest you come to make another musical instrument? You’re using one, for heaven’s sake! What do you need to make one for? If this one breaks, you might as well just fix it!
ReplyDeleteWait, did I just say what I think I said? A person who plays a musical instrument might come to fix it? Surely that’s something to be concerned about, now isn’t it? So obviously the decree against making sound, according to the Tosafists, is lest you come to fix an instrument.
Still not convinced? Here’s a proof by contradiction. Ready? Here we go. Suppose that, in fact, the Tosafists held that clapping, dancing, smacking legs, and making sound were all forbidden under the same edict. If that’s the case, then once the decree is no longer binding, none of the prohibitions is binding. Yet where do we find that the Tosafists were lenient? Only in Beitzah 30a, where the discussion was by clapping, smacking one’s legs, and dancing. But hold on! If the Tosafists thought that making sound was forbidden under the same law as that which outlawed clapping, then shouldn’t they tell us in Eruvin, when making sound is discussed, that nowadays we allow making sound because the decree about making an instrument (a decree which we already demonstrated to be nonsensical in such a context) no longer applies and so we are allowed to play instruments on the Sabbath? But we observe that they do no such thing! We have thus reached a contradiction. It is thus clear that our initial assumption that the Tosafists regarded all of these prohibitions as falling under the confines of one edict is entirely false.
ReplyDeleteDidn’t it ever strike you as odd that the g’mara in Eruvin never once even alludes to the prohibition of clapping while the g’mara in Beitzah similarly seems to be blind to the existence of the prohibition of playing a musical instrument? You’d think that if they were one and the same then you might see some sort of mention of the two in the same place, but that never happens. Maybe that helped give the Tosafists the sense that the prohibitions were not conjoined at the hip.
But wait, it gets better. Remember how the Meiri said to the Ramban’s students that it was blatantly obvious from a logical standpoint that playing musical instruments on the Sabbath was forbidden in light of the prohibition to even clap one’s hands, yet the g’mara went ahead and explicitly told us the prohibition anyway? Kind of funny that the Meiri should say such a thing. The Meiri is the champion of the perspective that we are dealing with just one decree on everything here, and yet the point that the Meiri makes really seems to support the idea that there are two separate decrees.
ReplyDeleteConsider two things. Number one, if it was all one decree then you’d think that the g’mara in Eruvin would say that it’s forbidden to knock on a door on the Sabbath because it’s forbidden to clap your hands on the Sabbath as well, the term “forbidden to clap your hands” being the same secret code for the decree against fixing a musical instrument on the Sabbath as was used by clapping. Yet the g’mara in Eruvin tells us that the problem is making noise. In other words, if the g’mara meant to refer to the same decree, then it should’ve referred to the decree in the same way, namely that it’s forbidden to clap your hands. We find this kind of behavior often in the Talmud. So what gives?
Secondly, if it’s so blatantly obvious that making a sound with an item on the Sabbath is forbidden once I know that clapping is forbidden lest I come to fix an instrument, as the Meiri assumes, then why does the g’mara need to come and tell me this explicitly in Eruvin 104a? The g’mara can’t spell out every single little law for me! The g’mara always assumes that I’m smart enough to use my head and make simple logical extensions like that, so why even bother telling me that it’s forbidden to make sound on the Sabbath? Again, tell me in Eruvin 104a that it’s forbidden to clap my hands and then I’ll figure out that it’s also forbidden to make a sound with an instrument!
For the Tosafists, these two questions are nonstarters. There are two decrees, not one. The first question is answered quite simply. The g’mara couldn’t use the code words of “forbidden to clap your hands” to refer to the prohibition about making noise because they’re two different decrees altogether. And similarly with the second question: it is not a logical conclusion that making sound with an instrument is forbidden by virtue of the fact that clapping your hands is forbidden because the reasons for each of the prohibitions are entirely different. The g’mara has to spell out for you that making sound is forbidden on the Sabbath since you would otherwise have no other way of knowing about this prohibition.
ReplyDeleteNow that we’ve established the Tosafists’ position, its ramifications are obvious. In the case of clapping hands, the Tosafists’ believed that the prohibition was lest someone come to make a musical instrument. The Tosafists observed, however, that nobody in their time really knew how to make an instrument, so their stance was that מילתא דלא שכיח לא גזרו ביה רבנן – the decree did not apply. But when it came to the prohibition of making sound, including playing a musical instrument, the story was entirely different. The concern behind that prohibition was that people might come to simply fix their musical instruments, and that surely is not beyond the abilities of the average musician. Therefore, in that case it was clear to the Tosafists that the decree still applied and it was still forbidden to use an item to make sound on the Sabbath.
It’s very sensible as well that the Tosafists should have been lenient when they were and stringent when they weren’t. Besides the fact that we see all over the Talmud that Chazal made the following distinction, it is perfectly logical to be more lenient about a greater act and more strict about a lesser act. That is, if someone is going to go ahead and make a whole instrument from scratch, that takes a considerable amount of effort and really looks like a creative action. People naturally will suspect that it is forbidden to do such a thing, and therefore there is less need to enforce prohibitive decrees. But when it comes to just doing a simple little behavior like fixing a tiny piece of an instrument that fell off, got dislodged, or who knows what, people will marginalize the actions, rationalizing the situation and telling themselves that it’s okay to do what they’re doing on the Sabbath when it truly is not. Because of this heightened risk, there is far greater need to declare prohibitively in the hopes of stopping people from violating the Sabbath. Hence a further rationale for the Tosafists to be lenient about the prohibition associated with making a musical instrument and strict about the prohibition associated with fixing one.
The Rama followed in the words of the Tosafists, bringing their leniency only in the case of clapping and dancing, and not stating it by playing musical instruments since such a leniency never existed in the first place. The fact that the Shulchan Aruch lops all of the prohibitions into one law (339:3) is insignificant: as a gloss to the Shulchan Aruch, the Rama was forced to go along with his format. It stands to reason that the Rama would have distinguished between the prohibitions and put them into separate laws had he written his own independent work.
Aruch HaShulchan-- The Aruch HaShulchan, who is famously known to have the occasional radical opinion both on the stringent side as well as the lenient, has a different take on the whole issue. His claim (339:9) is as follows: the kind of clapping and dancing we do nowadays was never forbidden in the first place because in the times of Chazal they only danced and clapped along with instrumental music. That is, clapping and dancing never stood alone but were always together with instruments. But nowadays we clap along with singing despite the lack of instrumental accompaniment, we don’t (so he claims) smack our hands on our legs at all these days, and we dance out of order instead of in organized fashions like they used to in the times of Chazal and like women do. Since our behaviors have no relation to musical accompaniment, we’re not at all in the discussion of fixing a musical instrument. This is not the kind of thing that the Sages outlawed, and thus it is permitted.
ReplyDeleteAll this is fine and good. But note first that he could never allow playing a musical instrument on the Sabbath based on this logic. Note further that in the previous law (339:8), he took the stance of the Meiri and the Rambam that we’re dealing with one decree that is predicated on the concern that someone might fix his musical instrument on the Sabbath. Given that understanding, he was looking at an all-or-nothing proposition, and since he was only trying to explain why clapping and dancing would be okay, he clearly couldn’t operate within the confines of the decree since allowing part of the actions prohibited by the decree would logically necessitate permitting all of the other prohibited actions, and this was not his goal. He therefore had to take us out of the context of the decree altogether to permit clapping and dancing. Had he failed to do so, though, it is patently obvious that he would not have accepted the Tosafists’ leniency.
Summary-- The Talmud has two sources which would seem to be instructive on the question of playing instruments on the Sabbath. One addresses clapping, smacking one’s leg, and dancing, while the other discusses making sounds with objects. According to some of the rishonim, the prohibitions are all for the same reason and thus come as a package deal: when the prohibition on one category applies, the prohibition on the other category applies as well. None of these rishonim entertains the idea of this decree not applying in our time, and some acharonim, including the Shulchan Aruch and Aruch HaShulchan, rule like them. Other rishonim believe that there are two decrees: one to prevent making instruments and one to prevent fixing them. The Tosafists state that one can be lenient with regard to the prohibitions associated with the decree meant to prevent making instruments but not with regard to those associated with the decree to prevent fixing them. No one accepts the Tosafists’ stance as formulated. The Aruch HaShulchan comes to the conclusion that the action which the Tosafists were permitting is permitted nowadays because we are entirely out of the context of any of the rabbinic decrees, and the Rama suggests that those who take the actions described as permitted by the Tosafists may be relying on their opinion, yet ultimately the Rama forbids them.
ReplyDeleteYour contention that the prohibition is “beyond ridiculous” is itself the most supreme of all farces as it is firmly rooted in Jewish law. The question is, in truth, on those who ignore it and violate it. But, as we have observed, throughout the ages we have found Jews ignoring this injunction, and as Abaye wisely stated, it is better that they be unintentional sinners than intentional sinners.
Final thoughts-- While you may contend that the decree against repairing instruments does not apply to your complex clarinet, it is clear as day that the rabbis made no distinction in their decree between different kinds of instruments. The point is that you might come to repair any instrument, period. This idea of לא פלוג – the rabbis did not differentiate – is common and certainly no one in his right mind supposes that it does not apply here. Even if you were to suppose that one was allowed to fix a complex instrument, you would figure that Chazal should at least allude to such a notion or that any of the rishonim or acharonim should give rise to the idea, especially in later times when more complex instruments were developed. It could even be argued that simply tuning an instrument would be a kind of repair since it perfects the item, contrary to your assertion that the lack of explicit mention of such an activity implies its nonapplicability. Surely you will agree that Chazal couldn’t explicitly enumerate all theoretical cases for all of time in the Talmud but instead had to teach you the principles like makkeh b’fatish, the prohibition of completing an item. No, even a complex instrument may not be played on the Sabbath.
ReplyDeleteAs we discussed in our conversation, the psalm of David was written before this decree was enacted, so of course David did not abide by it. Moreover, as we mentioned, the psalm was written for the Levites to perform in the Temple, where rabbinic law has no bearing (Pesachim 65a, Beitzah 11b). This fact also serves to explain the verse in Numbers (10:10) to which you make reference at the end of your blog post. And your point about playing a musical instrument on the Sabbath not violating m’lachah is absolutely right: we noted at the start of this discussion, after all, that this is a rabbinic decree.
FIN DE LA LETTRE
MY TURN: Ultimately, in spite of this lengthy response, my counter-response is simple. The real reason for this prohibition is mourning the fall of the Second Temple. That reasoning lines up with the historical context, which is before the fall, we used musical instruments as a legitimate expression on Shabbos, and after 70 C.E., we didn't. The principle of "ein gozrin gezeirah al tzibbur aleh im cain rov hatzibbor yaholin la’amod ba" (We do not impose a fence unless a majority can abide by it) applies here. I have outlined that nobody abides by the entirety of this prohibition, thereby making it permissible to strike from the law books.
ReplyDeleteIf the meant refer to the same decree then it should have referred to the decree in the same way. The champion of the perspective that we are dealing with just one decree on everything. The namely that it is forbidden to clap your hands. We find this kind of behavior often in the fall of the Second Temple.
ReplyDeleteI've heard that argument from my Orthodox friends, that we are dealing with the single prohibition of clapping on Shabbos. Aside from my previously mentioned protestations, I have an equally large objection to that argument. Rabbi Moshe Isserles already overturned the ban on clapping during Shabbos (Shulchan Aruch, OH 339:3). By extension, the prohibition on musical instruments is overturned. However, as I have stated in other blog entries, the Orthodox establishment is so obsessed with "tradition for tradition's sake" that the underlying reason to uplift the ban on musical instruments is ignored. Why? If they didn't, it'd lead to the slippery slope of halachic laxness. Essentially, this preservation of the status quo is based on an unsubstantiated logical fallacy.
ReplyDeleteinstrument is art, music...
ReplyDeletenot for controversial :'(
B"H
ReplyDeleteThe real reason for not playing instruments on Shabbos is similar to the deeper reason for why we don't play shofar on Shabbos.
Delight ("taweenoog") is the highest level of the soul.
When one plays an instrument, that delight is manifested in an object in the physical universe, outside of someone.
Similar to how Hashem creates the universes, he uses Sefiros, which have oros and keilim (and everything is made, constantly, from the Torah (see ד"ה אנכי תשמ"ט), so technically the Sefiros are not only "instruments" ("keilim"), but also musical instruments.
On Shabbos, all of the universes are elevated to automatically have inherent delight, and the "lights" that are manifested in the Sefiros, are beyond the way they usually are (lights in vessels/"keilim"; rather, the lights on Shabbos are beyond keilim)..
In the beis Hamikdash, it was such a holy place that they were even able to draw down those elevated lights (that exist in shabbos) into keilim--instruments.
But outside of the Beis Hamikdash, everything is in a much lower level, so we're not able to properly draw down those intense oros into keilim of chutza laatetz (/outside mikdash), and attempting to draw down the oros into defiled keilim, chas vishalom, is a disgrace to the oros